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Preface 
1987 marked the beginning of a new phase in the process of European monetary 
integration when the Single European Act invested the Treaty of Rome itself 
with a new objective in the shape of the gradual achievement of economic and 
monetary union. However, the really decisive factor in this process will be the 
new impetus given by the Act for the completion of the single internal market. 
More explicitly, once a single financial market in which capital can move freely 
has been established, the EMS, which has proved to be an extremely effective 
instrument of convergence, will require more delicate handling and, once a sin-
gle market in which individuals and goods can move freely has been established, 
the last remaining obstacle to trade will be the continued existence of exchange 
rates. Ultimately, it was realized that the single market would not be complete 
and could not function properly without a single currency. 
The long haul to economic and monetary union therefore began again with 
renewed vigour in June 1988 when the European Council instructed a group of 
experts chaired by Mr Delors to study and propose the practical stages culminat-
ing in such a union. Since the publication of the Delors report in April 1989, 
each meeting of the European Council has provided further impetus for the 
accomplishment of EMU: in Madrid (July 1989), the conclusions of the report 
were endorsed and the date for the beginning of the first stage of EMU was set 
at l July 1990; in Strasbourg (December 1989) and Dublin (April 1990), the 
Council issued a timetable for the Intergovernmental Conference and for the 
ratification of its results; in Rome (October and December 1990), ll Member 
States - the United Kingdom continues to have reservations concerning the 
end result of the process - agreed on an overall conception of EMU based 
closely on that arrived at in the Delors report and gave the go-ahead for the 
Intergovernmental Conferences. 
All sides agree that progress at the Intergovernmental Conference on EMU has 
been greatly facilitated by the quantity and quality of the preparatory work car-
ried out: first and foremost the Delors report but also the Guigou report from the 
high-level working party on EMU, the draft Statute of the ESCB drawn up by 
the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States, the 
reports of the Monetary Committee and the European Parliament, etc. 
The Commission has also endeavoured to make a significant contribution to the 
Conference by producing the documents set out in this Bulletin. The communi-
cation of 21 August 1990 sets out the official Commission view of the whole 
concept of EMU and the transition period. 
The draft treaty transposes the Commission's views into legal terms and has 
served as the central thread for the deliberations of the Conference. Finally, the 
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comments relating to this draft treaty will enable those who are unfamiliar with 
the language of legal documents to correlate the ftrst two documents more eas-
ily. 
It is of course too soon to make an assessment of a conference which is unlikely 
to come to a close before the end of 1991. Furthermore, the 'Draft treaty on the 
union' (or 'non-paper') presented by the Luxembourg presidency at the end of 
June is based on the dominant trends which emerged during the work of the 
conferences. This document is to be seen therefore as no more than a 'snapshot' 
of the negotiations and, quite understandably, leaves many points in abeyance. 
Since the Intergovernmental Conference on EMU opened in December 1990, 
however, observers have tended to give greater emphasis to certain areas of dis-
agreement (e.g. strengthening of the ecu, the name of the new monetary institu-
tion, 'two-speed Europe', etc.) than to the swift progress made in the negotia-
tions, in which all the countries (including the United Kingdom) have played an 
active part. Indeed, very broad agreement has already been reached on a number 
of essential points: the principles and objectives of EMU, the monetary architec-
ture of Stage Ill, ways and means of improving convergence during the transi-
tion period, the conditions for the commencement of Stage 11. Moreover, a 
compromise appears to be within easy reach in other ftelds: external monetary 
policy, multilateral monitoring arrangements, conditions for transition to Stage 
Ill and so forth. 
Admittedly, disagreement subsists on a number of important aspects, the main 
examples being the attitudes to economic policy within EMU, problems con-
nected with institutional balance, the content of Stage 11, the nature of the 
monetary institution to be set up at the beginning of 1994, and the position of 
the United Kingdom, which remains favourable to the introduction of a parallel 
hard ecu as from Stage 11 as an alternative strategy to monetary union. These 
obstacles to the implementation of the conclusions reached by the European 
Council in Rome in October 1990 are not surprising. The conclusions were after 
all those of 11 countries and are far from constituting an enunciation of general 
principles for the negotiation of a treaty which will then have to be ratifted by all 
the Member States and which will condition the future of the Community as a 
whole. The conclusions of the European Council and the Council on Economic 
and Financial Affairs of June 1991 none the less provide optimistic pointers to 
the further progress of the negotiations. There are two main considerations to be 
borne in mind here: 
(i) the ftrst concerns the programmes of convergence to be set up during Stage I. 
These programmes, based on individual diagnoses of the different countries and 
encompassing all economic and monetary indicators, will be drawn up by the 
Member States for approval by the Community. This new procedure will consti-
tute a qualitative leap forward in multilateral monitoring in the sense that it will 
lead to greater transparency. 
(ii) the second concerns the danger of institutional stalemate arising from the 
United Kingdom's opposition to a single currency. Under the solution sketched 
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out in Luxembourg, the United Kingdom Government could, when ratifying the 
treaty, declare that, when the time came, transition to the final stage of monetary 
union would be put to a separate vote in the House of Commons. In any case, 
the Intergovernmental Conference had already discussed the possibility that 
special arrangements could be made for the transition of certain Member States 
through the various stages. This goes to show that the debate about a 'two-speed 
Europe' has now lost some of its immediacy. 
These advances would seem to indicate that the main obstacles to rapid progress 
towards economic and monetary union can be overcome. 
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Economic and monetary union 
Introduction 
Progress towards economic and monetary union has 
a double significance for the current development of 
the European construction. 
On the one hand, it can be seen as the natural com-
plement of the full realization of the Single European 
Act and of the realization of the 1992 objective: the 
internal market without frontiers. From an economic 
and social point of view, the Member States and the 
citizens of the European Community will only fully 
benefit from the positive effects of the creation of the 
large common market and cooperation if they can 
use a single currency - the ecu - and if they are 
capable of reinforcing their cooperation, and conse-
quently the convergence of their macroeconomic pol-
icies. 
On the other hand, to be fully effective, economic 
and monetary union requires a qualitative institu-
tional jump which will bring the Community consi-
derably nearer to a political union. How is it possible 
to envisage this union if the Member States are not in 
agreement either with its necessity or with the objec-
tives of economic and social policy? This agreement, 
which is already often expressed within the present 
framework of the functions of the Community, is 
founded on the conviction that Member States have 
a common view of their essential interests and are 
convinced that, by acting in common, they expand 
their capabilities with regard to both their own inter-
nal development and the duties which fall on them in 
external affairs. 
Thus, a new frontier is taking shape for the Com-
munity, which, in any case, needs to have the means 
for reinforcing its capacity for action and its effi-
ciency in the areas of foreign policy and of security, 
which is the other essential element for building a 
European union, and which the Single European Act 
recalls, in its preamble, constitutes the political objec-
tive of the 12 Member States. 
To advance harmoniously towards this European 
union, the Community will have to have an institu-
tional schema which meets the two imperatives of 
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efficiency of action and of democratization of the 
decision-making process. The preparation of the 
necessary amendments to the Treaty of Rome is the 
task of two Intergovernmental Conferences, one for 
economic and monetary union and the other for 
strengthening the political dimension of the Com-
munity, including the desired expansion of its pow-
ers. 
These two courses of action are therefore intercon-
nected and must lead to a common philosophy on 
the institutional framework. A constant link must 
therefore be maintained between the two series of 
negotiations in order to ensure a consensus on the 
objectives and coherent approaches to debate, demo-
cratization, decision-making and the implementation 
of decisions. 
Without doubt, this will be the occasion for a wide-
ranging debate, enriched - at least as far as the six 
founder countries are concerned -by the experience 
of nearly 40 years of living together. What can we 
learn from this short history? That the founding fath-
ers of the Community, with imagination and realism, 
devised a system which would make possible the 
gradual integration of our countries in a setting where 
the workings of the institutions are open, dynamic 
and, moreover, realistic, since every step forward 
must be ratified by the sovereign bodies of each 
country. Given the success already achieved, thanks 
in particular to the balanced working of the existing 
institutions, we must take care that, even with the 
best of intentions, we do not arrive at a system which 
is bogged down in sterile tensions between Com-
munity institutions or in irresolvable conflicts 
between Community decisions and national wishes, 
between the European Parliament and national par-
liaments. 
This consideration, which is of prime importance in 
the eyes of the Commission, has led it to suggest a 
plan for economic and monetary union which incor-
porates the basic principles of the Treaty of Rome so 
that the interest of the Community is constantly 
promoted by the European Commission, this being 
one of the roles assigned to that institution, though 
not its exclusive privilege. Having noted this, the 
decision-making mechanism is still based on the 
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Council of Ministers, while the desire for democrati-
zation leads us to recommend more active participa-
tion by the European Parliament. Alongside this 
institutional triangle the European Council is con-
firmed in its role as a driving force in the construction 
of Europe. The Court of Justice is destined to 
become more and more the court of appeal in dis-
putes over the application of the rules of the Treaty, a 
sort of embryonic constitutional court. 
This is the spirit which has inspired the Commission 
in outlining the institutional aspects of economic and 
monetary union, on the understanding that a single 
monetary policy and a single currency can only be 
managed by a single body yet to be created. This is 
the only new institution required by this plan. It has 
been conceived with two considerations in mind: 
efficiency and the principle of subsidiarity. It will 
have the independence necessary to carry out its 
mandate, the unremitting pursuit of price stability, 
which is required not only to have a strong currency 
but also to permit continuous, durable growth cre-
ating jobs and prosperity. 
The same principles will guide the European Com-
mission when, as for economic and monetary union 
in the present document, it comes to make its propo-
sals for the second Intergovernmental Conference, to 
be devoted in the European Council's own words to 
'political union'. 
Of course, nothing would have been done, nothing 
can be done, without a strong political will expressed 
clearly by the Member States. But it is worth repeat-
ing that nothing would have been done or can be 
done without an institutional system which, while 
taking account of the legitimate interests arising from 
the situation of each country, is also able to identify 
the general European interest and then to firmly 
promote it. 
The new impetus for economic and monetary union 
started with the Hanover European Council of 1988 
deciding to entrust a committee with 'the task of 
studying and proposing concrete stages leading 
towards this union'. On the basis of the Delors Com-
mittee report, the Madrid European Council decided 
one year later that Stage I of economic and monetary 
union would start on I July 1990 and asked for the 
preparation of the Treaty changes necessary for 
Stages 11 and Ill. Now, the first stage of econ-
omic and monetary union has come into effect as 
foreseen and the June European Council in Dublin 
has consolidated the drive in favour of economic and 
monetary union by noting 'that all the relevant issues 
are being fully and thoroughly clarified', by deciding 
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that the Intergovernmental Conference for agreeing 
on the necessary Treaty changes will open on 13 
December 1990, and by stating that further work 
should be carried out 'in such a way that negotiations 
on a concrete base can be entered into as soon as the 
conference opens'. 
In recent months the Commission has made contrib-
utions to the clarification of the major issues in all 
bodies concerned with the preparation of the Inter-
governmental Conference. The present communica-
tion not only presents a synthesis of the Commis-
sion's view but also attempts to build a consensus in 
bridging, as far as possible, the opinions expressed in 
these bodies. The UK Government's position has 
also recently evolved positively by accepting, in its 
'hard ecu' proposal, the necessity of a Treaty revision, 
the creation of a common monetary institution and 
that the ecu could eventually become the single cur-
rency in Europe. In this communication reference is 
made to the proposal, but it is not seen as fitting eas-
ily into the general conception, based on the Delors 
Committee recommendations, on which widespread 
agreement has emerged not only between the other 
Member States, in the Council as well as in the Com-
mittee of Central Bank Governors, but also in the 
European Parliament. 
This communication is the contribution of the Com-
mission for a full and adequate preparation of the 
Intergovernmental Conference. The Commission is 
confident that the timetable envisaged by the Dublin 
European Council of ratification before the end of 
1992 can be kept. It is therefore proposed to start 
Stage 11 on I January 1993. It is essential to make 
good use of the time until then; indeed, the frrst stage 
should make it possible to achieve a high degree of 
convergence, to reinforce monetary policy coordina-
tion and to promote the role of the ecu. The second 
stage would then become a phase of intensive prepar-
ation during which the European System of Central 
Banks would be set up. While there is already now a 
clear economic case for a short duration for the tran-
sition, the beginning of Stage Ill and the introduc-
tion of the ecu as the single currency would be the 
subject of political agreement by the European 
Council. 
For the definitive economic and monetary union, the 
communication advocates a design similar to that of 
the Delors Committee report. Economic and monet-
ary union is a whole; the European Council would 
be concerned with the overall coherence of the Com-
munity's economic and monetary policy.The Com-
mission proposes that the Treaty should designate the 
ecu explicitly as the future single currency of the 
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union. Moreover, a single monetary policy is required 
which will have to be determined in a centralized 
way by a new Community institution. The new insti-
tution would be independent and democratically 
accountable; the institution would be committed to 
the objective of price stability and, subject to the fore-
going, should support the general economic policy 
set at the Community level by the competent bodies. 
Economic union would be founded on the internal 
market, on closer coordination of economic policies 
and on the development of common policies. This 
requires a reinforcement of multilateral surveillance. 
Two rules concerning budget deficits (no monetary 
financing and no bailing-out) should be introduced 
into the Treaty. The Treaty should also state the prin-
ciple that excessive budget deficits must be avoided. 
Furthermore, two new economic policy instruments 
would be created: multiannual guidelines for econ-
omic policy to be formally endorsed by the European 
Council and a specific financial support scheme 
which would be activated when major economic 
problems arise or when economic convergence calls 
for a particular Community effort alongside national 
adjustment strategies in the sense of positive condi-
tionality. 
Common policies would be further developed in the 
economic union with the aim of improving economic 
efficiency and fostering economic and social cohe-
sion. For improving economic efficiency a growing 
Community involvement in policy areas with impor-
tant European-wide effects should be foreseen and, 
when necessary, present Treaty provisions be 
extended or modified. In the final stage of economic 
and monetary union there might also be the need to 
further strengthen Community structural policies; 
their instruments and resources would have to be 
adapted to the needs of the union. For the structural 
Funds, consideration should be given to widening 
the eligibility criteria and to endowing them with a 
greater capacity to respond more quickly and more 
flexibly. Furthermore, the new special financial sup-
port scheme might be used in favour of the cohesion 
objective on condition that this fosters economic con-
vergence more generally. 
:!· 
* * 
To put the role of the intergovernmental conference 
in its proper context, it should be recalled that at the 
same time the tonstruction of Europe is continuing 
at a rapid pace, stimulated as it is by the results 
already achieved in the economic and social spheres, 
by the implementation of the Single Act and the 
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prospects which it offers, and pushed forward as it is 
by the demands from the outside world, es-
pecially the larger Europe in the process of rapid 
change. 
More than ever since its history began, the Com-
munity is under pressure to define the level of its 
ambitions and to take up the responsibilities which 
are incumbent on a group of rich countries with their 
history, culture and material potential. 
Without awaiting the outcome of these conferences, 
the Community must therefore demonstrate its ability 
to take up these two challenges, internal and external. 
It must not let itself be diverted by its discussions on 
the two plans for the future constituted by economic 
and monetary union and political union. Indeed, it 
will not be able to put these plans into effect unless 
as the same time it reinforces the credibility of the 
objectives of the Single Act and lays the foundations 
for the new system of international relations in which 
history has reserved for it, if it has the will and the 
means, an important role alongside the other great 
world powers. 
Among the objectives which the Community has to 
achieve, only those which are fully associated with 
the success of economic and monetary union are 
mentioned here: the single market by the end of 
1992, reinforced cooperation in the fields of research 
and technology, the environment, infrastructure net-
works, the social dimension and, even more directly, 
economic and social cohesion. This last objective, 
which is written into the Single Act, is at present 
being pursued by means of structural policies aimed 
at giving each region a chance with the correspond-
ing responsibility for planning and implementing its 
own development. A first balance-sheet of these new 
policies, decided by the European Council in Febru-
ary 1988, will be drawn up by the Commission at the 
end of next year. Thus, the European Council will be 
in a position to assess the appropriateness of the 
approach, the need for adjustments or additional 
measures and the means to be allocated to the poli-
cies, in terms of both financial and human resources. 
During the same period, the European Monetary Sys-
tem will further demonstrate its essential contribution 
to economic convergence and the pursuit of Euro-
pean monetary stability in a world characterized by 
unstable foreign exchange markets and sharp fluctua-
tions in the financial sector. Together with the multi-
lateral economic surveillance exercises conducted by 
the Economic and Finance Ministers and the streng-
thened role of the Committee of Governors, the EMS 
will be one of the three pillars of Stage I of economic 
15 
and monetary union. Once again, therefore, we are 
reminded of the importance of the Community's 
day-to-day activities for the achievement of its long-
term objectives. 
1. Benefits and costs of 
economic and monetary 
union 
The economic impact of economic and monetary 
union will deeply affect the workings of the Com-
munity economy, and will go to the heart of the 
determinants of both inflation and growth. Moreover, 
its repercussions will extend as far as influencing the 
management of the world economy. 
The benefits and costs of economic and monetary 
union are the subject of an extensive analysis cur-
rently being completed by the services of the Com-
mission, with contributions from independent 
experts. This study will be published by the Commis-
sion in the near future, thus underpinning the sum-
mary presented in the following paragraphs. 
While quantification of many partial features of the 
overall economic impact will be possible, there are 
fundamental reasons why an aggregate estimate of 
the impact of economic and monetary union is not 
feasible (unlike the Cecchini report on 1992). This is 
because economic and monetary union will cause a 
very complex chain of reactions: the systemic 
changes will lead to policy changes, and both will 
condition behavioural changes in the economy, 
before arriving at the final impacts in terms of econ-
omic well-being. Much of the impact will therefore 
be indirect, and conditional on the responses of gov-
ernments as well as private economic agents. 
There will, none the less, be important linkages 
between the real economic impacts of the completion 
of the internal market by the end of 1992 and econ-
omic and monetary union. A single currency is the 
natural complement of a single market. The full 
potential of the latter will not be achieved without the 
former. Going further, there is a need for economic 
and monetary union in part to consolidate the poten-
tial gains from completing the internal market, with-
out which there could be risks of weakening the pres-
ent momentum of the 1992 process. Economic and 
monetary union therefore offers the prospect of con-
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solidating the single market as well as bringing its 
own value-added to the performance of the Com-
munity economy. 
1.1. Definition 
Economic and monetary union is a whole. The defi-
nition given here follows the Delors Committee 
report on both the monetary and economic sides. 
Monetary union is recognized as either irrevocably 
fixed exchange rates or a single currency; a single 
monetary policy is the central characteristic of both 
these regimes. The single currency is clearly the first-
best in terms of the economic benefit/ cost ratio. 
Economic union would see a much lesser centraliza-
tion of policy competences than monetary union, fol-
lowing the principle of subsidiarity. It would be 
founded on the internal market and would require 
the Community to have common economic objec-
tives and a close coordination of economic policies 
as well as the development of the common policies. 
Budgetary policies, at national and EC levels, would 
be affected in important ways as proposed below. 
For the purpose of analysing the benefits and costs of 
the definitive economic and monetary union, as just 
defined, the point of comparison must be identified. 
For this purpose, the comparison may be made with 
a Community that would have completed its 1992 
programme for the internal market and retained the 
European Monetary System (1992 plus EMS). How-
ever, this is an abstract point corresponding to stated 
ambitions. In reality such a point may not exist since, 
in the absence of expectations of progress to econ-
omic and monetary union, 1992 plus EMS might well 
prove not to be stable. This is because complete capi-
tal liberalization and exchange rate stability impose 
virtual unity of monetary policy. In other words, if 
the dynamics of economic and monetary integration 
progress are not recognized, extra costs might have to 
be borne because of difficulties in sustaining the 
present system. This means that the benefits of mov-
ing to economic and monetary union would effec-
tively be greater. 
1.2. Major benefits and costs 
These may be grouped under the following headings: 
(i) Efficiency and growth. Elimination of exchange 
rate variability, uncertainty and transaction costs, and 
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further refinements to the single market are sure to 
yield gains in efficiency. Through improving the 
risk-adjusted rate of return on capital (adjusted for 
exchange rate related risk and uncertainty factors), 
and the business climate more generally, there are 
good chances that a credible commitment to achiev-
ing economic and monetary union in the not-too-dis-
tant future will help further strengthen the trend of 
investment, growth, and employment. 
(ii) Price stability. This is an objective sine qua non 
for economic and monetary union. It is also benefi-
cial economically in its own right, for example 
through allowing the price mechanism to work effi-
ciently for resource allocation purposes. The main 
problem for policy-makers is that of attaining price 
stability at the least cost, and then maintaining it. The 
Community has the opportunity of being able to 
build its monetary union on the basis of the reputa-
tion for monetary stability of its largest national 
economy, and more recently, increasingly also of 
other narrow-band participants in the EMS. Given 
the paramount importance of credibility and expecta-
tions in winning the continuous fight against infla-
tion at the least cost, this is a great advantage. 
(iii) Public finance. A new framework of incentives 
and constraints will condition national budgetary 
policies, which will be generally conducive to 
macroeconomic discipline and stability. Economic 
and monetary union will bring valuable gains for 
many countries' national budgets through reductions 
in interest rates, as inflation and exchange risk prem-
iums are eliminated. These benefits will outweigh the 
loss of seigniorage revenue to be experienced by 
some countries. 
(iv) Employment and regional balance. The 
improved prospects for growth outlined above will 
contribute to increased employment. The main 
potential cost of economic and monetary union is 
that represented by the loss of the nominal exchange 
rate as an instrument of economic adjustment. This 
loss should not be exaggerated for several reasons: 
exchange rate changes by the Community in relation 
to the rest of the world will remain possible, whereas 
within the Community the nominal exchange rate 
instrument is already largely abandoned; far from 
freezing relative labour costs and competitiveness, 
economic and monetary union, in the right policy 
context, will encourage necessary changes, and poli-
cies at national and Community levels will also 
absorb shocks and aid adjustment. In its present 
form, the external current account constraint will dis-
appear for individual Member States which will be a 
great advantage, even if the national performance in 
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trade of goods and services will continue to have 
some influence. For the EC as a whole the constraint 
will of course remain. 
(v) The international system. With the ecu becoming 
a major international currency, there will be advan-
tages for the Community as banks and enterprises 
conduct more of their international business in their 
own currency. Moreover the monetary authorities will 
be able to economize in external reserves and achieve 
some international seigniorage gains. Economic and 
monetary union will also mean that the Community 
will be better placed, through its unity, to secure its 
interests in international coordination processes and 
negotiate for a balanced multipolar system. 
1.3. Benefits and costs in the 
processes of convergence and 
the transition 
Much progress has been made in the Community 
recently in convergence in terms of inflation, cost 
trends and sound public finance. Even the presently 
more divergent economies could plausibly now adapt 
their medium-term economic strategies to the pros-
pects of full participation in economic and monetary 
union. 
The costs of the transition to economic and monetary 
union (for example disinflation, and the reduction of 
budget deficits) for those countries would be greatly 
reduced by the setting of clear political commitments 
with fixed dates. If economic agents (public auth-
orities, companies, trade unions, individuals) perceive 
these commitments to be credible, they will anticipate 
the effects of economic and monetary union in their 
economic strategies and behaviour. Such a process 
has already been at work to advantage with the 1992 
programme, and a similar strategy could be equally 
beneficial for economic and monetary union, if not 
more so. 
Since most of the costs of moving to economic and 
monetary union arise in the preparatory stages of the 
economic and monetary union process, whereas 
some of the important benefits (elimination of 
exchange rate uncertainty and transaction costs, a 
better international system) arise only in the defini-
tive regime with a single currency, there is a clear 
economic case for a short duration for the transitional 
period. 
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As regards the regional distribution of the impact, 
which is relevant to the objective of longer-term con-
vergence of economic performance, there are no a 
priori grounds for predicting the overall pattern of 
relative gains and losses. There are risks and oppor-
tunities of different types affecting all categories of 
regions. However, social and economic cohesion 
involves the reduction of existing regional disparities 
as well as ensuring that economic and monetary 
union does not lead to any increase in disparities. 
Policy actions already seek to achieve these aims and 
to reduce locational disadvantages. The performance 
of structural and regional policies will have to be 
evaluated and if necessary be adapted and streng-
thened in the light of experience. However, the key to 
the catching-up process lies in obtaining synergies 
between Community policies (for 1992, the structural 
policies and the move to economic and monetary 
union) and national efforts to upgrade the least 
favoured regional economies and to prepare for 1992 
by supply-side measures. The fixing of clear policy 
objectives, such as for the internal market and econ-
omic and monetary union, are also highly relevant 
here for mobilizing such efforts. 
GRAPH: A business perception of the microeconomic impact of EMU 
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Opinions on the prospects for the business climate become very much 
more positive when a single currency complements the single market. 
1992 
.--Very pos11Ive 
1992 plus 
single currency 
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Source: Business survey undertaken for the Comm1ssion of the European Commumties by Ernst & Young. 
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1.4. Overall evaluation 
Summarized in tenns of the conventional distinction 
between the three major objectives of economic 
policy, the likely impact of economic and monetary 
union is: 
(i) efficiency and growth: sure advantages, as a single 
currency and economic union complements the sin-
gle market and adds to its impact. Economic analyses 
supports the perceptions of industrialists. One market 
needs one money (see Graph); 
(ii) stability: sure advantages as regards better overall 
price stability (i.e. both very low inflation on average, 
and low variability) assuming that the design of the 
system is handled well, and likely gains also in tenns 
of the stability of the real economy (lesser fluctua-
tions in output and employment); 
(iii) equity: no a priori balance of relative advantage 
for any particular type of region. Nevertheless, in the 
light of experience, structural and regional policies 
will have to be evaluated and if necessary be adapted 
and strengthened. However, the currently less well-
off regions have a real opportunity for rapid catch-
up, if they maximize potential synergies between EC 
policies (in particular the structural ones) with 
national development efforts. Economic and mon-
etary union, like 1992, is a positive-sum game. 
2. Monetary union 
2.1. The choice of a single currency 
Monetary union is fully completed with a single cur-
rency. The analysis (see Chapter I) shows that the 
advantages expected from a monetary union can 
only be reaped fully with a single currency. 
Adopting a single currency rather than having 
national currencies with irrevocably fixed exchange 
rates would not only have a symbolic character. It 
constitutes a point of no return. Also it totally elimi-
nates transaction costs. The maintenance of several 
currencies would leave in existence residual transac-
tion costs on small-sized operations, and makes mar-
ket transparency less than full. The existence of dis-
tinct capital markets would not allow the economies 
of scale associated with monetary union to be 
exploited completely. Interest rate differentials could 
subsist in particular between the long-tenn segments 
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of capital markets. Finally, Europe would not appear 
as a genuine monetary entity; it would not reap the 
external benefits linked to the emergence of the ecu 
as a major currency next to the dollar and the yen. 
The completion of the monetary union does not 
imply, however, the immediate establishment of a 
single currency, which may require a technical and 
psychological delay in order to deploy the new pay-
ment instruments and prepare the public at large to 
use them. But the final objective must be clear: 
Europe needs a single currency. This choice influ-
ences the conception of the institution that will be 
responsible for issuing and managing this currency. 
From the beginning of Stage Ill, the Community 
institution created during the preceding stage would 
be solely responsible for defining the Community's 
monetary policy. This centralization removes a priori 
any possibility of conflict between different monetary 
policies within the zone. This institution would also 
guarantee unlimited convertibility of the different 
national currencies and the fixity of their parities. 
These currencies would thus be perfectly substitut-
able and by definition there would be a single mon-
etary policy. 
2.2. General principles and 
organization 
The Community's monetary policy and the institu-
tion responsible for it need to be committed explicitly 
to the objective of price stability. Given this priority, 
they have to support the general economic policy 
objectives defined at Community level by the compe-
tent institutions. 
The stability commitment needs to be written into the 
basic legislative texts. But in order to be fully 
credible, the new Community monetary system also 
needs to enjoy a high degree of independence vis-a-
vis national governments and other Community bod-
ies. This independence should concern the system, 
which would include the existing national central 
banks, its working conditions and its agents. The 
appropriate means to meet this requirement are of 
two types: on the one hand, the freedom not to have 
to take measures likely to compromise the fundamen-
tal stability objective; and, on the other hand, the 
duration of the mandate as well as the appointment 
and dismissal conditions with regard to the persons 
called upon to serve the institution. In addition to 
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Community legislation, national proviSions should 
be adopted to ensure that the central banks enjoy the 
necessary independence vis-a-vis national authorities. 
The Community monetary institution needs to be 
democratically accountable for its actions. This prin-
ciple is the necessary corollary of its independence, in 
order to make the policies defined by the institution 
acceptable to political representatives and to public 
opinion at large. The democratic legitimacy of this 
institution would stem from both the legal provision 
creating it (a treaty submitted to ratification by the 
national parliaments) and the method of appoint-
ment of its president and the board members, which 
will be designated by the European Council after 
consultation with the European Parliament. 
Reports would be presented periodically to the Euro-
pean Council and the European Parliament. The 
president of the institution would be responsible for 
explaining its policies generally and to the Com-
munity institutions: the President of the Council and 
a Member of the Commission would attend meetings 
of the decision-making body of the monetary institu-
tion. The Commission would make observations 
which, in its view, relate to the consistency between 
monetary policy and the general economic policies 
adopted at Community level. 
Taking into account the nature of the Community 
and the long experience of the national central 
banks, the new monetary institution should have a 
federal structure and comprise the existing national 
central banks and a central body. The system as a 
whole could be called the European System of Cen-
tral Banks (or, in brief, 'Eurofed'). Eurofed would be 
placed under the authority of a Council composed of 
the 12 governors of the Community central banks 
and of a smaller number of members from the central 
body, called the board of directors (in brief 'board'). 
The Eurofed Council would be respdnsible for deter-
mining the Community's monetary policy: it could 
for example set main rates and define intermediate 
objectives. The Council would meet periodically and 
as often as necessary, in order to determine the 
monetary policy stance. It would decide by simple 
majority of its members' votes (one man, one vote). 
The board would be responsible for the day-to-day 
conduct of monetary policy on the basis of the 
instructions given by the Council. It would manage 
the central body which would have the necessary 
capital and sufficient staff to analyse all aspects of 
the common monetary policy and follow monetary 
trends. The members of the board would be 
20 
appointed because of their professional competence. 
Their mandate should be of long duration and irrev-
ocable.The president would be a member of the 
board: he would represent Eurofed. 
This set of provisions will ensure to Eurofed the 
necessary credibility for the effectiveness of its action. 
2.3. Internal monetary policy and 
the ecu 
For the conduct of the Community monetary policy 
Eurofed will be endowed with the means and powers 
necessary to use the whole range of monetary policy 
instruments including open-market operations, repur-
chase operations, intervention rates, reserve require-
ments, etc. The regulation of the monetary conditions 
will be made by recourse to market-oriented instru-
ments, mainly open-market operations. 
The ongoing process of European financial integra-
tion reinforces the trend towards homogeneous finan-
cial structures and more uniform methods of mon-
etary regulation. Monetary union eliminates the bor-
ders between the national monetary areas: financial 
instruments of the same nature with identical risks 
will become perfectly substitutable and provide a 
unified market where there will only remain one 
interest rate. In this context any intermediate objec-
tive of the Eurofed can only be defined on a Com-
munity basis. 
The policy defined by the Council of Eurofed will be 
carried out by the national central banks as executive 
agents under the authority of the board of directors of 
Eurofed. With the adoption of instruments compat-
ible with indirect monetary regulation (as defined 
above), the risk of endangering the coherence of 
monetary policy will be eliminated. Their instruments 
will be compatible, even if, at least initially, they still 
reflect certain specific national characteristics. In 
other words, a single currency regime will allow a cer-
tain differentiation in the technical modalities of how 
to implement the monetary policy defined at Com-
munity level, it being understood that the national 
central banks will no longer have any room for man-
oeuvre in fixing the interest rate applicable to the 
zone in its entirety. 
The final responsibility for the payment system will 
be with the Council of Eurofed. But, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, the national central 
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banks will be responsible for the proper functioning 
of the national payment systems, the links with 
national financial institutions and the business com-
munities, the surveillance of the market, etc. 
The irrevocable fixing of exchange rates will deprive 
the basket formula for the ecu of all significance. As 
a genuine currency the ecu would become the refer-
ence unit for non-Community currencies. The contin-
ued existence of national currencies in the Com-
munity will at this stage have mainly a symbolic 
significance; it will be technically justified during the 
period necessary for putting the Community money 
(coins and bank notes in ecus) into circulation and 
for linking the payment systems. 
But the introduction of a single currency character-
izes the full monetary union: the ecu will be that sin-
gle currency. It will have the full status of a genuine 
currency and be a symbol of the unity of the mon-
etary area: it will be issued solely on the authority of 
Eurofed, circulating as the denominator of economic 
and financial transactions in the area and will be 
legal tender. At the changeover to the ecu as a single 
currency, all credits and debts previously denomi-
nated in national currency will have to be converted 
into this new unit. This conversion can take place 
smoothly given that the interest rates attached to the 
different currencies will have been equalized at the 
time of the fixing of the parities. 
2.4. The ecu and external monetary 
policy 
The ecu will also have an important role to play in 
the international monetary system. For the Com-
munity the development of the ecu as a major world 
currency will involve an increasing use of the ecu in 
international transactions, the possibility of benefit-
ing from the seigniorage accruing to the issuer of an 
externally held currency, portfolio shifts in favour of 
ecu-denominated assets as a result of a diversification 
process, and finally the possibility to hold a smaller 
amount of foreign exchange reserves. 
Economic and monetary union will give the Com-
munity an appropriate role in the design and man-
agement of a more stable and responsible interna-
tional monetary system. For this the Community 
should be represented on the international scene in 
an analogous way to individual countries, i.e. by 
those responsible for economic policy, assisted by the 
monetary authority- Eurofed. 
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Because the exchange rate is an important element of 
external economic policy, external monetary relations 
have a double aspect, monetary in a narrow sense 
and economic. They therefore require the participa-
tion of two actors, the monetary authority and the 
body responsible for economic policy. Existing 
models vary from one country to another. The Ger-
man or US examples show a different sharing of res-
ponsibility in the definition of an exchange rate and 
intervention policy. In the USA the executive is in 
charge; the German model gives more weight to the 
central bank. The discussions have revealed some 
differences of opinion on this point. While there is 
unanimous agreement that the choice of the 
exchange rate regime and the negotiation of interna-
tional monetary agreements should continue to be a 
matter for the political authorities, assisted by 
Eurofed, there is some disagreement about the alloca-
tion of responsibilities for exchange rate and inter-
vention policy. 
However, it is important that the exchange rate policy 
should be defined in a framework of close coopera-
tion and that it should follow some basic principles: 
especially that foreign exchange interventions vis-a-
vis third currencies should not be in contradiction 
with the principal objective of monetary policy, i.e. 
price stability. Interventions in the markets for for-
eign exchange and the daily management of foreign 
exchange reserves could be conducted on the basis of 
instructions from the board of Eurofed. The board 
should be able to decide to use the reserves put at its 
disposal for its own interventions or to request the 
intermediation of a central bank. 
3. Economic union 
3.1. Principles, objectives and 
coherence 
There does not need to be a single economic policy 
in the same way as for monetary policy, and corres-
pondingly there is not the same need for institutional 
change. Even in mature federations economic policy 
is made up of different functions and is conducted at 
different levels of government. In such federations, 
the principle of subsidiarity is an important criterion 
for assigning functions to the different levels of gov-
ernments implying that it has not only a theoretical 
but also a solid empirical foundation. 
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The Community's involvement in economic deci-
sion-making should be based on a balance between 
subsidiarity and parallelism. Most economic policy 
functions will remain the preserve of Member States 
even in the final stage of economic and monetary 
union. 
None the less there should be agreement at the Com-
munity level on the principal objectives of economic 
policy as they feature already in the Treaty: a har-
monious development of economic activities, a con-
tinuous and balanced expansion, an increase in 
stability, an accelerated raising of the standards of 
living, and economic and social cohesion. These 
objectives should be pursued within the framework 
of flexible market-oriented economies and of price 
stability. The latter, of course, is the main objective of 
monetary policy. 
Member States and the Community should be com-
mitted to conduct their economic policies in such a 
way as to attain these objectives. The Community's 
potential contribution to their attainment will be dis-
cussed under the headings of efficiency, cooperation 
and economic and social cohesion. 
The sound functioning of economic and monetary 
union will require coherence between these three 
aspects (efficiency, cooperation and cohesion) of 
economic union as well as coherence between the 
monetary and economic aspects of the union. Coher-
ence within the economic union requires a decision-
making capacity such that the determination of 
policy at Community level avoids inefficient overlap-
ping and contradictions in the various aspects of 
economic policy. The European Council should 
ensure coherence, and more operational cooperation 
should be established between the Ecofin Council, 
the Commission and the European Parliament. The 
Economic and Social Committee should be con-
sulted on matters of its competence. 
For the Ecofin Council to make economic policy 
effectively does not warrant major changes in institu-
tional powers. The Council has the capacity to act in 
the legislative and budgetary domains, as well as 
assure coordination. With the increased responsibili-
ties of the economic and monetary union, these func-
tions may be expected to develop strongly, but within 
the existing institutional framework. 
For the consistency between the economic and 
monetary aspects the Commission will have the res-
ponsibility to make observations, and there will be 
cross-participation of the representatives of the deci-
sion-making bodies (see Section 5 below on institu-
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tional aspects). A particular responsibility of the 
Ecofin Council will be to define in cooperation with 
Eurofed the Community's external economic and 
monetary policy. 
3.2. Efficiency 
The main pillar of economic union is the completed 
internal market within which persons, goods, services 
and capital move freely. In order to exploit fully the 
potential of the internal market, the Community 
should deepen the drive to improve resource alloca-
tion and competitivity, and stimulate innovation 
through research and technology and entrepreneur-
ship. To this end the Community's involvement in 
policy areas with important European-wide effects 
should grow. These concern in particular competition 
policy, commercial policy, research and technological 
development, European-wide infrastructure, labour 
markets, the environment, and some aspects of taxa-
tion. 
Competition policy and commercial policy have 
already an important place in the Treaties, but their 
importance will increase with the completion of the 
internal market, the realization of economic and 
monetary union and the increasing cooperation with 
other European countries including those of Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
The Treaty also provides a legal base for some Com-
munity involvement in research and development, 
European-wide infrastructure, labour markets, the 
environment and taxation. Policy advances can, to 
some extent, be obtained on the basis of the present 
Treaty provisions. However, judging from experience 
there is the risk that the existing base would not lead 
to desired progress. In the Commission's view it 
would be against the principle of parallelism if major 
progress in the monetary field would not go hand in 
hand with considerably strengthened Community 
policies in these fields which are crucial for the over-
all economic efficiency of the European economy. It 
might therefore be necessary to extend or modify the 
present Treaty provisions for at least some of these 
policy areas. 
The decision-making rule of unanimity could prove 
to be a major obstacle for sufficient progress in the 
fields of research and technological development, the 
environment and aspects of taxation, for all of which 
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a strong economic case can be made for a more sub-
stantial Community involvement. 
Research and technological development has an 
important role to play for increasing the competitive-
ness of European industry. The Community's grow-
ing involvement should reduce the fragmentation of 
national efforts, increase the coherence in long-term 
strategic objectives and exploit economies of scale. 
Community environmental policy becomes more 
important in the context of the internal market for 
two reasons. First, it can be misused by Member 
States as an instrument to create a new segmentation 
of markets in Europe. Secondly, allocative efficiency 
in economic terms becomes more and more inter-
related with ecological efficiency. 
In the field of taxation the necessary harmonization 
for the completion of the internal market has so far 
progressed slowly and has given rise to considerable 
difficulties. In economic union, competitive pressures 
with regard to taxes on mobile factors will intensify. 
In order to cope with these pressures, Community 
involvement might need to be stepped up, since 
otherwise revenues from such taxes might be con-
siderably eroded. 
The Community should also have the responsibility, 
through a combination of coordination efforts and its 
own interventions, to see that the internal market 
enjoys European-wide infrastructures that reach the 
highest standards attained within Member States. The 
creation of specific Treaty provisions providing a uni-
fied legal base for Community action, in particular 
with respect to highways and railways, telecommuni-
cations and energy distribution networks, could 
greatly facilitate real progress in this area allowing a 
cheaper and faster circulation of goods, services and 
information. This is also highly relevant for the objec-
tive of cohesion. 
Labour markets will have to be adapted further. The 
essential responsibility for wage determination will 
remain with the social partners. The Community 
should have some role in encouraging the adoption 
by labour markets of the best observed practices for 
labour market management. This concerns especially 
mobility, permanent education, training systems, the 
introduction of new technologies and efficient meth-
ods of collective bargaining. The Community should 
also seek to give concrete substance to the Social 
Charter while enhancing the capacity of national 
labour markets to adjust to competitive pressures in 
an efficient way. 
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3.3. Cooperation 
Cooperation between Member States and the Com-
munity covering all aspects of economic policy is an 
essential feature of economic union. This has already 
been recognized in Council Decision 90/ 141 /EEC 
on 'the attainment of progressive convergence of 
economic policies and performance during Stage I of 
economic and monetary union' where it has been 
agreed that multilateral surveillance will cover all 
aspects of economic policy. 
Taking account of the learning by doing foreseen in 
the Council Decision, cooperation should be further 
strengthened in the final stage of economic and 
monetary union. For this purpose, the following spe-
cific cooperation instruments are proposed: 
(i) pluriannual economic policy guidelines; 
(ii) reinforced multilateral surveillance of economic 
policy, including rules for budget deficits; 
(iii) a special financial support scheme. 
The pluriannual economic policy guidelines would 
be drafted each year by the CommissioQ on the basis 
of a global evaluation of the economic development 
of the Community and of every Member State. They 
would set general economic targets for the Com-
munity and identify the means to realize them. For 
enhancing the compatibility of Member States' 
economic policies, specific reference would be made 
to public finance policies, labour market develop-
ments, and national structural policies. The guide-
lines would be submitted to the Ecofin Council and 
endorsed by the European Council, which would 
also be concerned with the overall coherence of the 
Community's economic and monetary policy. 
Within the framework of the pluriannual guidelines, 
multilateral surveillance would be reinforced in the 
light of the experience acquired during Stage I. In the 
Treaty a new legal basis for this coordination instru-
ment should be provided for, amending the present 
Article 103. This should allow the contents of and 
procedures for multilateral surveillance to be rede-
fined by secondary legislation. 
Multilateral surveillance should be open-ended in its 
coverage of all aspects of economic policy and per-
formance that significantly affect Community objec-
tives. The surveillance would include analyses of sup-
ply and demand trends, price and cost developments, 
competitivity, employment, regional development, 
public finance, financial markets and the ·underlying 
economic policy orientations. Multilateral surveil-
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lance would monitor the economic conditions, pros-
pects and policies in the Member States. Periodically, 
a global assessment of Member States' economic per-
formance would be made. This would include a 
review of budgetary policies including an evaluation 
whether a deficit is excessively high. 
If the global assessment is not satisfactory, a gradual 
system of incentives for policy adaptation would 
come into play. In normal circumstances, the quality 
and efficiency of the analysis would provide a basis 
for change. This could be complemented with an 
attempt to reach agreement in the context of confi-
dential peer-group pressure. Beyond that, formal 
recommendations would be made which could lead 
to public declarations. In addition, the special finan-
cial support scheme (further outlined below) could 
play a significant role, relying on positive condition-
ality, in bringing about policy adjustments since it 
would help the Member State to overcome particular 
economic difficulties. 
The threat to monetary stability and the sustainability 
of the union represented by excessively high levels of 
deficits and debt and the method of deficit financing 
(i.e. pressure for monetary accommodation, or insta-
bility of the financial system) is a matter of special 
concern. While other matters of common interest 
such as normal macroeconomic policy interactions 
can be adequately covered within the multilateral 
surveillance process, the potential threat of budget 
deficits and their financing to monetary stability 
requires additional provisions. It is therefore pro-
posed that two rules should feature in the Treaty: 
(a) no monetary financing of public deficits or mar-
ket privileges for the public authorities concerning 
the placing of public debt; 
(b) no bailing-out; in the case of imbalances, a 
Member State could not benefit from an uncondi-
tional guarantee concerning its public debt either 
from the Community or from another Member State. 
With respect to the method of financing, Member 
States' external borrowing in non-EC currencies 
should also be a matter of Community concern given 
its potential impact on the monetary policy of the 
Community. While external financing shuld not be 
forbidden, Eurofed and the Commission would 
closely monitor its development and the Council 
would be empowered to recommend policy changes 
in the framework of multilateral surveillance. 
In addition, excessive budget deficits may endanger 
the stability-oriented monetary policy. As a matter of 
principle, excessive budget deficits therefore must be 
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avoided and this should be stated in the Treaty. In 
practice, the judgment whether a deficit is excessive 
is related to the sustainability of the fiscal position, 
which cannot be evaluated in isolation from an over-
all assessment of the economic situation and 
development, and should therefore be an integral 
part of multilateral surveillance. Nevertheless, some 
yardstick would seem necessary for the identification 
of excessive deficits. Despite its definitional short-
comings, the golden rule of public finance, i.e. that 
public borrowing shall not exceed investment 
expenditure, appears the most satisfactory from an 
analytical point of view and is the only one widely 
applied in existing federations. Complementary to 
this rule, other objective criteria, such as the deficit 
and debt to GDP ratios might prove helpful in this 
context. These rules and criteria will have to be laid 
down in the Council regulation covering multilateral 
surveillance. 
A special financial support scheme would be prov-
ided for in the Treaty, amending the present Article 
108. The scheme would be activated when major 
economic problems arise in one or several Member 
States or when economic convergence calls for a 
particular Community effort alongside national 
adjustment strategies in the sense of positive condi-
tionality. The initiative for activating the scheme 
could come from the Member State concerned as 
well as from the Commission. The Council would 
decide the conditions and details of the support 
when a case arises, including the need for coherence 
with multilateral surveillance concerning budget defi-
cits. The support could be given through grants from 
the Community budget or through loans from a 
Community financial instrument. 
3.4. Economic and social cohesion 
It is essential to ensure that the beneficial effects of 
economic and monetary union are felt in all parts of 
the Community and thus contribute to cohesion. 
Unduly large regional imbalances would pose an 
economic as well as a political threat to the union. 
For this reason particular attention has to be paid to 
an effective Community policy aimed at narrowing 
regional and structural disparities and promoting a 
balanced development throughout the Community. 
The Community's existing instruments are already 
making a substantial contribution to the cohesion 
objective, as is the greater economic activity asso-
ciated with the Single Act and the completion of the 
internal market. Pluriannual programmes for the 
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development of backward regions and of those 
requiring reconversion have been established by these 
regions and cover many aspects that are necessary for 
the adaptation and development of their economies. 
Concrete experience of this new approach, which was 
adopted by the Council in February 1988, has now 
begun. At the end of 1991 the Commission will make 
a full assessment of the structural policies, and make 
recommendations on their continuation and further 
improvement. 
The effects of economic and monetary integration 
may be at least as beneficial for the less-developed 
regions as for the more prosperous. A greater amount 
of inward investment may, for example, be attracted 
by their comparative advantages. The trend towards 
service industries and high-value manufactured prod-
ucts is already reducing the importance of transport 
costs in location decisions. However, some historical 
experience suggests that regions within an economic 
and monetary union can be disadvantaged over long 
periods of time unless sufficient measures are taken. 
In the final stage of EMU there might be a need to 
further strengthen Community structural policies. 
Instruments and resources would be adapted to the 
needs of the union. In addition, considerations of 
absorptive capacity, as well as more general consider-
ations, may point in favour of widening eligibility cri-
teria, such as for education, for support to the least 
favoured Member States. 
While adjustment in the Community exchange rate 
can absorb external shocks to some extent, the 
exchange rate can no longer be used by individual 
Member States as a policy instrument to deal with a 
loss of competitiveness or to adjust to adverse econ-
omic shocks. The adjustment must therefore take 
place in a different form, for example through labour 
market flexibility and policy measures. The structural 
Funds could also be endowed with a greater capacity 
to respond more quickly and more flexibly. Further-
more in such circumstances a conditional Com-
munity support as outlined above in the section on 
cooperation could be activated. 
3.5. Consequences for Community 
finance 
Community finance should reflect and support the 
gradually increasing Community contribution to the 
attainment of the principal economic policy objec-
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tives related to efficiency, cooperation and economic 
and social cohesion. Such a gradual increase would 
not imply a large-scale transfer of major expenditure 
responsibilities from the national to the Community 
level but would nevertheless require a significant 
development of Community finan~al activity in the 
form of expenditure from the Community budget 
and of loans from Community financial instruments. 
As a consequence, the Community's own-resources 
system and the budgetary responsibilities of the 
Community institutions will have to be adapted to 
the needs of the economic union. 
The development of Community financial activity 
would have two dimensions: an extension of the vol-
ume of budgetary expenditure and of loans and a 
more flexible use of the financial means. The exten-
sion would reflect the growing Community involve-
ment in areas with important European-wide effects 
related to internal as well as external policy require-
ments. The greater flexibility is necessary in view of 
the growing concern about economic convergence, 
including economic and social cohesion, which 
might be threatened by unforeseen economic shocks. 
Greater Community responsibility on the expenditure 
side would have to go hand in hand with an 
increased capacity on the revenue side of the Com-
munity budget. Moreover, the Community's loan 
instruments would have to adjust their activities to 
the needs of the economic union implying in parti-
cular a closer and more effective combination with 
budgetary expenditure. The role and intervention 
modalities of the EIB will also have to be examined 
in this context. Moreover, the need for greater flexi-
bility on the expenditure side of the budget would 
have to have its counterpart on the revenue side 
involving an adaptation of the present own-resources 
system. 
Greater flexibility of Community finance would 
require more discretionary powers of the Community 
institutions, in particular as regards the revenue side 
of the budget. More generally, the budgetary proce-
dure should be reviewed in order to achieve a better 
balance of responsibilities between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission; a bal-
ance which should more explicitly recognize the 
Commission's role already manifest in the 1982 and 
1988 agreements. A substitute for the present bal-
ance-of-payments loans facility should be devised 
and its funding extended to budgetary means. 
Within the framework of multilateral surveillance the 
contribution of the Community budget and its bor-
rowing and lending activities to the policy objectives 
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and to economic policy-making should be assessed 
and consideration be given to improve their cost/ 
benefit ratio in the various functions affecting econ-
omic performance and competitivity. 
4. Transition 
4.1. The general conception 
The transition is referred to as the time-span between 
now and the beginning of the third stage of economic 
and monetary union; four main elements can be con-
sidered as essential: 
(i) the transition should be short for the reasons out-
lined below; 
(ii) Community achievements, notably concerning 
economic convergence, economic and monetary 
policy coordination and the consolidation of the 
EMS, should be reinforced; 
(iii) Eurofed should be created as a new Community 
institution; 
(iv) the use of the ecu should be stepped up and its 
development further encouraged. 
In fact, the process leading to the achievement of 
economic and monetary union has already been 
embarked upon. The ftrst stage started officially on I 
July 1990. Concerning the necessary Treaty amend-
ments for Stages li and Ill, the Dublin European 
Council of 25 and 26 June 1990 stated that the inter-
governmental conference 'should conclude its work 
rapidly with the objective of ratification of the results 
by Member States before the end of 1992'. This 
strong impulse reflects an increasing convergence of 
viewpoints on the possibility and necessity for a 
rapid transition towards a complete monetary union. 
Indeed: 
(a) in the fteld of convergence, faster progress than 
expected can be observed, certainly for the countries 
participating in the exchange rate mechanism; 
(b) current developments are buoyant. The dynamics 
of the completion of the single market should be 
'capitalized', and the political zest and expectations 
due to the events in Eastern Europe, in particular 
German monetary unification, should be profited 
from; 
(c) the period ahead contains risks of instability due 
to the gap between the achievement of financial inte-
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gration, which facilitates currency substitution and 
financial mobility, and the completion of monetary 
union. Furthermore, as convergence increases, other 
currencies join the German mark in its role as anchor 
of the system. This calls for a multilateral approach to 
monetary regulation; 
(d) finally, the analysis of costs and benefits of 
economic and monetary union shows more clearly 
the gains of the union and especially of the adoption 
of a single currency. In most important respects, the 
Community already shows a homogeneity compa-
rable to existing monetary unions; the dynamics of 
the single market will bring it even closer to being an 
optimum currency area. 
For these reasons, the Commission proposes that the 
transition should proceed as follows: 
(i) Stage I is important; it should make it possible to 
achieve a high degree of convergence, to reinforce 
monetary policy coordination and to promote the 
role of the ecu; 
(ii) Stage II would be a phase of intensive prepara-
tion, both technically and legally, especially of the 
monetary union. During this phase, Eurofed would 
be set up; the secondary legislation emanating from 
the Treaty would be adopted. This stage should start 
on I January 1993, i.e. at the same time as the com-
pletion of the internal market and immediately after 
the ratification of the Treaty revisions; 
(iii) from the start of Stage lll, Eurofed would be 
entirely responsible for the single monetary policy, 
and the provisions flowing from the Treaty revision 
would be applied. The timing of the beginning of 
Stage III and the introduction of a single currency, 
desirable as soon as possible, would be the subject of 
political agreement by the European Council based 
on an assessment of the results achieved during the 
transition in terms of market integration, converg-
ence, including economic and social cohesion, and 
economic policy coordination; 
(iv) with regard to the participation of some Member 
States there might be a need for safeguard clauses 
during the transition. Moreover, there could be a 
degree of flexibility concerning the date on which 
some Member States would join in all arrangements 
of Stage lll, this flexibility should be expressed in 
terms of specific transitory provisions within Stage 
Ill. Member States making use of this flexibility 
could have representatives in Eurofed without them 
having the right of vote. 
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The UK Government has recently put forward its 
ideas on the transition. According to this proposal a 
'hard ecu' would be issued in parallel to the national 
currencies by a 'European Monetary Fund' created to 
this end. Representing a positive development of the 
previous proposal of the British Treasury ('An evolu-
tionary approach to EMU'), it favours a new Treaty, 
the creation of a common monetary institution, and 
of exchange-rate policy coordination vis-a-vis third 
currencies; it also accepts that the ecu could even-
tually become the single currency in Europe. This is 
therefore an important commitment to the creation of 
an economic and monetary union in Europe and it 
should be welcomed as a political confirmation of 
the Madrid and Dublin Summits. 
Nevertheless, the proposal does not fit easily into the 
conception of the transition outlined above. In fact, 
the complexity of its implementation and its uncer-
tain success would make it hardly suited for an 
advantageous rapid transition. In addition, the pro-
posal would not help to reduce the existing differ-
ences between national monetary concepts and 
instruments and does not build on the existing multi-
lateral cooperation between central banks. The tech-
nical aspects related to the ecu are discussed below in 
Section 4.5. 
4.2. What is at stake in Stage I? 
(a) The completion of the internal 
market 
The completion of the internal market by the end of 
1992 will mean the elimination of all physical, tech-
nical, fiscal and financial frontiers in the Community. 
Two-thirds of the necessary measures have already 
been adopted; in particular, the free movement of 
capital is a reality for eight of the 12 Member States, 
in accordance with the timetable originally foreseen. 
The advantages expected from the 1992 deadline, in 
terms of increased efficiency in the allocation of capi-
tal, reduced costs arising from intensified competi-
tion and faster growth, are likely to influence the 
expectations and behaviour of private and public 
economic operators and have certainly played a part 
in the recent improvement of the Community's 
economic situation. 
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(b) Intensified economic 
convergence 
The process of convergence has already made ad-
vances in recent years and further progress can be 
expected as a result of the new arrangements decided 
by the Council in March (Decision 90/141/EEC): 
(i) multilateral surveillance has been established, 
covering all aspects of economic policy in both the 
short- and medium-term perspectives. In the context 
of surveillance, special attention will be given to the 
evolution of employment, prices and costs, competi-
tivity, wage-fixing processes and budgets. Member 
States must also demonstrate that their policies 
remain coherent with the implementation of the Sin-
gle Act and that they are making proper use of the 
structural Funds. The effectiveness of multilateral 
surveillance relies mainly on the exercise of 'peer 
pressure' and on the degree of transparency achieved. 
There must be a passage from the implicit to the 
explicit, which will have far-reaching economic and 
political consequences; 
(ii) this decision also opens up the possibility of spe-
cifically monitoring the development of budgetary 
policies. Thus, countries where convergence is jeopar-
dized would be encouraged to present medium-term 
strategies (including for their budgets) for reducing 
their disequilibria to levels compatible with participa-
tion in the subsequent stages of the process of union. 
These strategies should include the evolution of 
revenue and expenditure, deficits and the outstand-
ing public debt which would be discussed and, if 
necessary, amended, during the second half of 1991. 
Thereafter, Member States should inform the Com-
munity about the measures they intend to take. 
Moreover, recent advances with respect to the objec-
tive of economic and social cohesion should con-
tinue; the increasing assistance of Community struc-
tural policies should provide an efficient underpin-
ning for the necessary further progress. Their assess-
ment at the end of 1991 provides the opportunity to 
take stock of the degree to which disparities between 
the various regions and the backwardness of the 
least-favoured regions have been reduced. 
(c) Coordination of monetary 
policies 
Monetary policies must be more closely coordinated 
during Stage I. The completion of financial integra-
27 
tion (especially the liberation of capital movements) 
and the objective of exchange-rate stability in the 
EMS reduce the real autonomy of national monetary 
policies and call for common responses to externally 
generated shocks (in particular fluctuations in non-
EMS currencies). The Committee of Governors must 
already prefigure the future Community monetary 
institution which will be set up at the beginning of 
the second stage. The existing institutional frame-
work offers the necessary margins of manoeuvre for 
the development of coordination and makes it poss-
ible to begin the learning phase of the common mon-
etary policy. 
A decisive step forward in cooperation between the 
central banks will be accomplished with the introduc-
tion of explicit ex-ante coordination of monetary pol-
icies, accompanied by regular ex-post monitoring 
exercises. During this ftrst stage, the technical aspects 
of such an exercise are, doubtless, less important than 
the procedure itself. Indeed, the Member States will 
continue to take a variety of objectives as reference 
points (monetary aggregates, domestic credit, 
exchange rates, etc.) and one task of the Committee 
of Governors, now with permanent structures, will be 
precisely to reduce the differences between the var-
ious concepts and instruments. Nevertheless, the 
simultaneous announcement of their objectives by 
the national central banks will be a tangible sign of 
the beginnings of a Community policy in the eyes of 
the public and the markets. 
(d) Evaluation of the results 
of Stage I 
At the end of Stage I, i.e. at the end of 1992, the 
Commission would submit a report to the European 
Council on the progress on economic and monetary 
union. The report would contain an in-depth econ-
omic evaluation of the results of the ftrst stage in 
terms of deepened integration in goods, services, cap-
ital and labour markets; intensified economic con-
vergence; strengthened economic and social cohe-
sion; and improved policy coordination. In addition, 
recommendations would be put forward in the report 
for overcoming difficulties that might have occurred 
during the ftrst stage. The aim should be to enable all 
Member States to participate in a rapid transition to 
the definitive economic and monetary union. 
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4.3. Consolidation of the EMS 
The EMS should be further consolidated. As far as 
the exchange rate mechanism is concerned, the 
Basle/Nyborg agreements of September 1987 have 
shown the way by widening the possibilities for the 
central Banks to make use of very short-term financ-
ing and by strengthening the role of the ecu in the 
Community's support mechanisms. There is a stead-
ily increasing tendency for central banks to concert 
their interventions in the foreign exchange markets. 
During the first stage, all the Community currencies 
should be brought into the narrow band of the 
exchange rate mechanism. Thus, Spain could quickly 
give up its 6% margin as Italy did last January. For its 
part, the British Government recently let it be under-
stood publicly that an early entry of the pound ster-
ling into the ERM was likely, The entry of Portugal 
and Greece into the mechanism will depend on the 
degree of convergence which they achieve. Rigorous 
economic policy programmes, supported by the large 
transfers of resources from which these countries ben-
efit, could lead to entry before the second stage. 
The enlargement of the exchange rate mechanism is 
essential for the creation of uniform monetary condi-
tions throughout the area and for its credibility with 
respect to non-EMS currencies. Thus, the ecu, in 
whose composition the pound sterling accounts for 
13% of the total, would gain in terms of stability and 
would be given further impetus. 
4.4. The creation of the new 
monetary institution 
The main characteristic of Stage 11 will be the estab-
lishment of a new Community monetary institution, 
called the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), or Eurofed. In the UK paper it is also pro-
posed to set up a new monetary institution called the 
European Monetary Fund (EMF). 
During the second stage the national central banks 
will retain the ultimate responsibility for the conduct 
of monetary policy. This does not imply the creation 
of an 'empty shell'. This will be a period of intensive 
learning during which the central body of Eurofed 
must participate actively in the management of the 
EMS and of foreign exchange reserves as well as hav-
ing a pivotal role to play in the coordination of the 
activities of the central banks; it should also take 
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over the task of the European Monetary Cooperation 
Fund. Eurofed should increasingly play an active 
part in the coordination of monetary policy including 
the determination of interest rates and the definition 
of monetary objectives. The statistical, operational, 
regulatory and logistical instruments to conduct a sin-
gle monetary policy will be set up and tested. It 
would also be in charge of making the necessary 
preparations for the ecu to become the single cur-
rency. 
There is no contradiction between Eurofed's role in 
the second stage and its legal status. On the one 
hand, it is clear that a purely legal conception of 
monetary sovereignty, already very much a formal 
matter in the EMS, will no longer have much signifi-
cance when the Member States are on the verge of 
entering fully into the monetary union. On the other 
hand, it should be said that internal conflicts in the 
Eurofed are likely to be the exception in a context 
where the objectives will be fixed by agreement and 
where the central body will exert collective pressure 
to correct deviations from guidelines voluntarily 
agreed to at the outset. 
4.5. The ecu 
As has been argued above, a single currency is an 
essential feature of economic and monetary union. In 
the same way as it is not acceptable that the single 
monetary policy should be determined by one of the 
existing national central banks, it is not desirable that 
the single currency should be one of the existing 
national currencies. Furthermore it should not be a 
new 13th currency. For these reasons and because 
public acceptance should be improved, introducing a 
new monetary denomination, however, requires time 
and management. Existing arrangements for the ecu 
should therefore be built upon as much as possible. 
The ecu is already to some extent the common cur-
rency of Europe. It is a basket of the various national 
currencies. But it is also destined to become Europe's 
single currency. With this in mind, it is necessary to 
consider how its use can be increased during the tran-
sition and to define clearly its position in relation to 
national currencies and to encourage its develop-
ment. 
The expansion of the role of the ecu in commercial 
transactions and in the markets requires a strong 
impetus from the national and Community public 
authorities. This impetus could take several forms: 
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(a) the removal of all legal and regulatory obstacles 
to its private use; in particular, economic agents must 
be allowed freely to make legally binding contracts in 
ecus; 
(b) the generalization of the use of the ecu in the 
operation ot the Community institutions, including 
for the own-resources system of the Community 
budget; 
(c) the extension of the use of the ecu in operations 
between the Community central banks, and in their 
interventions in the foreign exchange markets; 
(d) the development of the use of the ecu in the issu-
ing of public bonds and in public borrowing opera-
tions; 
(e) encouraging the smooth development of the ecu 
market by central banks and Eurofed. 
However, all these efforts will only be fully validated 
by the clear provision in the Treaty that designates 
the ecu explicitly as the future single currency of the 
union. This would reinforce its credibility and act as 
a powerful stimulus to its use. 
In any case, there would be no discontinuity between 
the present ecu and the single currency of the union; 
ecu obligations would be payable at face value in 
ecus. During the transition the ecu would be increas-
ingly used, but in the same way as it is now alongside 
the national currencies. It would not, however, for-
mally abandon its definition as a basket until the 
moment of the irrevocable fixing of parities. 
From the monetary point of view, the implications 
are clear: the ecu will continue to be defined by its 
component currencies until Stage Ill and the 
national central banks will retain in the last resort 
their monopoly over the issuing of money in the area. 
But during the transition, as realignments become 
very infrequent and as all currencies fully participate 
in the exchange-rate system, this basket definition 
will have increasingly less practical relevance. If all 
the currencies perform well, the average is as good as 
the best, and the ecu becomes de facto a 'hard ecu'. 
This is already more and more the case. 
There are disadvantages in prematurely abandoning 
the basket definition of the ecu. The introduction of a 
13th currency in the Community, as put forward no-
tably in the UK proposal and even with the precau-
tions taken there to avoid extra money creation, 
would increase the risks of instability in a period (the 
completion of the internal market) when it is impor-
tant to limit the effects of competition between cur-
rencies. Furthermore, a parallel currency would not 
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be consistent with the accepted strategy of streng-
thening the coordination of monetary policies, albeit 
on a voluntary basis. 
Concluding, the ecu should become an increasingly 
'hard' currency during the transition. 
5. Institutional aspects 
The creation of the economic and monetary union 
based on the design outlined above necessitates sev-
eral important Treaty modifications. In particular it 
will be necessary to agree upon the objectives of 
economic and monetary union; to define the charac-
teristics of Eurofed, the new Community institution 
for which the Committee of Central Bank Governors 
is already drafting a statute proposal; to adapt the 
economic role of the existing Community institu-
tions; to mention the principal provision§ for the 
transition; to attempt to find a satisfactory balance 
between the institutions and to clarify their role. 1 
5.1. The creation of Eurofed 
(a) The Treaty would state three fundamental princi-
ples for the institution: 
(i) the objective: price stability. Subject to this objec-
tive, Eurofed should support the general economic 
policy set at the Community level by the competent 
bodies; 
(ii) independence of Eurofed from national govern-
ments and Community authorities; 
(iii) democratic accountability. 
(b) The Treaty should also define the tasks of 
Eurofed. The major ones would be the following: 
(i) the formulation and implementation of the single 
monetary policy and the issue of ecus; 
(ii) exchange rate and reserve management in 
accordance with the guidelines defined by the Coun-
cil of Ministers; participation in international mon-
etary cooperation; 
(iii) participation in the coordination of banking 
supervision policies and guaranteeing the proper 
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functioning of the payment system and of capital 
markets. 
(c) The main provtswns for the organization of 
Eurofed would also be included: controlling author-
ities (council, board, president); relations between the 
Eurofed Council and national central banks; rela-
tions within the system of Eurofed between its central 
body and the other Community institutions; manage-
ment and ownership of exchange reserves. 
(d) Finally, the Treaty could also deal with the 
instruments of the common monetary policy as well 
as other questions concerning the organization of 
Eurofed (balance sheet, status of the personnel, 
auditing, etc.). Preferably, the main elements should 
be defined in the statutes of Eurofed which would be 
annexed to the Treaty and the other elements should 
be defined by secondary legislation. 
Member States will have to adjust their national 
legislation on the national central banks in order to 
ensure conformity with the new Treaty. 
5.2. Economic provisions 
In the economic field, an institutional framework has 
already been established under the Treaty of Rome. 
While on the monetary side a new institution has to 
be set up, it will not be necessary, on the economic 
side, to add another institution to the existing ones 
(European Parliament, European Council, Council of 
Ministers and Commission), but the roles of the exist-
ing institutions should be enhanced and adjusted in 
accordance with the new tasks which they will have 
to accomplish in an economic and monetary union. 
Similarly, the Treaty provides a definition of the 
objectives which the Member States and the Com-
munity should commit themselves to attain: a har-
monious development of economic activities, a con-
tinuous and balanced expansion, an increase in sta-
bility, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, 
and economic and social cohesion. 
The reinforcement of multilateral surveillance makes 
necessary the modification of certain Treaty provi-
1 The possible results of the second Intergovernmental 
Conference on political union are not taken into account 
here. 
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sions and even more so of the secondary legislation. 
Two rules concerning budget deficits (no monetary 
financing and no bailing out) should also be 
included in the Treaty. The Treaty should also state 
the principle that excessive budget deficits have to be 
avoided. 
Furthermore, the Treaty would need to provide a 
legal base for the creation of two new economic 
policy instruments: multiannual guidelines and the 
conditional Community financial support scheme; 
these would also be further specified by secondary 
legislation. 
5.3. Provisions for the transition 
The Treaty should specify the procedures for the pas-
sage from one stage to another. It should fix the date 
for the start of the second stage as well as the proce-
dures for determining the beginning of Stage Ill and 
for the introduction ofthe ecu as the single currency. 
The Treaty would also provide safeguard clauses for 
the transition and the possibility of flexibility for 
some Member States with regard to the date of their 
full participation in Stage Ill. 
5.4. Balance between the 
institutions 
A satisfactory balance between the institutions of 
economic and monetary union will have to be found. 
The creation of a new Community institution in the 
monetary field, Eurofed, raises the question of the 
balance to be achieved between this new institution 
and the existing ones which will be responsible for 
the implementation of the economic union. 
The Council and the Commission would also have to 
cope with an increase in their respective tasks: the 
definition of guidelines for economic policy, partici-
pation in negotiations and agreements on interna-
tional monetary matters, dialogue with Eurofed (par-
ticularly with regard to the exchange rate policy), 
regular multilateral surveillance exercises. 
The European Parliament will have to play an 
increasingly more important role in terms of its 
democratic responsibilities. In the context of the 
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economic union the reinforcement of the involve-
ment of the European Parliament appears easier to 
realize in view of the nature of the measures in ques-
tion, in the form of the control of the executive; it 
being understood that in addition it should partici-
pate in all debates of an economic nature. 
The arrangement of Community procedures for the 
definition of multiannual guidelines and the multila-
teral surveillance exercise has important political con-
sequences. In their deliberations, the national parlia-
ments will have to take into consideration the guide-
lines and recommendations flowing from the new 
procedures. Member States will have to justify their 
attitudes not only vis-a-vis the Community institu-
tions but also vis-a-vis domestic public opinion. Con-
sequently, there is a need for these procedures to be 
highly transparent: sufficient publicity has in parti-
cular to be assured for the recommendations which 
the Community would address to Member States 
which deviate from jointly agreed guidelines. This 
necessary transparency of Community procedures is 
an additional reason for ensuring a balance between 
the institutions. 
5.5. The role of each institution 
The organization of a satisfactory balance between 
the institutions, which should form part of the Treaty, 
should be based on a reinforcement of the role of 
each, on a certain degree of specialization, and on a 
precise definition of their relationships having regard 
to the attainment of the objectives of economic and 
monetary union: 
(a) the European Council would be concerned with 
the overall coherence of the Community's economic 
and monetary policy; it would formally endorse the 
multiannual economic guidelines and would nomi-
nate the President of Eurofed and the other members 
of the Board; the Presidents of the Ecofin Council 
and of Eurofed would report to the European Coun-
cil at least once a year; 
(b) the Ecofin Council would be responsible, in 
addition to its present activities, for deepened multi-
lateral surveillance exercises, the issuing of recom-
mendations, the granting of special financial support 
and for the major decisions concerning the 
exchange-rate policy (international agreements); it 
would take its decisions by qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission after consulting the 
European Parliament; in cases of urgency the Coun-
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cil would have to decide within a fixed delay; its 
President would participate in the Eurofed Council 
without the right to vote and represent the Com-
munity in international monetary meetings; 
(c) the Commission, the executive institution respon-
sible to the Parliament, would play, in addition to its 
traditional role of impulsion and legislative initiative, 
an essential role in multilateral surveillance: presen-
tation of annual reports on the economic situation of 
Member States, the drawing up and monitoring of 
multiannual guidelines, the drawing up of recom-
mendations for economic policy; moreover, it would 
monitor the consistency between monetary and the 
general economic policy adopted at Community level 
and would make observations, as appropriate; a 
Member of the Commission would participate in the 
Eurofed Council without the right to vote and assist 
the President of the Ecofin Council in international 
monetary meetings; 
(d) the European Parliament would be consulted on 
the nomination of the President of Eurofed, the defi-
nition of multiannual guidelines, the granting of 
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special financial support, and on the recommenda-
tions; in urgent cases it would have to give its posi-
tion within a prespecified time-limit; it would regu-
larly debate the Community's economic and mon-
etary policy, with a general debate held once a year 
during which it would give a discharge to the Com-
mission in respect of its economic policy responsibili-
ties; the President of Eurofed would regularly, and 
whenever exceptional circumstances make it neces-
sary, report on monetary policy; the President of the 
Ecofin Council and the Commission would regularly 
report on the economic situation in the Community 
and would associate Parliament closely in the multi-
lateral surveillance exercises; 
(e) Eurofed would be responsible for the tasks set 
out in 5.1 (b); also, it would be consulted by the other 
institutions on matters of their competence relating to 
its objectives and tasks; in this spirit it would partici-
pate in multilateral surveillance exercises; it would 
also assist the Ecofin Council in international mon-
etary meetings; it would regularly report on monetary 
policy to the European Council and to the European 
Parliament. 
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Draft treaty amending the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community with a view to 
achieving economic and monetary union 
Explanatory memorandum 
1. Need for coherence between the two 
Intergovernmental Conferences 
The European Council's decision to convene two 
Intergovernmental Conferences running in parallel, 
one on economic and monetary union and the other 
on political union, reflects a desire to integrate moves 
to achieve apparently different but, in practice, inti-
mately linked objectives into the framework of the 
existing institutions. 
Political union enriches the Treaty of Rome by add-
ing a new dimension to the venture launched more 
than 30 years ago. EMU very much follows in the 
direction of that venture. As a natural extension to 
implementation of the Single European Act, EMU, 
far from being an end in itself, is both a more effec-
tive and a more demanding means of fulfilling the 
mission assigned to the Community by the Treaty. 
Effectiveness must be accompanied by the solidarity 
needed for economic and social cohesion to be 
achieved, but within the framework of a policy taking 
full advantage of price stability and the strength of 
the single currency. EMU and political union alike 
aim to give the Community a new capacity for action 
and a genuine external identity. Both are aspects 
closely linked to one and the same movement: the 
advance towards European union. 
These two approaches are intended to complement 
the Community's achievements to date - and pri-
marily the creation of an area without internal fron-
tiers by 31 December 1992 - by means of closer 
economic and monetary integration and the develop-
ment of the political dimension. They draw inspira-
tion from the same institutional philosophy and are 
based on the need to reconcile more democracy and 
greater efficiency. 
In view of the complementary nature of the objec-
tives to be achieved within a single Community, and 
in order to maintain a balance, the work of the two 
Intergovernmental Conferences calls for parallel pro-
gress as regards institutional development, with this 
alone permitting the osmosis necessary between the 
political, social, economic and monetary spheres. 
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Without it being possible or necessary to indicate at 
this stage the final content and shape of European 
union, care must be taken to ensure that the condi-
tions for transferring new powers to the Community 
- however important they may be - do not jeopar-
dize the existing institutional framework, which has a 
proven dynamism. 
The main asset of the Treaty of Rome is the relation-
ship of positive synergy between the three institu-
tions: Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
The cooperation between the Council and Parliament 
works by dint of the intervention of a third institu-
tion, the Commission, whose essential task is to 
attempt to safeguard the general interest while bring-
ing closer together the often diverse positions of the 
Member States. 
The joint exercise of new powers in areas which 
reach to the very heart of sovereignty - such as cur-
rency matters and foreign policy - will require the 
existing institutional framework to be adapted to a 
higher degree of Community integration. 
It will be for each of the two Intergovernmental Con-
ferences, in exercising the mandate they will have 
been given, to ensure that a dynamic balance is 
struck between the new decision-making centres and 
the existing institutions, which will continue to be in 
charge of implementing all common policies with 
due regard to the two criteria of democratic legiti-
macy and efficiency. 
The Parliament will be called on to play an increas-
ingly important role, not only through its being 
closely involved in the decision-making process but 
also as a result of the indispensable strengthening of 
its position in terms of democratic accountability. 
It will be for the Council of Ministers for Economic 
and Financial Affairs to take, on the basis of Com-
mission proposals, the decisions within the compet-
ence of the Council. 
As for the Commission, it will have to continue to 
perform the tasks assigned to it by the Treaty as an 
initiator and executor of Community decisions. Its 
accountability to the European Parliament satisfies in 
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part the requirement of greater democratic accounta-
bility. 
Finally, the European Council will have to provide 
the necessary impetus, the very role for which it was 
originally set up, and to ensure the overall coherence 
of economic and monetary policy in terms of the 
broad guidelines which it lays down. 
2. The march towards economic and monetary 
union 
The march towards economic and monetary union, 
which has been a Community objective since 1969, 
gained fresh momentum in June 1988 with the deci-
sion of the Hanover European Council to entrust a 
committee of experts, chaired by Mr Delors, with the 
task of studying and proposing concrete stages lead-
ing to this union. 
This was prompted by the realization that, with the 
creation of the single market forging ahead, consider-
able gains were to be expected from economic and 
monetary union, and in particular the adoption of a 
single currency. 
Over and above the direct gains associated with the 
elimination of transaction costs are the indirect or 
dynamic gains, which are potentially much greater 
although certainly difficult to quantify. 
These dynamic gains will stem from price stability, 
enhanced economic efficiency, itself conducive to 
growth, and more efficient management of public 
finances owing to a reduction in the real burden of 
interest and in the size of deficits. This should have a 
positive impact on employment and on the balanced 
development of the regions and, finally, should give 
the Community a greater role to play in the world 
economy. 
On the basis of the Delors Committee's report and 
the work carried out by the Community institutions, 
each meeting of the European Council has provided 
fresh impetus. 
In Madrid, the main principles were laid down: 
(i) implementation of EMU in stages, with Stage I to 
begin on I July 1990; 
(ii) parallelism between the economic and monetary 
aspects; 
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(iii) subsidiarity; 
(iv) diversity of specific situations. 
In Strasbourg and Dublin, a link was established 
between EMU and the strengthening of the Com-
munity's political dimension, a decision was taken to 
convene two intergovernmental conferences, and a 
timetable envisaging the ratification of the Treaty 
amendments before I January 1993 was adopted. 
Finally, in Rome, agreement among 11 Member 
States was reached on the overall conception of 
EMU, involving the adoption of a single currency 
(the ecu) and the fixing of I January 1994 as the date 
for transition to Stage 11 and of the general condi-
tions for the transition leading from Stage I to Stage 
Ill. The conclusions of the European Council consti-
tute, in a way, the mandate given to the relevant 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
The preparatory work has now been completed. It is 
for the Conference that will open on 15 December to 
agree on amendments to the Treaty of Rome. It will 
have less than a year in which to do so, given the 
time needed to complete ratification of the fruits of 
its work in 1992. 
Consequently, and in order that the negotiations can 
begin on a sound basis as soon as the Conference 
opens, as the Dublin European Council requested, 
the Commission is presenting a draft treaty amending 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community with a view to achieving economic and 
monetary union. 
In the spirit of its document of 21 August 1990, and 
out of a concern to draw the various points of view 
together, the Commission has striven to combine the 
main contributions which have been made, namely: 
(i) the report of the Delors Committee, which was 
regarded by the European Council - or at least by 
11 of its members - as the outline for establishing 
EMU; 
(ii) the report of the high-level working party on 
EMU, chaired by Mrs Guigou, which has drawn up a 
list of essential questions for the Intergovernmental 
Conference; 
(iii) the work of the European Parliament, and in 
particular the resolution adopted on the basis of the 
report presented by Mr Herman; 
(iv) the reports drawn up by the Commission: the 
communication to the Council of 21 August and the 
report on the costs and benefits of EMU; 
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(v) the work of the Council, based on reports pre-
sented by specialized committees; 
(vi) the work of the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors, which has led to the presentation of a 
draft statute for the new monetary institution (the 
links between the draft statute and the forthcoming 
treaty should be emphasized). 
3. Points of agreement and remaining differences 
of approach 
The draft treaty, presented by the Commission in 
accordance with the method employed in drafting the 
Treaty of Rome, establishes in legal form: 
(i) the basic principles of EMU, which are designed 
to supplement the provisions on the 'principles' of 
the Community (in particular Articles 2, 3 and 4 of 
the Treaty of Rome); the latter principles will also be 
enriched by the amendments to be proposed by the 
Intergovernmental Conference on political union; 
(ii) the rules relating to EMU (economic and mon-
etary policies, institutional arrangements), the powers 
of the new monetary institution, Eurofed (made up 
of the national central banks and the European Cen-
tral Bank), the principles governing its operation, and 
its relations with the Community institutions; 
(iii) the principles, rules and procedure relating to the 
transitional period and the transition to the final 
stage. 
The Conference will centre its deliberations not only 
on the Treaty but also on the Eurofed Statute, which 
will take the legal form of a protocol annexed to the 
EEC Treaty and will constitute an integral part there-
of (see Article 239). However, some provisions will 
have to be amended according to a different proce-
dure and one which is more straightforward than that 
laid down for the Treaty. 
The Commission has taken note of the draft statute 
drawn up by the Committee of Central Bank Gover-
nors: it notes that there is a great deal of common 
ground between the draft statute and the opinion 
which it formulated on EMU pursuant to Article 236 
of the Treaty. 
The Commission is of the opinion that the essential 
tasks and elements of the system's structure, in parti-
cular the principles relating to the balance and rela-
tions between the institutions, must be incorporated 
into the Treaty, whereas the actual operation of the 
system - essentially that of the new monetary insti-
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tution - must be dealt with by the Statute, even 
though the latter may, for reasons of clarity, include 
certain of the Treaty's provisions. 
The draft treaty sets out in legal terms the principles 
and operating rules of EMU, on which there is 
already a broad measure of agreement. 
This will cover a large part of the agenda of the Inter-
governmental Conference, and particularly: 
(i) on the economic side: 
(a) the tools which must be available to the Com-
munity in order to achieve better coordination of 
economic policy, on the basis of commonly-agreed 
targets, and an improved measure of convergence; 
(b) the minimum rules with which Member States 
will have to comply in the budgetary sphere in order 
to prevent the appearance of imbalances which might 
compromise monetary stability; 
(ii) on the monetary side: 
(a) the principles which underlie the creation of 
Eurofed: the priority objective, which must be price 
stability; its structure, which must be federal; its com-
plete independence, which must be reflected in rules 
enshrined in the Treaty; and democratic responsibil-
ity, which is the corollary to Eurofed's necessary 
independence; 
(b) the tasks, organization and main operating rules 
ofEurofed. 
In general the economic and monetary aspects 
should be tackled in parallel, as the Delors Com-
mittee report emphasized. Since the model that has 
been chosen does not seek to create new institutions 
in the economic sphere, but rather to give greater res-
ponsibilities to the Council (Economic and Financial 
Affairs), the draft treaty seeks to provide a mechan-
ism for relations between the existing institutions and 
the new Eurofed based on the two criteria of effec-
tiveness and democratic legitimacy. 
Lastly, the draft treaty lays down procedures for 
movement from one stage to the next, and foresees 
the possibility of a period of adaptation for any 
Member State ratifying the Treaty and thus accepting 
the ultimate goal of EMU. 
In addition to giving legal form to the general agree-
ment which exists, the Commission felt it would be 
useful for the draft to include provisions dealing with 
the few questions still open, in order to make it easier 
for the Conference to concentrate on these questions 
and to settle them. As is its proper role, however, the 
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Commission has tried to propose solutions which it 
feels will facilitate the necessary compromises, even 
where those solutions do not exactly reflect its own 
initial position. 
There are only a few of these questions; they relate 
essentially to economic union: 
(i) The final shape of economic union. There is unan-
imity that certain rules (no monetary financing, no 
automatic bail-outs) and a principle (the avoidance 
of excessive budget deficits) should be enshrined in 
the Treaty. These rules will have to be complied with, 
but the way in which the principle is to apply can be 
made more or less binding - sanctions might even 
be envisaged. The Commission would prefer a sys-
tem of incentives in a framework of tight multilateral 
surveillance. An important factor in the success or 
otherwise of the procedures adopted will be transpar-
ency, given its impact on political life in each of the 
Member States. 
(ii) The relationship between EMU and economic and 
social cohesion. This question is central to the future 
of the Community, and will also have to be consid-
ered in the negotiations on political union; it has 
obvious budgetary implications. For the time being, 
however, as suggested by the analyses that have been 
carried out so far, the Commission takes the view that 
practical discussion of this question will not be poss-
ible at the Intergovernmental Conference. Only in 
1991, when a progress report has been made on the 
structural policies, can a review of the February 1988 
agreement be envisaged and improvements be made 
to the mechanism applied since 1989. 
(iii) Democratic responsibility in economic union. 
Alongside the European Council, which provides the 
impetus, the main lines of economic and social 
policy will continue to be set by Council, Commis-
sion and Parliament, the institutional triangle set up 
by the Rome Treaty. The roles of each of these insti-
tutions are strengthened and spelt out in the draft 
treaty, and the balance between them is clarified. Not 
only will the Council (Economic and Financial 
Afairs) see a development of its role as multilateral 
surveillance is tightened; it will also have to take, in 
collaboration with the new monetary institution 
(Eurofed), the main decisions on exchange-rate 
policy. The Commission will have an important role 
to play in economic union, and it should accordingly 
be clearly and directly responsible before the Parlia-
ment; this will foreshadow the role the Parliament 
will play when the building of the Community is 
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complete, that is to say when European union has 
been achieved. 
(iv) The nature of the transition. Debate on the dura-
tion of the transitional period has obscured its nature. 
The Commission has taken the side of those favour-
ing a short transitional period, and the reasons which 
led it to take this position are as strong as ever. Stage 
I, which began on I July 1990, has a vital role to play 
here. Its success or failure will determine not only the 
success or failure of the process as a whole but also 
the duration of Stage 11. This can be shorter if Stage I 
achieves its objectives rapidly, with the Committee of 
Governors operating as the centre for the elaboration 
and guidance of monetary policy, while on the 
economic union side progress is being made on con-
sultation and policy convergence. Stage 11 represents 
the introduction of the final mechanism. The Com-
mission is therefore in favour of a transitional stage 
with a substantial content. In the economic field it is 
proposing that the final outcome should be antici-
pated, more in the spirit than in the letter, from the 
beginning of Stage 11. In the monetary sphere, too, 
the Commission is proposing that Eurofed should be 
given the task of actively preparing its future role 
from the day it is set up, and indeed of prefiguring 
that role. The establishment of an institution and its 
governing bodies before it takes up its full powers is 
in line with the thinking and practice of the Rome 
and Paris Treaties. It allows the institution to make 
preparations and to take measures necessary for its 
proper operation while creating a climate of confi-
dence among its members before it enters into full 
operation. The same thing was done for the introduc-
tion of the Rome Treaty and the Community institu-
tions. 
(v) the role of the ecu in the transition. The nature and 
role of the ecu in the dynamics of EMU are currently 
at the heart of a debate which is not simply about 
method. It is the very essence of the EMU undertak-
ing which is under discussion. In response to those 
who state that they wish - and are able - to make 
the ecu an instrument of convergence by 'hardening' 
it, the Commission takes the view that only a streng-
thening of the ecu is capable of giving it a central 
position in the EMU process. But this will not come 
about simply as a result of its being sanctioned by the 
market but only if the Community and the 12 Mem-
ber States adopt a series of decisions to promote the 
use of the ecu and to make it increasingly attractive. 
Convinced that convergence can and should proceed 
with the help of the instruments established at the 
beginning of the first stage, the Commission has cho-
sen this approach, which involves the decision to 
entrust to Eurofed, once it is set up, the task of man-
aging the ecu. 
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4. The Community's responsibilities and the 
creation of appropriate instruments 
By adopting a single currency, the ecu, as a replace-
ment for national currencies, the Member States are 
transferring to the Community an area of compet-
ence in which it currently exercises responsibility 
only very indirectly. 
This is the principal change introduced by the draft 
Treaty. A new institution is to be set up to administer 
the Community's monetary policy. It will have at its 
disposal the whole range of instruments necessary for 
conducting a market-based monetary policy: open-
market operations, repurchase agreements, interven-
tion rate, compulsory reserves, etc. It will be for it to 
equip itself with those instruments and to use them. 
At the same time, economic policy instruments will 
have to be reinforced. The field of economic policy is 
very wide and cannot be reduced to budgetary policy. 
The range of instruments to be used goes far beyond 
those required for simply coordinating economic pol-
icies, even since the Community embarked on the 
first stage of EMU. In some areas, the Treaty already 
gives the Community a major role which has a clear 
economic dimension, even if there is not always 
awareness of this. Whatever fields are involved -
whether competition (Articles 85 to 89), the opening 
up of public procurement (Article 130f(2)), research 
and development (Article 130f et seq.), European 
infrastructures (Article 74 et seq.), labour markets 
(Articles 49 and 118), the environment (Article 130r et 
seq.) or taxation (Article 99) - Community policies 
will have to be reinforced in order to improve the 
general efficiency of the internal market and to 
increase the competitiveness of the Community econ-
omy, which is essential if the basic objectives of 
European union are to be achieved. 
The coordination of economic policies, which is 
already an area for which the Community has res-
ponsibility, will have to be reinforced in particular. 
The instruments required for the conduct of econ-
omic policies will remain the prerogative of the 
Member States. For the purposes of coordination, 
however, various additional instruments and proce-
dures will have to be set up: 
(i) multiannual economic policy guidelines which 
will define general objectives for the Community and 
indicate means of achieving those objectives; 
(ii) reinforced multilateral surveillance of economic 
policies, which will cover all aspects of policy and 
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performance likely to have a significant impact on 
economic and social objectives. This will lead to the 
necessary economic policy adjustments as a result of 
the discussions which will take place in the Council 
of Ministers, the peer pressure that may be exerted at 
such meetings and, if necessary, formal recommenda-
tions which could be published. Observance of the 
budgetary rules referred to above forms part of these 
arrangements. The transparency of these procedures 
gives promise of their impact; 
(iii) a specific financial support mechanism which 
will be brought into operation in the event of major 
economic difficulties in one or more Member States 
or where economic convergence calls for a special 
Community effort to be made alongside national 
adjustment strategies. Such support will be condi-
tional; it will take the form of special Community 
grants or loans as part of a comprehensive pro-
gramme. 
Arrangements need to be made to ensure day-to-day 
coordination of economic and monetary policy: the 
participation, without the right of vote, of the Presi-
dent of the Council and of a Member of the Com-
mission in the meetings of the Eurofed governing 
body (and, in return, the participation of the Presi-
dent of Eurofed in the multilateral surveillance exer-
cises) and the possibility open to the Commission to 
comment on progress towards EMU in order, where 
it considers it necessary, to instigate discussion in the 
various Community institutions. 
Cooperation between institutions will be particularly 
necessary in order to define exchange-rate policy, 
ultimate responsibility for which will lie, as is the case 
in the Member States, with the institutions respon-
sible for economic policy. The Council of Ministers 
will have a special role to play, in close collaboration 
with the new monetary institution, in defining the 
Community's position in international monetary and 
financial bodies. 
At the same time - and this task is also one for the 
Conference on Political Union - it will be necessary 
to amend and rearrange the Treaty provisions on 
external economic policy in order to reinforce the 
Community's capacity to act and the way in which it 
is represented in all international bodies. 
Democratic accountability in EMU will take three 
practical forms: frrst of all, the Commission, alone 
responsible to the Parliament, will have to give it an 
account of the way in which it is fulfilling its duties, 
i.e. the way in which it is carrying out its task of coor-
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dinating economic and monetary policy. Secondly, 
Eurofed will explain its policy and report to Parlia-
ment. Finally, Parliament itself will hold a general 
debate on the multiannual guidelines and specific 
recommendations, during which it will express its 
view. 
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All of these arrangements and instruments will 
ensure that, in addition to there being a clear division 
of roles between each institution, there is a satisfac-
tory balance of powers, that the need for democratic 
accountability is satisfied and that the system works 
effectively. 
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Draft treaty 
The EEC Treaty as amended is to read as follows: 
PART ONE 
Principles 
Article 1 
By this Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES establish among themselves a EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY. 
Article 2 
Ihe Community, having due regard to the personality 
of the States it unites and working on the basis of its 
achievements to date, shall have as its task progress-
ively to achieve economic and monetary union, which 
shall be based on a single cu"ency, the ecu, social 
development and the pursuit of a common policy with 
regard to external relations and security. 
It shall be founded on respect for democracy and fun-
damental rights and on the principle of subsidiarity. 
In carrying out its tasks, it shall seek: 
(i) to promote within its ambit a harmonious develop-
ment of economic and social activities, growth, a high 
level of employment and cohesion in conditions of sta-
bility, an accelerated raising of the standard of living 
and closer relations between the States and peoples it 
unites; 
[(ii) to speak with one voice on the international scene 
and to act with cohesion and solidarity in order more 
effectively to defend its common interests and its 
independence. 1] 
Article 3 
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of 
the Community shall include, subject to the condi-
tions and within the time-limits laid down therein: 
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of 
customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on the 
import and export of goods, and of all other mea-
sures having equivalent effect; 
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(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff 
and of a common commercial policy towards third 
countries; 
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of 
obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, ser-
vices and capital; 
(d) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of 
agriculture; 
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of 
transport; 
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competi-
tion in the common market is not distorted; 
(g) the institution of a common economic policy based 
on the definition of common objectives, close coordina-
tion of Member States' economic policies, and the 
implementation of the other common policies; 
(ga) the definition and pursuit of a single monetary 
policy whose primary objective shall be to maintain 
price stability and, without prejudice to that objective, 
to support the common economic policy; 
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States 
to the extent required for the proper functioning of 
the common market; 
(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order 
to improve employment opportunities for workers 
and to contribute to the raising of their standard of 
living; 
G) the establishment of a European investment Bank 
to facilitate the economic expansion of the Com-
munity by opening up fresh resources; 
(k) the association of the overseas countries and terri-
tories in order to increase trade and to promote 
jointly economic and social development. 
Article4 
I. The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be 
carried out by the following institutions: 
Note to the reader: For ease of reference, the sections of 
the EEC Treaty amended by the new Treaty have been 
shown in consolidated form, incorporating the amend-
ments. 
The amendments are shown in italics. 
1 To be reviewed in the light of the proceedings of the 
Intergovernmental Conference on political union. 
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a EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
a COUNCIL, 
a COMMISSION, 
a COURT OF JUSTICE. 
Each institution shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty. 
2. Monetary policy shall be defined and pursued by a 
European System of Central Banks (hereinafter 
referred to as 'Eurofed') acting within the limits of the 
powers confemd upon it by this Treaty and the Statute 
annexed hereto. 
3. The Council and the Commission shall be assisted 
by an Economic and Social Committee acting in an 
advisory capacity. 
4. The audit shall be carried out by a Court of Audi-
tors acting within the limits of the powers conferred 
upon it by this Treaty. 
Article 5 
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of 
the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting 
from action taken by the institutions of the Com-
munity. They shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty. 
Article 6 
(Coordination by Member States of their economic 
policies) 
Repealed. 
Articles 7 to 8c 
Unchanged. 
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PART TWO 
Foundations of the Community 
TITLE I 
Free movement of goods 
Articles 9 to 37 unchanged. 
TITLE 11 
Agriculture 
Articles 38 to 47 unchanged. 
TITLE Ill 
Free movement of persons, 
services and capital 
Chapter 1 
Workers 
Articles 48 to 51 unchanged. 
Chapter2 
Right of establishment 
Articles 52 to 58 unchanged. 
Chapter3 
Services 
Articles 59 to 66 unchanged. 
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Chapter4 1 
Capital 
Article 67 
I. All restnct1ons on the movement of capital 
belonging to persons resident in Member States and 
any discrimination based on the nationality or on the 
place of residence of the parties or on the place 
where such capital is invested shall be prohibited as 
between the Member States. 
2. Current payments connected with the movement 
of capital between Member States shall be free. 
[The repeal of Articles 68 to 73 has still to be consid-
ered.] 
TITLE IV 
Transport 
Articles 74 to 84 unchanged. 
PART THREE 
Policy of the Community 
TITLE I 
Common rules 
Articles 85 to I 02 unchanged. 
TITLE 11 
Economic and monetary union 
Article 102a 
Economic and monetary union shall be founded on 
close economic integration and a single monetary 
policy. 
It shall be brought about gradually over a period div-
ided into two stages preceding the final stage, with par-
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allelism between economic policy and monetary policy 
being ensured. 
Building on the developments which have taken place 
since Stage I began, on 1 July 1990, Stage Il, or the 
transitional period, shall begin on 1 January 1994. 
During this transitional period, Articles 109b to 109e 
shall apply. A finding that the conditions for transition 
to the final stage are met shall be made by the Euro-
pean Council in accordance with Article 109f 
Chapter l 
Economic policy 
Article 102b 
1. '/he economic policy of the Community shall aim to 
ensure growth, a high level of employment and equili-
brium in the Community's balance of payments, in a 
context of price stahllity, generally balanced public 
finances, and economic and social cohesion. 
It shall be based on an internal market which has been 
completed in accordance with the objectives of Article 8a 
and on the various policies of the Community, in parti-
cular competition policy, commercial policy, research 
policy and structural policies. 
It shall also be based on the progress achieved with 
regard to convergence since the beginning of Stage I of 
economic and monetary union. 
2. '/he Member States shall pursue their economic poli-
cies with a view to contributing to the realization of the 
objectives of economic and monetary union in the con-
text of the measures adopted by the Community to that 
end. 
Article 102c 
1. '/he Commission shall submit multiannual guide-
lines to the European Council, which shall discuss them 
after consulting the European Parliament. '/he guide-
lines shall relate in particular to: 
I This Chapter is to be brought into line with the content 
of Chapter 4 of the Title on economic and monetary 
union. 
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the development of Member States' budget balances; 
the control of production costs, having due regard to 
the freedom of the two sides of industry to enter into 
contracts; 
the level and promotion of saving and investment; 
the adaptation of Community policies for achieving 
economic and soda/ cohesion; 
the development of structural policies in the Member 
States. 
2. Jhe Council, acting by a qualified majority and tak-
ing into account the deliberations of the European 
Council and the opinion of the European Parliament, 
shall adopt these guidelines. 
3. On the basis of an annual report from the Commis-
sion, the Council shall each year decide, in accordance 
with the procedure provided for in paragraph 2, on the 
adjustments that need to be made to the multiannua/ 
guidelines. 
Article 102d 
I. Within the framework of the multiannual guidelines 
adopted pursuant to Article 102c, and without prejudice 
to Article 103, the Council, acting by a qualified major-
ity on a proposal from the Commission and after con-
sulting the European Parliament, which must issue an 
opinion within a maximum period of two months, may, 
where necessary, adopt recommendations specific to 
each Member State concerning the general thrust of its 
economic and budgetary policy. 
2. Jhe Commission shall see to it that these specific 
recommendations are implemented; it shall involve the 
relevant Committee of the European Parliament in the 
monitoring of their implementation. 
3. Where it is observed that a Member State has failed 
to implement these recommendations, and notwith-
standing Articles I69 to 17I, the Commission shall, 
after alerting the Member State concerned, present to 
the Council a confidential proposal for a recommenda-
tion concerning the measures which must be taken to 
rectify the situation. 
If the Council does not take a decision within one 
month, the Commission may make its proposal for a 
recommendation public. 
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Article 103 
l. Member States shall regard their conjunctural pol-
icies as a matter of common concern. They shall con-
sult each other and the Commission on the measures 
to be taken in the light of the prevailing circum-
stances. 
In this connection, an overall evaluation shall be car-
ried out regularly at Community level of the short and 
medium-term economic developments in the Com-
munity and in each of its Member States. 
Moreover, the guidelines and recommendations 
adopted in accordance with the procedure described in 
Articles 102c and 102d shall serve as a framework for 
the multilateral surveillance undertaken by the Council 
with a view to assessing the results of the coordination 
of Member States' economic policies. 
2. Without prejudice to the other procedures prov-
ided for in this Treaty, the Council may, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission, decide unanimously 
on the measures appropriate to the situation. 
3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall, where necess-
ary, issue the directives needed to give effect to the 
measures decided on under paragraph 2. 
4. The procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 
shall also apply if any difficulty should arise in the 
supply of certain products. 
Article 104 
I. Where a Member State is in difficulties or is ser-
iously threatened with difficulties, the Commission may 
propose to the Council, which shall act by a qualified 
majority, that, subject to certain conditions, the Mem-
ber State concerned be granted Community financial 
assistance which may take the form of a support pro-
gramme accompanied by budgetary intervention or 
special loans. 
2. Jhe general conditions for such intervention by the 
Community shall be laid down by the Council, acting 
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Com-
mission and in cooperation with the European Parlia-
ment. 
3. Jhe Council may establish a system of bo"owing in 
order to finance the special loans refe"ed to in para-
graph I. It shall/ay down the maximum volume of such 
bo"owing. Jhese measures shall be decided on in 
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accordance with the procedure provided for in para-
graph2. 
Article 104a 
1. The following shall be recognized as incompatible 
with the economic and monetary union and shall 
accordingly be prohibited: 
(a) the financing of budget deficits by means of direct 
assistance from Eurofed or through privileged access by 
the public authorities to the capital market; 
(b) the granting by the Community or the Member 
States of an unconditional guarantee in respect of the 
public debt of a Member State. 
2. Excessive budget deficits shall be avoided. The 
Council may, to this end, adopt appropriate measures 
pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter. 
Article 105 
(Coordination by Member States of their economic 
policies) 
Paragraph l is repealed. 
Paragraph 2 (Monetary Committee) is transferred, in 
an abridged form, to Article l09a. 
Chapter2 
Monetary policy 
Article 105 
Monetary union shall entail the circulation of a single 
cu"ency, the ecu, the pursuit of a single monetary 
policy and the establishment of Eurofed. 
Article 106 
1. Eurofed shall be made up of the European Central 
Bank and the central banks of the Member States. 
2. The European Central Bank shall have legal person-
ality. 
3. The Statute of Eurofed and the European Central 
Bank is set out in a protocol annexed to this Treaty. 
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The Council may, acting by a qualified majority at the 
request of the European Central Bank, amend Articles 
[ . . . ] of the Statute after consulting the Commission 
and the European Parliament. 
Article 1 06a 
1. With a view to achieving the objective set out in 
Article 3(ga), the European Central Bank shall carry 
out its tasks on its own responsibility under the condi-
tions laid down in this Treaty and in the Statute 
annexed hereto. 
2. In performing their duties, the European Central 
Bank, a central bank of a Member State and members 
of their decision-making bodies shall neither seek nor 
take instructions from the institutions of the Com-
munity or its Member States or from any other body. 
The Community and the Member States shall not seek 
to influence the European Central Bank, the central 
banks of the Member States and the members of their 
decision-making bodies in the performance of their 
tasks and shall respect their independence. To that end, 
the Member States shall amend, where necessary, 
legislation governing relations between their central 
banks and their national governments. 
3. The European Central Bank may under no circum-
stances grant to the Community or to one of its Mem-
ber States or to any public body a loan or other credit 
facility intended to make good a budget deficit. 
Article 106b 
1. For the purposes of the preceding Article, Eurofed's 
tasks shall be: 
(i) to determine and conduct monetary policy; 
(ii) to issue notes and coins denominated in ecus as the 
only legal tender throughout the Community, subject to 
the provisions of Article 109h(2); 
(iii) to conduct foreign-exchange operations in accord-
ance with the guidelines laid down by the Council; 
(iv) to hold and manage foreign reserves; 
(v) to participate in international monetary coopera-
tion; 
(vi) to monitor the smooth operation of the payments 
system; 
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(vii) to participate as necessary in the formulation, 
coordination and execution of policies relating to bank-
ing supervision and the stability of the financial system. 
2. In order to carry out the tasks assigned to it, 
Eurofed shall: 
(i) conduct credit operations and operate in the money 
and financial markets; 
(ii) hold the foreign reserves of the Member States, 
ownership of which will have been transfe"ed to the 
Community; 
(iii) have its own decision-making powers, and in parti-
cular the power to require credit institutions to lodge 
reserves with it. 
3. lhe European Central Bank shall be consulted by 
the Commission regarding any draft Community legis-
lation or any proposed international agreement on 
monetary, prudential supervision, banking or financial 
matters. 
It shall also be consulted by the authorities of the 
Member States regarding any draft legislation on such 
matters. 
Article 107 
1. Eurofed shall be administered by the decision-mak-
ing bodies of the European Central Bank. 
2. lhe European Central Bank shall be administered 
by a Council, hereinafter referred to as the 'Council of 
the Bank' made up of the 12 governors of the national 
central banks and the six members of the Executive 
Board, one of whom, the President of the European 
Central Bank, shall chair meetings of the Council of 
the Bank. 
lhe members of the Council and the Executive Board 
of the Bank shall carry out their tasks in a completely 
independent manner in the general interests of the 
Community. 
3. After discussion by the European Council and after 
consulting the European Parliament, the President and 
the other members of the Executive Board of the Bank 
shall be appointed for a period of eight years by the 
Council, acting unanimously. 
4. lhe Council of the Bank shall take the decisions 
necessary to ensure performance of the tasks entrusted 
to Eurofed under this Treaty. It shall determine the 
Community's monetary policy and shall adopt the 
guidelines necessary for its implementation. 
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5. lhe Council of the Bank shall adopt its decisions by 
a majority vote of its members. 
lhe conditions governing the casting of votes by the 
members of the Executive Board are laid down in the 
Statute of Eurofed and the European Central Bank. 
6. lhe Executive Board shall take the necessary 
administrative decisions in line with the guidelines and 
decisions adopted by the Council of the Bank. 
In addition, the Executive Board may, subject to the 
conditions set out in the Statute, be delegated certain 
powers by decision of the Council of the Bank. 
7. lhe President of the Bank shall chair the Executive 
Board, represent the European Central Bank exter-
nally, act in its name in judicial or other matters and 
exercise authority over all its departments. 
8. lhe division of responsibilities between the Council 
of the Bank and the Executive Board is set out in the 
Statute. 
Article 108 
1. lhe Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission and in close cooperation 
with the European Central Bank, shall/ay down guide-
lines for the Community's exchange-rate policy. 
In accordance with those guidelines, the European 
Central Bank shall conduct an appropriate intervention 
policy. 
2. lhe Council shall adopt, in accordance with the 
same rules and, where necessary, by urgent procedure, 
the Community's position in international monetary or 
financial bodies. 
3. Within those bodies, the Community shall be repre-
sented by the President of the Council, the President of 
the Bank and a Member of the Commission. 
Chapter3 
Institutional provisions 
Article 109 
1. lhe President of the Bank shall attend meetings of 
the Council that deal with the coordination of economic 
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policies and the examination of the specific recommen-
dations referred to in Article 102d. 
He may transmit to the Commission opinions of the 
Council of the Bank on developments in the economic 
and monetary situation in the Community or in certain 
Member States. 
2. The President of the Council and a Member of the 
Commission may attend meetings of the Council of the 
Bank but shall not be entitled to vote. 
3. The Commission may address to the President of 
the Council and to the President of the Bank observa-
tions which, in its view, have a bearing on the consist-
ency between economic and monetary policy. Those 
observations may be published. 
4. The European Central Bank shall, each year, trans-
mit a report on Eurofed's activities and on monetary 
developments to the European Parliament, the Euro-
pean Council and the Commission. 
5. The European Parliament shall hold a general 
debate once a year on the conduct of economic and 
monetary policy at Community level on the basis of a 
report from the Commission and the report from the 
European Central Bank. 
The President of the Bank shall take part in that 
debate. 
6. In addition, the President of the Bank may, at the 
request of the European Parliament or on his own ini-
tiative, be heard by the competent committee of the 
European Parliament. 
Article 109a 
{former Article 105 (2)) 
A Monetary Committee with advisory status is 
hereby set up. It shall have the following tasks: 
(i) to keep under review the monetary and financial 
situation of the Member States and of the Com-
munity and the general payments system of the 
Member States and to report regularly thereon to the 
Council and to the Commission; 
(ii) to deliver opinions at the request of the Council 
or of the Commission or on its own initiative, for 
submission to these institutions. 
The Member States and the Commission shall each 
appoint two members of the Monetary Committee. t 
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Chapter4 
(for information) 
The contents and title of this chapter are to be deter-
mined in the light of the Treaty amendments relating 
to political union. This chapter could in particular 
group together all the other economic provisions 
relating to EMU in the Treaty (notably the provisions 
relating to the free movement of capital). (See 
Article 67 et seq. above). 
Chapter 5 
Transitional provisions 
SECTION 1 
Transitional period 
Article J09b2 
The transitional period 3 for achieving economic and 
monetary union shall begin on 1 January 1994. 
2. By that date, the following shall have been achieved: 
(i) the abolition, as between Member States, of all 
obstacles to the free movement of capital; 
(ii) the participation of the largest possible number of 
Member States' currencies in the exchange-rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS); 
(iii) the existence of effective arrangements preventing, 
in each Member State, the monetary financing of 
public-sector budget deficits and ensuring that the 
Community or the Member States are not liable for the 
debts of another Member State. 
3. [. .. ]4, the Member States shall initiate the process 
for ensuring the independence of the members of 
1 The composition and functions of this Committee shall 
be amended in the light of the overall approach of 
economic and monetary union. 
The numbering is provisional and will have to be 
adjusted in line with the number of articles included in 
Chapter 4 above. 
3 Comsponding to Stage ll of the Delors Committee's plan. 
4 Date of entry into force of the Treaty amending the EEC 
Treaty with a view to achieving economic and monetary 
union. 
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Eurofed, which is to be completed not later than the 
time of the transition to the final stage of economic and 
monetary union. 
Article 109c 
1. During the transitional period, the Community shall 
adopt appropriate measures to reinforce the conver-
gence of economic and monetary developments in the 
various Member States and in particular price stability 
and the consolidation of public finances. It shall, in 
particular, ensure that the instruments and methods of 
the multilateral surveillance exercise are improved in 
the light of the experience gained during Stage 1. 
2. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament, may implement, in so far as necess-
ary, some or all of the provisions set out in Articles 
102d to 104 of the Treaty. 
Article 1 09d 
1. At the start of the transitional period, Eurofed shall 
be established pursuant to Article 106, in particular 
with a view to: 
(i) reinforcing the coordination of monetary policies; 
(ii) establishing the instruments and procedures necess-
ary for the future conduct of the single monetary 
policy; 
(iii) supervising the development of the ecu. 
2. The Community and the Member States shall take 
all appropriate measures to set up the various bodies of 
the European Central Bank and to allow Eurofed to 
operate. 
3. For the purposes referred to in paragraph 1, the 
Community shall adopt the acts provided for in this 
Treaty and the Statute annexed hereto so as to enable 
Eurofed to perform its duties. 
4. As soon as they are set up, the bodies of the Euro-
pean Central Bank shall perform the tasks and comply 
with the obligations provided for in Article 109. 
Article 1 09e 
1. As soon as it is set up, the European Bank, having 
due regard to the responsibilities incumbent upon the 
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authorities of the Member States as regards the formu-
lation and conduct of their monetary policies: 
(i) shall perform the duties entrusted to the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) and the Com-
mittee of Governors of the Central Banks and, in parti-
cular, shall ensure the smooth operation of the EMS; 
(ii) shall be empowered to make recommendations, 
which it may publish, to the central banks of the Mem-
ber States concerning the conduct of their monetary 
policy; 
(iii) may hold and manage foreign-exchange reserves, 
assist in the definition and conduct of a Community 
exchange-rate policy and, in particular, intervene on the 
foreign exchange markets; 
(iv) shall ensure the smooth operation of the ecu mar-
ket and, in particular, shall assume responsibility for 
the ecu bank clearing system; 
(v) shall participate in the harmonization of monetary 
and financial statistics and in the approximation of 
monetary policy instruments; 
(vi) shall make preparations for linking up payments 
networks and money and financial markets; 
(vii) shall supervise the devising and technical prepara-
tion of means of payment and notes and coins in ecus. 
2. The European Central Bank shall be consulted by 
the Commission on any draft Community legislation or 
any proposed international agreements in the mon-
etary, prudential supervision, banking or financial 
fields. 
It shall also be consulted by the authorities of the 
Member States on any draft legislation on such mat-
ters. 
3. Having due regard to the provisions of the Statute 
of Eurofed and of the European Central Bank, the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission, in cooperation with the Euro-
pean Parliament and after consulting the European 
Central Bank, shall adopt the measures required to 
allow the performance of the duties defined in para-
graph 1. 
Under the same procedure, the Council shall adopt the 
arrangements for transferring the assets and liabilities 
of the EMCF to Eurofed. 
4. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Central Bank, may 
entrust other functions to the European Central Bank 
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within the limits provided for in Article 106b. It shall, in 
accordance with the same procedure and in so far as is 
necessary, adopt the measures required to allow the 
performance of such functions. 
SECTION 2 
Transition to the final stage 
Article 109/ 
Within three years of the start of the transitional 
period, the Commission and the Council of the Bank 
shall report to the European Council on the results 
obtained and in particular on the progress achieved on 
convergence. 
On the basis of such reports, and after consulting the 
European Parliament, the European Council shall 
establish that the conditions for moving from the transi-
tional period to the final stage of economic and mon-
etary union have been met. 
It shall do so on the basis of an assessment of the 
results of market integration and of the convergence of 
economic and monetary developments in the Member 
States. 
Article 109g 
Having established the fact referred to in Article 109/. 
the Council, acting by a qualified majority in favour 
cast by at least eight members, shall immediately take 
the decisions required on a proposal from the Commis-
sion. 
It may, in particular, decide on the principle of a tem-
porary derogation for a Member State which, because 
of economic difficulties, is not yet in a position to parti-
cipate fully in the monetary-policy mechanisms speci-
fied for the final stage of economic and monetary 
union. 
On the basis of a report drawn up by the Commission 
and after consulting the European Central Bank, it 
shall also lay down, in accordance with the same proce-
dure, the duration and implementing a"angements for 
such derogation. The Council and the Commission 
shall immediately send the European Parliament a 
report on the decisions taken. 
Article 109h 
1. Immediately after establishing the fact referred to in 
Article 109/. the Council shall adopt thefzxed exchange 
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rates between Member States' cumncies and the mea-
sures necessary for introducing the ecu as the single 
cumncy of the Community, acting in accordance with 
the procedure provided for in paragraph 3. 
As from such time, Eurofed shall exercise fully its func-
tions in the monetary policy field. 
2. The Council, acting in accordance with the proce-
dure provided for in paragraph 3, shall adopt, in so far 
as is necessary, the technical a"angements under which 
Member States' cumncies may provisionally remain 
legal tender. 
3. The measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 
shall be adopted by the Council, acting unanimously on 
a proposal from the Commission and in consultation 
with the European Central Bank. 
Where, pursuant to Article 109g, the Council has 
decided on a derogation for one or more Member 
States, such measures shall be adopted unanimously by 
the Member States participating in the final stage. 
4. Where, pursuant to Article 109g, the Council has 
decided on a derogation for one or more Member 
States, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and in consultation with the 
European Central Bank, shall determine the conditions 
under which the qualified majority provided for in 
Article 108 are met. 
Chapter61 
Commercial policy 
Articles 110 to 116: Unchanged (subject to amend-
ments to be made to these Articles in the light of the 
work of the Intergovernmental Conference on politi-
cal union). 
TITLES Ill TO VII 
Unchanged. 
* 
* * 
I Change in numbering: currently Chapter 4. 
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PART FOUR 
Association of the overseas 
countries and territories) 
Unchanged. 
* 
* * 
PART FIVE 
Institutions of the Community 
TITLE I 
Provisions governing the 
institutions 
The provisions under this Title are unchanged except 
for Article 173 on legal review of acts of the institu-
tions, which should read as follows: 
Article 173 
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts 
[of the European Parliament,] 1 of the Council, the 
Commission and the European Central Bank other 
than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this 
purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by [the 
European Parliament] I a Member State, the Council 
or the Commission on grounds of lack of compet-
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ence, infringement of an essential procedural require-
ment, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of 
law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. 
The European Central Bank may, in order to safe-
guard its prerogatives, bring an action based on 
grounds deriving from infringement of such preroga-
tives against acts of the Council and the Commission. 
(Rest of Article unchanged). 
TITLE 11 
Financial provisions 
Article 199 
All items of revenue and expenditure of the Com-
munity, including those relating to the European 
Social Fund, shall be included in estimates to be 
drawn up for each financial year and shall be shown 
in the budget. 
The revenue and expenditure shown in the budget 
shall be in balance. 
Article 199a 
The proceeds of bo"owings contracted to finance the 
special loans referred to in Article 104 (1) shall be 
shown as revenue in a special section of the budget. 
They may not be allocated by transfer or in any other 
way to the financing of the Community's normal oper-
ating expenditure. 
[For information: The other budgetary provisions of 
the Treaty will have to be reviewed in the light of the 
work of the Intergovernmental Conference on politi-
cal union.] 
1 Article to be completed in the light of the work of the 
Intergovernmental Conference on political union. 
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Commentary 
Article 1 
I. Article I of the 1957 Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) is the provision 
which created the Community. That designation has 
become too narrow given the tasks conferred on the 
Community by the 1986 Single European Act and 
those which may be assigned to it by the Intergovern-
mental Conferences on EMU and political union. 
Nor does that designation any longer correspond to 
the public's perception of the Community. It is pro-
posed that current practice should be reflected by 
replacing the words 'European Economic Com-
munity' by 'European Community'. 
2. The amendment of the Community's name in 
Article I of the EEC Treaty would not affect the legal 
scheme of the three European Communities. Thus, 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
and the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) will still perform the tasks assigned to them 
by the respective Treaties in accordance with the 
rules laid down in them even though, since 1967, the 
institutions responsible for carrying out those tasks 
have been common to the three legal persons repre-
sented by the three Communities. 
Article 2(0bjectives) 
I. Article 2 defines the objectives of the Community 
and the means by which they are to be achieved. 
This Article, which has remained unchanged since 
1957, will have to reflect the new dimension of the 
Community after the entry into force of the treaties 
on political union and on economic and monetary 
union (EMU) following the two Intergovernmental 
Conferences that have been convened in accordance 
with Article 236 of the EEC Treaty. It will need, 
therefore, to summarize the amendments envisaged 
at the two conferences. 
Accordingly, the draft EMU treaty submitted by the 
Commission proposes a new wording for Article 2 
which will have to be finalized in the light of the out-
come of the Intergovernmental Conference on politi-
cal union. The draft EMU treaty contains only those 
amendments to the EEC Treaty which are necessary 
to ensure the establishment and the operation of 
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EMU; it does not affect the other amendments 
necessary for the parallel development of political 
union. 
2. EMU forms part of the objectives of the Com-
munity mapped out in this provision. It becomes the 
framework within which the Community's economic 
and social objectives can be achieved more effec-
tively and more rapidly, while providing individuals 
and economic operators with the advantage of a sin-
gle currency, the ecu, both inside the Community and 
in relations with third countries. 
3. As emphasized in new Article 2, EMU is to be 
based on the Community's achievements to date, the 
acquis communautaire. These achievements include 
everything which has been done to establish the com-
mon market (Article 8(7) of the EEC Treaty). More 
specifically, they include the creation of an internal 
market comprising an area without internal frontiers 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, ser-
vices and capital is ensured (Article 8(a) of the EEC 
Treaty). 
These achievements likewise include the other Com-
munity policies as clarified or supplemented by the 
Single European Act (social policies, structural poli-
cies and environmental protection policy, for exam-
ple). 
4. As pointed out in the comments on Article I 02b 
below, EMU is to be seen in the context of the full 
achievement of the objectives of the Single European 
Act. 
Article J(Activities) 
I. This Article describes the various activities to be 
carried on with a view to achieving the objectives set 
out in Article 2. It should have been supplemented 
when the Treaty was amended by the Single Euro-
pean Act in 1986 to take account of the new Com-
munity policies provided for in that Act. It will have 
to be updated as part of the work of the Intergovern-
mental Conference on political union and will have 
to take account of any extension of the Community's 
activities and of the description of such new activities 
as are endorsed by the Conference. 
Note to the reader: The numbering used in the sections on 
the articles does not necessarily correspond to that of the 
paragraphs or subparagraphs of the articles of the draft treaty 
that are commented upon. 
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In the draft EMU treaty, it was deemed sufficient to 
amend Article 3(g), which has become too narrow to 
describe the economic aspects of EMU, and to add a 
new point (ga) dealing with the monetary aspects. 
2. Article 3(g) is amended to clarify the foundations 
of the common economic policy of EMU: the defini-
tion of common objectives, close coordination of 
Member States' policies (an element taken over from 
present Article 3(g)), and the implementation of the 
other common policies. These matters are developed 
in Articles 102b to 104a of the Treaty. 
3. Article 3(ga) describes the essential feature of the 
monetary dimension of EMU, namely the definition 
and pursuit of a single monetary policy. 
It affirms that the primary objective of the policy is 
price stability, as advocated in the report of the 
Delors Committee and incorporated into the Statute 
of the European System of Central Banks drawn up 
by the Governors (Article 2.1), while at the same time 
emphasizing that this policy must support the com-
mon economic policy. The two aspects are comple-
mentary, even though the first one is described as the 
primary one. 
The institution entrusted with administering this 
policy, the European System of Central Banks, is 
established by Article 4; its structure and tasks are 
defined in Article 105 et seq. of the draft treaty. 
Article 4 (Institutions) 
I. Article 4 states that the tasks entrusted to the Com-
munity are to be carried out by its institutions, which 
are specified in paragraph I. 
The task of defining and conducting monetary policy 
is to be entrusted to a new institution, the European 
System of Central Banks, to be known as 'Eurofed'. 
Eurofed will be composed of the existing central 
banks of the Member States and of the newly estab-
lished European Central Bank (see Article 106(2)). 
There are two important distinctions between 
Eurofed and the four Community institutions (the 
European Parliament, the Council, the Commission 
and the Court of Justice). For this reason, its estab-
lishment is envisaged in new paragraph 2 of Article 4, 
thereby avoiding any confusion between the legal 
scheme applicable to the four Community institu-
tions and that applicable to Eurofed. 
2. Eurofed differs from the Community's existing 
institutions in two respects. 
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First, the institutions referred to in paragraph I form 
an integral part of the legal structure imparted by the 
EEC Treaty to the European Economic Community, 
the legal person in public international law which it 
set up (see Articles I, 210 and 211 of the EEC 
Treaty); those institutions thus have no legal person~ 
ality of their own. 
Eurofed, on the other hand, comprises the European 
Central Bank, which will have legal personality under 
international law (see Article 106(2) below), and the 
national central banks, which will retain the legal per-
sonality conferred on them by their own national law. 
Second, Eurofed is to be independent not only politi-
cally but also administratively. The rules laid down in 
the EEC Treaty for the traditional institutions, and 
particularly the financial rules (Articles 199 to 209), 
are not adapted to its needs. There is thus a need for 
specific rules to apply to Eurofed or the European 
Central Bank. 
On these two points, the views of the Commission 
coincide with those expressed by the Governors of the 
Central Banks when they drew up their draft statute. 
3. In line with the general scheme of Community 
law, the tasks and main features of the system should 
be included in the treaty itself, while the operation of 
the system should be defined in its statute, which will 
take the legal form of a protocol annexed to, and will 
constitute an integral part of, the EEC Treaty (Article 
239 of the EEC Treaty). 
This was the practice followed by the architects of the 
Treaty of Rome in setting up the European Invest-
ment Bank, for example (Articles 129 and 130 of the 
EEC Treaty). 
The Governors' draft statute and the Commission's 
draft EMU treaty agree on the principles of the 
scheme for the provisions dealing with Eurofed. But 
the EMU draft treaty starts from the assumption that 
more particulars regarding the structure of the system 
must be included in the treaty in order to give them a 
more formal status, even though, for reasons of clar-
ity, the statute may include certain provisions of the 
treaty. 
4. The present paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 are 
renumbered accordingly; they may also be revised as 
a result of the Intergovernmental Conference on pol-
itical union. 
Article 6 (Coordination of economic policy) 
Article 6 is deleted; the coordination of Member 
States' economic policies and the rules governing the 
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role that the European Community is to play in this 
connection have been incorporated into the provi-
sions on the economic policy of EMU (Articles 102b 
and !04a of the draft treaty). 
Part Two: Foundations of the 
Community 
Title Ill: Free movement of persons, 
services and capital 
Chapter 4: Capital 
This chapter has to be reworded to take account of 
EMU and placed in new Chapter 5 of Title 11 of Part 
Three of the EEC Treaty as amended by the EMU 
Treaty ('Economic and monetary union'), with the 
exception of the ban on restrictions on the free move-
ment of capital (Article 67), which is one of the foun-
dations of the Community developed in Part Two. 
Article 67(Free movement of capital) 
I. As worded at present, Article 67, which deals with 
the free movement of capital, must be distinguished 
from the Articles dealing with the other fundamental 
freedoms (free movement of goods in Article 30; free 
movement of persons in Articles 47 and 52; freedom 
to provide services in Article 59). Those provisions 
have direct effect and confer rights on individuals; 
Article 67, on the other hand, does not have direct 
effect, with the result that the free movement of capi-
tal is governed entirely by secondary Community 
legislation adopted under Article 69 to give effect to 
Article 67 (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Case 203/80 Casati [ 1981] ECR 2595). 
2. The proposed amendment to Article 67 extends its 
scope beyond what is necessary for the proper opera-
tion of the common market. It transforms Article 67 
into a prohibition of like nature to those that the 
other freedoms demand. 
3. The wording of Article 67(2) has been tidied up, 
since the reference to the ftrst stage in the establish-
ment of the common market (Article 8 of the EEC 
Treaty) has become redundant. 
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Articles 68 to 73 
The change made in Article 67 has repercussions on 
the other articles in the chapter on the free movement 
of capital, which have to be adapted or indeed 
repealed as a result. Some of these provisions will 
have to be included in an appropriate form in new 
Chapter 4 of Title 11 of the amended EEC Treaty. 
Part Three: Policy of the 
Community 
Title 11: Economic and monetary 
union 
This Title of the EEC Treaty, at present entitled 
'Economic policy', is amended to 'Economic and 
monetary union', in line with what is announced in 
Article 2 of the draft treaty. 
The present Treaty comprises four chapters: Cooper-
ation in economic and monetary policy (Article 
102a), Conjunctural policy (Article 103), Balance of 
payments (Articles 104 to 109) and Commercial 
policy (Articles !I 0 to 116). 
The draft treaty completely recasts the ftrst three 
chapters and their constituent articles, with only 
Article 103 being retained, albeit with some addi-
tional provisions. 
Two other chapters are added, and this means that 
Chapter 4 (Commercial policy) becomes Chapter 6 
with no amendment as to substance since the provi-
sions of this chapter are liable to be amended in the 
context of the Intergovernmental Conference on pol-
itical union. The Treaty provisions on the external 
economic policy should be adapted and regrouped in 
order to reinforce the Community's capacity for act-
ion within all international forums. This point was 
emphasized by the Commission in its opinion of 21 
October 1990 concerning the Intergovernmental Con-
ference on political union (COM(90) 600), delivered 
pursuant to Article 236. In this connection, it will be 
for the Council of Ministers to lay down the guide-
lines and for the Commission to ensure that they are 
implemented. 
It should be recalled that, in certain areas, the Treaty 
already confers on the Community an important role 
that has clear economic implications even if these are 
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occasionally overlooked. Whether we take competi-
tion (Articles 85 to 89), the opening-up of public pro-
curement (Article l30f(2)), research and development 
(Article l30f et seq.), European infrastructures 
(Article l30r et seq.), labour markets (Articles 49 and 
118), environment (Article l30r et seq.) or taxation 
(Article 99), the Community's role will have to 
increase and the policies of the Community will have 
to be reinforced so as to improve the efficiency of the 
internal market, which is the foundation of economic 
union. It will be necessary in those areas to enhance 
the powers of the Community, essentially within the 
context of the Intergovernmental Conference on pol-
itical union, which would go hand in hand with pro-
gress towards EMU. 
Moreover, specific provisions have already been 
enacted by the Member States in order to improve 
economic convergence during Stage I of EMU. Take, 
for instance, Council Decision 90/141/EEC, which 
sets up a multilateral surveillance mechanism cover-
ing all aspects of economic policies in the short and 
medium term. This Decision also opens up the possi-
bility of specific surveillance of budgetary policies 
during that initial stage. 
The provisions described below, which will not come 
into play until Stage II, must therefore be considered 
as an extension to those applicable during Stage I. 
In contrast, the provisions relating to monetary policy 
cannot be linked, at least not from a legal viewpoint, 
to anything which exists today. They are a new 
departure and, as such, deserve a more detailed com-
mentary. 
Article 1 02a (Implementation of EMU) 
l. This Article spells out the foundations of EMU, as 
referred to in Article 2, indicates that it will be 
brought about in stages, stresses the need for parallel-
ism between the economic and monetary aspects of 
EMU, and defines the arrangements for moving from 
one stage to the next. It refers implicitly to the 
approach proposed by the Delors Committee's report 
and endorsed at successive European Council meet-
ings. 
Stage I began on I July 1990 pursuant to the existing 
Treaty provisions. In contrast, the other two stages 
require a prior amendment of the EEC Treaty, as the 
report of the Delors Committee acknowledges. 
Stage II is described in legal terms as a transitional 
period. It will begin on l January 1994, in accordance 
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with the conclusions of the Rome European Council 
on 28 October 1990, which were adopted by the 
Heads of State or Government of ll Member States. 
2. The provisions applicable during this transitional 
period, which, in the Commission's view, must be a 
short one, are contained in Articles I 09b to l 09e of 
the draft treaty, as indicated in the fourth paragraph. 
The transition to Stage Ill of EMU, termed the 'final 
stage' in new Article l02a, should occur in accord-
ance with the conclusions of the Rome European 
Council of 28 October 1990. It will not be automatic 
but will depend on whether the European Council 
finds that the objective conditions for such a move 
are met. 
These conditions are set out in Article I 09f of the 
transitional provisions of Chapter 5. 
Chapter 1: Economic policy 
In accordance with Article 3(g), this chapter defines 
the objectives of the common economic policy and 
the instruments for close coordination of Member 
States' economic policies. 
Article 102b 
I. Paragraph l of this Article defines the main 
economic policy objectives: growth, a high level of 
employment, and balance-of-payments equilibrium. 
The objectives are to be achieved without jeopardiz-
ing price stability, which is the prime monetary policy 
objective, or economic and social cohesion. The 
Article stresses that EMU is based on the full 
achievement of the objectives laid down in the Single 
European Act and extends those objectives. In 
adopting the Single European Act, the Member 
States confrrmed the objective of achieving EMU in 
stages, as underscored by the European Council at its 
meeting on 27 and 28 June 1988 in Hanover. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the progress 
achieved during Stage I with regard to convergence: 
the success of the process as a whole depends on the 
successful completion of Stage I. 
2. Paragraph 2 calls on the Member States to pursue 
their economic policies in such a way as to contribute 
to achieving the objectives of EMU. 
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Article 102c(Multiannual guidelines) 
I. This Article creates a new instrument for coordi-
nating economic policies: multiannual economic 
policy guidelines. 
As stated in the Commission paper of 21 August 
1990, their purpose is to define general objectives for 
the Community and the means of achieving those 
objectives. So as to improve the compatibility of 
Member States' economic policies, specific reference 
will be made to the development of Member States' 
budget balances, the control of the costs of produc-
tion, the levels of saving and investment, the adapta-
tion of Community policies for achieving economic 
and social cohesion, and national structural policies. 
2. Paragraph 2 lays down the procedure to be fol-
lowed in formulating the guidelines; they will be pro-
posed by the Commission, approved by the Euro-
pean Council and officially adopted by the Council 
of Ministers (Economic and Financial Affairs), after 
consulting the European Parliament, with the Coun-
cil taking its decision by a qualified majority. The 
actual period during which the multiannual guide-
lines will apply is not stipulated in the Treaty, for rea-
sons of flexibility; this will be done in the Commis-
sion's proposals (the period will normally last some 
three to five years). 
3. Under paragraph 3, the Council will be able to 
make annual adjustments to the multiannual guide-
lines on the basis of a report drawn up by the Com-
mission. 
Article 1 02d (Recommendations) 
I. Economic policy recommendations already consti-
tute a coordination instrument in Council Decision 
90/141/EEC on the attainment of progressive con-
vergence of economic policies and performance 
during Stage I of economic and monetary union. 
This Article underlines the importance of this instru-
ment by enshrining it as a provision in the Treaty. 
Where necessary, the recommendations may be 
addressed to each Member State; they would contain 
general guidelines on Member States' economic and 
budgetary policies. 
2. The procedure to be followed in adopting the 
recommendations is set out in paragraph I. The 
Council' will act by a qualified majority on a propo-
sal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament. Paragraph 2 provides that the 
Commission, in association with the relevant Corn-
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mittee of the European Parliament, will see to it that 
the recommendations are implemented. 
3. Paragraph 3 provides for the possibility of taking 
action if a Member State does not comply with the 
recommendations. After making known its view to 
the Member State concerned, the Commission may 
confidentially propose the necessary policy adjust-
ments to the Council. If the Council does not take a 
decision on the Commission's proposal within one 
month, the Commission may make its proposal 
public. 
Compliance with the recommendations is not a mat-
ter for review by the Court of Justice. 
Article 103 (Multilateral surveillance) 
I. The new version of this Article is based very 
largely on Article 103 of the present Treaty. Para-
graphs 2, 3 and 4 remain unchanged. 
Two new subparagraphs have been added to para-
graph I as it currently stands. This paragraph other-
wise remains unchanged. First, an overall evaluation 
of the short and medium-term economic develop-
ments in the Community and in each of its Member 
States will be carried out regularly at Community level. 
The multilateral surveillance already provided for in 
Council Decision 90/ 141/EEC is incorporated into 
the Treaty as the principal instrument for assessing 
the results of the coordination of Member States' 
economic policies. 
This Article could be the legal basis for a subsequent 
revision of Council Decision 90/141/EEC, so as to 
reinforce convergence still further by redefining the 
content and procedures for multilateral surveillance 
in the light of the experience gained during Stage I. 
3. The establishment of Community procedures for 
defining multiannual guidelines and the exercise of 
multilateral surveillance have important political con-
sequences. In their deliberations, the national parlia-
ments will have to take account of the guidelines and 
recommendations deriving from the new procedures. 
The Member States will have to justify their attitudes 
not only to the Community institutions but also to 
public opinion in their countries: hence the need for 
a large degree of transparency in the procedures. 
1 This task will appropriately fall to the Council of Minis-
ters (Economic and Financial Affairs). 
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Article 104 (Financial assistance) 
l. In an economic and monetary union, it is the gen-
eral economic problems of the Member States and 
economic convergence which concern the Com-
munity rather than the balance-of-payments difficul-
ties of a particular Member State. Present Articles 104 
to I 09 thus become superfluous. By contrast, a 
special financial support mechanism is introduced in 
place of the mutual assistance provided for in Article 
108 of the present Treaty. 
This mechanism would be activated in the event of 
serious economic problems in one or more Member 
States or if economic convergence required a parti-
cular effort on the part of the Community to back up 
national adjustment strategies, so as to provide posi-
tive conditionality. As envisaged in the Commission 
paper of 21 August, the mechanism will provide sup-
port for national efforts. 
2. Paragraph I stipulates that, should such an even-
tuality arise, the Commission would examine the 
situation and could propose to the Council that, sub-
ject to certain conditions, financial assistance be 
granted in the form of aid to be borne by the Com-
munity budget or of special loans; the Council will 
decide by a qualified majority. 
3. As stated in paragraph 2, the general conditions 
for such intervention, including the requirement to 
inform the European Parliament, will be defined on 
the basis of secondary Community legislation. The 
Council will act by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission and in cooperation with the 
European Parliament. 
4. Under paragraph 3, the Council may establish a 
system of borrowing to finance the special loans 
under the support mechanism and will lay down the 
maximum volume of such borrowing. The decision-
making procedure is in line with that provided for in 
the preceding paragraph. The borrowings would be 
entered in the budget and the proceeds shown as 
revenue in a special section of the budget (see Article 
199a of the draft EMU treaty). 
Article 1 04a (Budgetary rules) 
I. This Article is concerned with the potential threat 
to monetary stability posed by budget deficits and 
their financing. It lays down specific rules (no mon-
etary financing, no unconditional guarantee for 
Member States' public debt) and embodies the prin-
ciple that excessive budget deficits must be avoided. 
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The two rules are in the nature of absolute prohibi-
tions which do not call for any secondary legislation 
although, to be effective, the principle presupposes 
that an assessment is made of the budgetary conduct 
of the Member States. As indicated in the Commis-
sion paper of 21 August 1990, any assessment of an 
excessive deficit is, in practice, linked to the sustain-
able nature of the budget situation, something which 
cannot be ascertained in isolation from a general 
appraisal of the situation and economic develop-
ments and should, therefore, form an integral part of 
multilateral surveillance. However, it seems necessary 
to have one or more benchmarks for judging whether 
or not a deficit is excessive. The Commission will put 
forward proposals in this respect. 
2. In order to avoid excessive budget deficits, para-
graph 2 provides that the Council may adopt mea-
sures. Together with Article 3, to which it may have 
recourse, the reference here is to the recommenda-
tions specified in Article 102d, including the possibil-
ity of a Commission proposal which could be made 
public. 
Article 105(Monetary Committee) 
It is proposed that paragraph I of Article I 05 of the 
EEC Treaty be repealed. This provision requires 
Member States to coordinate their economic policies 
and, for that purpose, to provide for cooperation 
between their appropriate administrative departments 
and between their central banks. 
The new provisions proposed, particularly the 
requirement that Member States pursue their econ-
omic policies with a view to contributing to achieving 
the objectives of EMU (Article 102b) and the multila-
teral surveillance arrangements, mean that paragraph 
I no longer serves any purpose. 
Paragraph 2, which sets up the monetary committee, 
is transferred in an abridged form to Article 109a. 
Chapter 2: Monetary policy 
Article J05(new) 
I. This Article sets out the definition of monetary 
union as understood for the purposes of the new 
treaty. 'Monetary union' can be viewed as a system 
of irrevocably fixed exchange rates accompanied by 
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full convertibility of currencies, total freedom of 
movement of capital, and complete financial integra-
tion; or it can be viewed as a system based on a sin-
gle currency. Since the publication of the Delors 
Committee's report, it has become clear that only a 
single currency can secure the full benefits of EMU. 
The ensuing provisions, dealing with the final stage, 
thus define EMU as a system based on a single cur-
rency. 
The chapter on monetary policy naturally involves 
more institutional changes to the Treaty than does 
the chapter on economic policy. It lays down the 
structure and operation of a new monetary authority, 
Eurofed. 
2. In line with the general scheme of Community 
law, the tasks and the essential structural features of 
the authority need to be included in the Treaty itself, 
while its manner of operation needs to be spelt out in 
its own Statute. This chapter has been drafted with 
this in mind and account has been taken of the pro-
posals made by the Central Bank Governors in their 
draft statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank. 
Article 106(Eurofed) 
I. This Article defines the new monetary authority: 
Eurofed is to be made up of the national central 
banks, which will retain their own legal personality, 
and of a central institution, the European Central 
Bank (ECB), which is established by this Article. This 
two-tier system, combined with the powers accorded 
to the governors of the national central banks within 
the managing bodies of the European Central Bank, 
reflects the federal character of Eurofed. Unlike its 
constituent bodies, Eurofed itself has no legal person-
ality. The term 'Eurofed' refers to the co-existence of 
the national central banks and the ECB and to the 
body of rules governing relations between them. 
2. Paragraph 3 states that the Eurofed Statute is to be 
annexed to the Treaty, conferring on it the same legal 
status as the Treaty itself (see Article 239 of the EEC 
Treaty). One particular effect of this is that the Sta-
tute could be amended only in the same way as the 
Treaty unless there was a specific provision to that 
end. Such a provision is, in fact, set out in paragraph 
3, which provides for a simplified procedure, distin-
guishing between those provisions of the Statute 
which could be amended by the simplified procedure 
and those which could be amended only in accord-
ance with Article 236 of the Treaty. Such a distinction 
can be made either by listing the provisions which 
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can be amended by the simplified procedure (a posi-
tive list) or by listing those which cannot be amended 
in this way (a negative list). 
The method proposed is the positive list, along the 
lines of Article 188 of the Treaty, which deals with 
the Statute of the Court of Justice. The list itself will 
have to be drawn up at a later stage, in close consul-
tation with the Central Bank Governors. As to proce-
dure, it is proposed that the Council should decide 
on any amendment, acting by a qualified majority at 
the request of the European Central Bank and after 
consulting the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment. 
Article 1 06a (Independence) 
I. This Article lays down the rules providing for the 
independence of Eurofed and ensures that the princi-
ple of independence cannot be called into question 
by any obligation on Eurofed to finance budget defi-
cits through money creation. 
Paragraph I states that the European Central Bank is 
to carry out its tasks on its own responsibility and 
that it can act only under the conditions laid down in 
the Treaty and in its Statute. 
Independence is vital if Eurofed is to achieve the pri-
mary objective assigned to it by Article 3(ga): the 
maintenance of price stability. Paragraph 2 accord-
ingly provides that, in performing their duties, the 
European Central Bank, the national central banks 
and the members of their decision-making bodies 
may not seek or take any instructions from any Com-
munity institution, national authority or other body. 
This provision and the following one, which obliges 
the Community and the Member States to respect 
this independence, are closely modelled on Article 
157(2) of the EEC Treaty, which concerns the Mem-
bers of the Commission. In substance, the definition 
given of independence is very similar to that pro-
posed by the Central Bank Governors. 
The independence of the system has also to be pro-
tected against the danger that, under their national 
law, certain national central banks may not enjoy the 
requisite degree of autonomy. Paragraph 2 accord-
ingly calls on the Member States to amend the rel-
evant national legislation as necessary. The Central 
Bank Governors' draft statute contains similar provi-
sions (Article 14.2). 
2. The ban on the monetary financing of budget defi-
cits is a necessary accompaniment to independence. 
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It applies to the public authorities (Article 104a of the 
draft EMU Treaty) and, as a corollary, to the mon-
etary authority. The provision does not, however, rule 
out the possibility of Eurofed acquiring public-debt 
securities on secondary markets in connection with 
its monetary-policy operations. Nor does paragraph 2 
rule out the granting of overdrafts on commercial 
terms to meet temporary shortages of liquidity. 
Article 106b(Tasks and operation ofEurofed) 
I. Paragraph I sets out the tasks of the system, while 
paragraph 2 spells out the powers that will enable it 
to carry out those tasks. 
Eurofed's main task is to determine and conduct the 
monetary policy of the Community. It has sole power 
to issue notes and coins (denominated in national 
currency at the start of Stage Ill and subsequently in 
ecus), and this gives it control of the monetary base. 
2. Eurofed will intervene on foreign-exchange mar-
kets in accordance with guidelines laid down by the 
Council. Article I 08( I) of the draft EMU treaty estab-
lishes the procedures by which these guidelines are to 
be laid down (in close cooperation with Eurofed). 
As a corollary to its role in exchange policy, Eurofed 
is to be the definitive holder of the official foreign-
exchange reserves and is to manage them. 
As stipulated in paragraph 2, it is to act on behalf of 
the Community, to which the ownership of those 
reserves will have been transferred. 
3. Eurofed is to participate in international monetary 
cooperation. EMU will enable the Community to 
play an appropriate part in devising and managing a 
more stable international monetary system. The 
Community will therefore be represented on the 
international scene in the same way as the individual 
countries, namely, by those responsible for economic 
policy assisted by their monetary authority, Eurofed. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 108 of the draft EMU 
treaty lay down the necessary institutional provisions. 
4. Eurofed's other tasks are stated in the same terms 
as those provided for in the Central Bank Governors' 
draft statute: 
(i) It is to monitor the smooth operation of the Com-
munity's payments system, which will have to be as 
efficient for the Community as a whole as is a 
national payments system at the moment. 
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(ii) Eurofed is to participate as necessary in the for-
mulation, coordination and execution of policies 
relating to banking supervision and the stability of 
the financial system. 
(iii) The list of powers in paragraph 2 includes the 
traditional tools of monetary policy. It also includes a 
provision setting out Eurofed's power to take deci-
sions, in iiCCordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty, 
such power being exercised within the limits of the 
other powers conferred upon Eurofed by the Treaty 
itself or, to a wider extent, by the Statute. 
Like the traditional institutions, which have power to 
take decisions (Council: second indent of Article 
145; Commission: third indent of Article 155), 
Eurofed may, in exercising this power of decision, 
have recourse to the legal instruments provided for in 
Article 189. 
(iv) Paragraph 3 entitles Eurofed to be consulted by 
both the Commission and the Member States regard-
ing any draft legislation or other official act in the 
fields within its competence. 
Article 107(0rganization) 
I. This Article deals with Eurofed's decision-making 
bodies and the decision-making process. Except 
where otherwise specified below, it mirrors the draft 
statute drawn up by the Central Bank Governors. 
The decision-making mechanism envisaged has to 
take account of the novel legal structure of the sys-
tem. If a single monetary policy is to be formulated 
and pursued, the national central banks, which retain 
their own legal personality, must be placed under the 
authority of the European Central Bank. It is there-
fore vital that the rules ensuring the primacy of the 
central institution be laid down without ambiguity. 
Paragraph I according provides that Eurofed is to be 
administered by the decision-making bodies of the 
European Central Bank. To the extent necessary, it 
establishes a legal basis for the exercise of the power 
of mangement by the European Central Bank vis-a-
vis the national central banks. 
2. The European Central Bank's decision-making 
bodies are to be the Council and the Executive Board 
(paragraph 2). These bodies therefore form part of the 
European Central Bank, an institution with legal per-
sonality, and are not traditional Community institu-
tions (see comments on Article 4 above). Each of the 
Central Bank Governors is to have a seat on the 
Council, reflecting Eurofed's federal structure. 
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The specific aspects of democratic accountability are 
spelt out in paragraph 3. The term of office of mem-
bers of the Executive Board is set at eight years, so as 
to ensure stability in office. The draft treaty makes no 
provision for the removal from office of members of 
the Executive Board. Any such provision will have to 
be included in the Statute. The members of the Exec-
utive Board, like the Governors of the national cen-
tral banks, are to be appointed by the political auth-
orities. 
3. It is proposed that all the members of the Execu-
tive Board should be appointed in the same way: 
after discussion by the European Council and after 
consultations with the European Parliament, the 
President of the European Central Bank and the 
other members of the Executive Board are to be 
appointed by the Council of the European Com-
munity acting unanimously. These procedures depart 
from those proposed by the Central Bank Governors 
in their draft statute, which envisages consultation of 
Parliament only in respect of the appointment of the 
President and Vice-President, with the Eurofed 
Council being called upon to give its opinion in the 
case of the other members (Article 11.2 and 3 of the 
draft statute). 
4. Paragraph 4 emphasizes the primacy of the 
Eurofed Council, granting it power to take the deci-
sions necessary to ensure performance of the tasks 
entrusted to Eurofed and to determine the Com-
munity's monetary policy. 
5. Paragraph 5 provides that the Council is to adopt 
its decisions by a majority vote of its members. This 
implies that each member has one vote. This rule 
reflects Eurofed's federal character while, at the same 
time, reinforcing the decision-making process and 
emphasizing that the members of the Council are res-
ponsible to the Community as a whole. The Central 
Bank Governors' draft statute likewise embodies a 
'one man, one vote' principle but requires a majority 
only of the members present (Article 10.2), with the 
result that an important decision could be taken in 
the absence of a large number of members. The prov-
ision proposed in the draft treaty is based on existing 
Community law (see, for example, Article 148(1) of 
the EEC Treaty). The other rules governing voting on 
the Executive Board will be set out in the Statute. 
6. Another aspect of the decision-making process is 
the division of responsibility between the Council 
and the Executive Board and between the European 
Central Bank and the national central banks. In the 
latter case, the division of responsibility as regards 
the implementation of monetary policy will have to 
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be spelt out in the Statute. As for the division of res-
ponsibility between the Council and the Executive 
Board, Article 107(6) empowers the Executive Board 
to take the necessary administrative decisions, in line 
with the guidelines and decisions adopted by the 
Council of the European Central Bank, but it also 
allows the Council to delegate other powers to the 
Executive Board. Paragraph 8 states that this division 
of responsibility will be spelt out in the Statute. 
Lastly, the President of the European Central Bank 
will represent the Bank and will be given authority 
over a permament staff (paragraph 7). 
Article J08(Exchange-rate policy and 
international monetary cooperation) 
I. Paragraph I of this Article specifies the procedure 
for adopting guidelines for the Community's 
exchange-rate policy. Since the exchange rate is an 
important component of external economic policy, 
external relations in the monetary field have two 
aspects: monetary in the narrow sense of the term, 
and economic. They therefore involve both the centre 
of economic decision-making (the traditional institu-
tions) and the centre of monetary decision-making 
(Eurofed). It is important that exchange-rate policy 
should be determined within a framework of close 
cooperation and should observe certain fundamental 
principles. In particular, exchange-rate intervention 
with regard to foreign currencies should not run 
counter to the main objective of monetary policy, 
namely price stability. 
2. With this in mind, it is proposed that the Council 
should lay down these guidelines, acting by a quali-
fied majority on a proposal from the Commission 
and in close cooperation with the European Central 
Bank. This mechanism confers ultimate responsibility 
for exchange-rate policy on the institutions respon-
sible for economic policy, as is the case in all Mem-
ber States, but it leaves Eurofed some room for 
maneouvre in carrying out that policy. It also ensures 
that the monetary authority is at all times in a posi-
tion to press home the interests of internal monetary 
policy. 
3. Under paragraph 2, the Community's position in 
international monetary bodies is to be determined by 
the same procedures. 
Turning to the external representation of the Com-
munity, one implication of paragraph 3 is that at G7 
meetings, for example, the Community would be 
represented by the President of the Council, the Presi-
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dent of Eurofed and a Member of the Commission. 
The Community would, therefore, be properly repre-
sented in this way both within international monetary 
bodies and within international economic bodies. 
Chapter 3: Institutional provisions 
Article 109 
I. As emphasized in Article 106a of the draft EMU 
treaty, the European Central Bank will enjoy com-
plete independence in carrying out the tasks assigned 
to it. It must, however, give an account of its activi-
ties. 
Procedures are also needed that will ensure the con-
sistency of economic and monetary policies without 
impinging on the independence of the European 
Central Bank. Such mechanisms exist in legislation 
in those Member States whose central banks are 
independent vis-a-vis the public authorities in the 
same way as Eurofed in general and the European 
Central Bank in particular will be. 
This is the reason why Article 109(1) provides for the 
Eurofed President to attend the meetings of the 
Council of Ministers that deal with the coordination 
of economic policies. He may address such meetings 
but will not be entitled to vote (see Article 148 of the 
EEC Treaty). This provision reflects in the main the 
wishes of the Central Bank Governors (Article 15.2 of 
the draft statute). It does not, though, satisfy their 
request that they be allowed to attend meetings of the 
European Council; this does not, of course, mean 
that the President of the European Central Bank 
could not be invited by the European Council to 
attend its meetings if the situation so demanded, no-
tably in order to explain an opinion given to the 
Commission (paragraph I) or the report he lays 
before it (paragraph 4). 
2. The corollary of attendance by the President of the 
European Central Bank at Council meetings to dis-
cuss economic matters (Article 109(1)) is participation 
(with no right to vote) by the President of the Council 
and a Member of the Commission at meetings of the 
Eurofed Council (Article 109(2)). In this respect, the 
text corresponds to that proposed by the Central 
Bank Governors (Article 15.1 of the draft statute). 
3. Paragraph I states that the President of the Euro-
pean Central Bank may transmit opinions on the 
economic and monetary situation in the Community 
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or in certain Member States to the Commission. This 
will allow the Commission to prepare, in full know-
ledge of the situation, the proposals it is required to 
present to the Council in connection with its task of 
ensuring the consistency of, and monitoring, the gen-
eral economic policy of the Community. 
4. Paragraph 3 provides that the Commission may 
address observations regarding the consistency 
between economic policy and monetary policy to 
Eurofed. This right to submit observations is entailed 
by the responsibility to be exercised by the Commis-
sion in ensuring consistency between economic 
policy and monetary policy (see Articles 102c and 
102d). 
The procedure to be followed by the Commission is 
spelt out in paragraph 3. The observations are confi-
dential and are addressed as such to the President of 
the Council of Ministers and to the President of the 
European Central Bank. If the observations are not 
acted upon within a reasonable period, the Commis-
sion may publish them. This provision mirrors Article 
102d(3) (proposal for a recommendation concerning 
measures to rectify the economic situation). 
5. In addition, paragraph 4 stipulates that Eurofed is 
each year to transmit a report giving account of its 
activities to the European Council and to the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
This report, together with a report from the Commis-
sion, will serve as the basis for a general debate in the 
European Parliament (paragraph 5) on the conduct 
of economic and monetary policy in which the 
Eurofed President will take part. Lastly, the Eurofed 
President may, at the request of the European Parlia-
ment or on his own initiative, be heard by the compe-
tent committee of the European Parliament (para-
graph 6). 
6. In sum, this Article establishes a set of provisions 
that give substance to democratic accountability 
within EMU. Whether we take cross-participation in 
the decision-making bodies, the Commission's right 
to make observations, the general debate in Parlia-
ment on the conduct of economic and monetary 
policy, or the explanations, 'hearings' and report of 
Eurofed to the European Parliament, all these factors 
contribute to a balance of power within EMU that 
respects the principle of democratic legitimacy. Of 
particular note here is the role of the Commission: 
exercise of its right to make observations must be 
assessed in the light of its accountability to Parlia-
ment in order to gauge its full significance. 
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Article 109a (former Article 105(2)) 
Basically, this provision is former Article 105(2), 
which set up the Monetary Committee and has been 
included in an abridged version that takes account of 
the development of EMU. The tasks and composi-
tion of the Monetary Committee will need to be 
adapted to take account of the overall design of 
EMU as it emerges from the deliberations of the 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
Chapter4 
This Chapter is to include the other provisions relat-
ing to EMU. It will need to pay special attention to 
the free movement of capital, and especially capital 
flows from (and to) third countries. Article 72 of the 
Treaty, which currently deals with this matter, needs 
to be extensively reworded, as has already been 
emphasized in the comments on the chapter concern-
ing the free movement of capital (Articles 67 to 73). 
Chapter 5: Transitional provisions 
Section 1: Transitional period 
Article 109b 
This Article lays down the date on which the transi-
tional period, corresponding to Stage 11 in the Delors 
Committee report, is to begin and sets out what must 
be done beforehand. It mirrors the conclusions 
reached by the Heads of State or Government of 11 
Member States at the European Council meeting in 
Rome on 27 and 28 October 1990. 
The transitional period, then, is to begin on I January 
1994. Before that date the free movement of capital 
must have taken effect, the largest possible number of 
currencies must have joined the exchange-rate 
mechanism of the EMS (thereby leaving a measure of 
discretion to the Community and the Member 
States), and monetary financing of budget deficits 
and automatic bail-outs must be prohibited. The pro-
cess for ensuring the independence of the members 
of Eurofed must also have been initiated in every 
Member State. 
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Article 109c 
I. This Article deals with the measures to be taken to 
reinforce convergence during the transitional period 
so that the single monetary policy can be pursued 
without difficulty as soon as the final stage begins. 
The achievements of Stage I of EMU will have to be 
built on, and the instruments and methods of multila-
teral surveillance will have to be improved in the 
light of the experience acquired. 
2. Paragraph 2 establishes a procedure for anticipat-
ing all or some of the economic policy provisions of 
the final stage (Articles 102d to 104). A decision of 
this kind will need a unanimous vote of the Council. 
In the absence of any such decision, the mechanisms 
for coordination and financial support for Member 
States in difficulty which have been developed for 
Stage I of EMU under the Treaty of Rome, as 
amended by the Single European Act, will continue 
to apply. 
Article 109d (Establishment of Eurofed) 
I. Paragraph I sets the date on which Eurofed is to 
be established as a legal person in public interna-
tional law and requires the Community and the 
Member States to take the necessary measures to 
allow Eurofed to operate. 
For example, they will have to appoint the members 
of the Executive Board of the European Central 
Bank and to take the measures guaranteeing the 
independence of its Council (Article 106a (2)). 
The establishment of an institution and its decision-
making bodies some time before it assumes all its 
powers is normal practice; it enables those bodies to 
adopt the procedural and administrative arrange-
ments necessary if they are to function properly and 
if their members are to establish a climate of mutual 
confidence beforehand. 
2. Paragraph I sets objectives for Eurofed which are 
to apply from the time it is set up, preparing the way 
for the exercise of the tasks to be assigned to it during 
the final stage under Article I 06b of the draft treaty. 
These objectives were spelt out in the conclusions of 
the Rome European Council. 
Paragraph 3 imposes an obligation on the Com-
munity institutions to adopt, during the transitional 
period, Community legislation that will enable 
Eurofed to perform its functions. This will include, 
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for example, the framework legislation requmng 
credit institutions to establish compulsory reserves or 
to provide statistics on their operations. 
Along the lines of Article 87(2Xa) of the present EEC 
Treaty, which concerns competition matters, such 
legislation will have to empower the European Cen-
tral Bank or the national central banks to impose 
fines or penalty payments to ensure compliance with 
the requirements it lays down. 
3. The last paragraph states that the institutional 
provisions provided for in Article 109 are to apply to 
the decision-making bodies of the European Central 
Bank and of Eurofed as soon as those bodies are set 
up. As a result, the dialogue between the Community 
institutions responsible for general economic policy 
and the institution which is to be responsible for 
monetary policy in the final stage will get under way 
during the transitional period. The European Central 
Bank will also have to report to the European Parlia-
ment on its activities as from the time it is set up (see 
Article 109e below). 
Article 109e 
I. This Article sets out the tasks to be assigned to the 
European Central Bank so that Eurofed is able to 
perform its duties during the transitional period: 
(i) it replaces the European Monetary Cooperation 
Fund (EMCF) and the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors; it therefore performs the functions 
assigned to them under current legislation, including 
that of ensuring smooth operation of the EMS; 
(ii) it is empowered, where necessary, to make 
recommendations to the Member States' central 
banks, if only to ensure that the EMS operates 
smoothly; it may publish those recommendations; 
(iii) it may hold foreign-exchange reserves over and 
above those it is responsible for administering under 
the EMCF; it can, therefore, assist in the formulation 
of Community exchange-rate policy by the Council 
of the European Communities (see Article 145 of the 
EEC Treaty) and, where appropriate, intervene on 
foreign-exchange markets in accordance with the 
guidelines laid down by the Council; 
(iv) its responsibility for carrying out surveillance of 
the ecu market arises from the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting in Rome on 28 October 
1990: this includes in particular responsibility for the 
clearing mechanism (currently administered by the 
BIS in Basle); 
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(v) finally, it is entrusted with more technical tasks in 
preparation for its role in the final stage: participa-
tion in the harmonization of monetary statistics and 
in the approximation of monetary policy instruments, 
preparations for linking up money and financial mar-
kets and payments systems; and the design and tech-
nical preparation of notes and coins denominated in 
ecus. 
2. Paragraph 3 contains the legal provisions necess-
ary for the European Central Bank to carry out the 
above functions, and in particular for the transfer of 
the EMCF's assets and liabilities. 
Paragraph 4 introduces a procedure to enable the 
Council to entrust to the European Central Bank 
functions other than those listed in paragraph I, in 
the light of the progress made towards convergence 
of economic and monetary policies. Such a decision 
requires unanimity in the Council. The procedure is 
similar to that provided for in Article 109e(3) referred 
to above. 
Section 2: Transition to the final stage 
This Section contains the necessary provisions for 
moving from the transitional stage to the final stage 
in line with the guidelines laid down by 11 of the 
Heads of State or Government at the Rome Euro-
pean Council. 
Article 109/ 
According to this Article, it is for the European 
Council itself to establish that the conditions for 
moving to the final stage have been met. This stems 
from the conclusions of the European Council meet-
ing in Rome on 28 October 1990. 
The use of the term 'establish' reflects the fact that 
this involves a political assessment of a number of 
objective factors - progress towards market integra-
tion and towards convergence of economic and 
monetary developments. 
Article 109g 
I. This Article enables the Council to take the neces-
sary measures once the European Council has estab-
lished that the above conditions have been met. 
These measures include in particular a temporary 
derogation for a Member State in economic difficul-
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ties. The arrangements for such derogations are set 
out in the second and third paragraphs. 
Other measures may involve monetary cooperation 
with third countries that might be associated, in one 
way or another, with the EMS (with the ecu) at the 
time of transition to the final stage of EMU. 
2. This Article also introduces an innovation in 
Community law: temporary derogations may be 
decided on by the Council on a majority vote as 
provided for in the second indent of Article 148(2). 
Such a majority is obtained where 54 votes are cast in 
favour of a decision (weighted according to Article 
148(2)) by at least eight Member States. 
Article 148(2) provides for this special qualified 
majority in cases where the Council acts other than 
on a proposal from the Commission (for example, 
where the Council revokes, pursuant to Article 108(3), 
a decision taken by the Commission). 
In this particular case, the Council acts on a proposal 
from the Commission. The exception to the rule in 
the second indent of Article 148(2) is justified by the 
special situation in which provision has to be made 
for a derogation to be granted. Special protection for 
small countries in such cases should be granted in the 
same way as when the Council acts, not on the basis 
of a Commission proposal, by a qualified majority. 
Article 109h 
I. This Article empowers the Council to decide, 
immediately after the European Council has estab-
lished that the conditions for moving to the final 
stage of EMU have been met, on the transition to 
that final stage, on the irrevocable fixing of exchange 
rates and on the measures necessary for introducing 
the ecu as the Community's sole currency. 
This decision marks entry into the final stage of 
EMU. In practice, it must be taken at the time of the 
European Council meeting at which the fact referred 
to in Article I 09f is established. 
The decision fixing exchange rates should, if any-
thing, be in the nature of a formal acknowledgement 
of the actual situation, since exchange-rate fluctua-
tions between Member States' currencies should by 
then have been eliminated. It is for this reason that, 
as regards exchange rates, the term 'adopt' has been 
used instead of 'fix'. 
It is provided that the Council and the Commission 
should confer with the European Central Bank with a 
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view to reaching agreement on the rates to be 
adopted, it being understood that the Council will 
have the last word. 
Eurofed will normally exercise all the functions 
assigned to it by Articles 3(ga) and 106 et seq. of the 
draft treaty as soon as the fixed exchange rates are 
adopted. 
2. Since adoption of the ecu as the Community's sin-
gle currency is an essential element of the transition 
to the final stage of EMU, it will be decided on at the 
same time as the irrevocable fixing of parities. 
Paragraph 2 stipulates how the arrangements for 
introducing the ecu should be adopted. While the ecu 
would be legal tender, it is accepted that Member 
States' currencies may provisionally remain legal ten-
der. 
3. Paragraph 3 deals with the consequences, in terms 
of decision-making, of the temporary derogations 
provided for in Article 109g. No Member State which 
has been granted such a derogation may impede the 
fixing of exchange rates or the introduction of the ecu 
and must not therefore stand in the way of unanimity 
being reached among the other Member States. 
With regard to the decisions provided for in Article 
108 in matters of exchange-rate and monetary policy, 
some flexibility should be allowed and it should be 
left to the Council, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission and unanimously, i.e. including the 
Member State to which a derogation has been 
granted, to determine in the light of circumstances 
the conditions under which the qualified majority 
provided for in Article 108 is met, i.e. to stipulate 
whether the votes of the Member State to which the 
derogation has been granted are or are not taken into 
consideration. 
Article 173 (Actions brought before the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities) 
I. Since Eurofed is authorized to take decisions 
which are binding on third parties, e.g. to require 
credit institutions to lodge reserves (third indent of 
Article 106b(2)), it is only proper that such decisions 
should be subject to review by the Court of Justice, in 
accordance with its responsibility under Article 164 
for ensuring that, in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the entire EEC Treaty, the law is observed. 
Accordingly, Article 173 expressly provides for 
review of the legality of the acts of Eurofed. 
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This is a reference to Eurofed acts that are subject to 
public law; its interventions of a commercial nature 
on the money markets are subject to commercial law 
and the jurisdiction of the competent court, under the 
relevant law applicable. 
2. Provision is also made to give the European Cen-
tral Bank express power to submit for review by the 
Court of Justice any act of the Council or the Com-
mission which affects the powers and guarantees 
granted to Eurofed by the Treaty relating to EMU. 
This clarification takes account of developments in 
the case-law of the Court of Justice regarding the 
European Parliament's power to act in its own right. 
It will have to be supplemented in the draft treaty on 
political union by a similar clarification regarding the 
prerogatives of the European Parliament. 
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3. As regards the nature of the acts subject to review 
by the Court of Justice, present Article 173 stipulates 
that recommendations and opinions are not to be 
reviewed by the Court. This category of acts includes 
the specific Council recommendations provided for 
in Article 102d of the draft EMU treaty and the Com-
mission's observations provided for in Article 109(3) 
of that draft treaty. 
Article 199a(Entry of borrowings in the budget) 
This provision anticipates a more general provision 
on the inclusion of the Community's borrowing and 
lending operations in the budget, this still at present 
being limited to a budgetary guarantee in respect of 
the repayment of funds borrowed. 
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Preface 
The European Council, meeting in Dublin on 28 April 1990, decided that an 
examination should be put in hand of the need to make changes to the Treaty 
with the aim of strengthening the democratic legitimacy and efficiency of the 
union and of ensuring unity and coherence in the Community's international 
action. 
In resolutions adopted in July and October, Parliament stated the changes it 
wished to have made, mainly on the basis of the Martin report, following on 
from the Spinelli draft. 
The Commission delivered an opinion on 21 October setting out the following 
objectives: a single Community, a common foreign and security policy based on 
Member States' sharing their essential common interests, strengthening demo-
cratic legitimacy by developing the concept of European citizenship and rein-
forcing the role of Parliament, increasing the Community's effectiveness by 
broadening its powers and writing the principle of subsidiarity into the Tr~aty. 
At its Rome meeting on 14 and 15 December the European Council asked the 
Intergovernmental Conference to look into the possibilities of extending Parlia-
ment's powers and of framing a common foreign and security policy 'in accord-
ance with a sustained evolutive process', including defence matters. 
The European Council also said that substance should be given to the concept 
of European citizenship and recognized the need to extend or redefine the pow-
ers of the Community as regards social matters, health, the environment, 
research, energy, infrastructures, culture and education. The question of bringing 
into the ambit of the union such areas as immigration, asylum, and the fight 
against drug abuse and organized crime should also be considered by the Con-
ference; and the importance of the principle of subsidiarity should be borne in 
mind. 
Following the Rome European Council, the two Intergovernmental Conferences 
on EMU and political union convened on 15 December, and the Commission 
then presented to the Conference on political union a number of contributions 
which are reproduced here. 
The paper on union citizenship takes up the idea suggested by the Spanish 
Prime Minister, Mr Gonzalez, of a European citizenship to supplement national 
citizenship, and incorporates in the Treaty rights deriving specifically from Euro-
pean citizenship, together with civic, economic and social rights and obligations 
to be determined at a later stage. 
In its contribution on the external policy of the union, the Commission adds to 
the Treaty a new title including provisions on common foreign and security 
policy, external economic policy, development cooperation policy and the con-
clusion of international agreements. The purpose of these proposals is to ensure 
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unity and consistency in the Community's action on the world scene by includ-
ing among the powers of the union aspects of external relations absent from the 
present Treaty. 
In a paper on the hierarchy of norms, executive powers and legislative proce-
dure, the Commission takes the view that the eo-decision procedure would enh-
ance the democratic nature of the decision-making process and guarantee 
its effectiveness through a hierarchy of norms. 
The Commission also produced a paper on the social dimension and the 
development of human resources. Here, the Commission points out that social 
policy is inseparable from economic policy. The establishment of a single econ-
omic and social area in which economic and social advances are made in step 
calls for an extension of qualified majority voting to most of the areas covered 
by the Social Charter, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and for 
the diversity of national systems. 
The Member States have also made many contributions to the Conference on 
political union. These relate mainly to democratic legitimacy, aiming to streng-
then the role of Parliament; European citizenship; the establishment of a com-
mon foreign and security policy; the extension and reinforcement of the Com-
munity's activities in areas such as health, social policy and research; and the 
effectiveness of the institutions. 
On 15 April 1991 the Presidency presented a first draft treaty on political union. 
This contained three distinct sections. The first proposed amendments to the 
EEC Treaty covering, among other things, union citizenship, the policies of the 
Community and the powers of Parliament. The other two sections concerned 
common foreign and security policy and cooperation on home affairs and legal 
matters. 
The Commission, supported by Parliament and some of the Member States, 
voiced its real concern at the risk of the Community breaking up and presented 
the IGC with a paper on the structure of the Treaty in which it reaffirmed the 
principle of a unitary Community. 
On 18 June the Presidency produced a revised version of its draft treaty main-
taining the three-pillar structure, affirming the federal goal of the union and pro-
viding that 'the union shall have a single institutional framework to ensure the 
consistency and continuity of activities carried out in order to achieve its objec-
tives while respecting ... the acquis communautaire'. 
The European Council took note of this revised draft at its Luxembourg meeting 
on 28 and 29 June. After confrrming that the final decision on the Treaty on 
political union and EMU would be taken when it met in Maastricht, the Euro-
pean Council underlined the importance of these principles: the maintenance in 
full of this acquis communautaire and its development, a single institutional 
framework with procedures appropriate to the requirements of the different areas 
of action, the evolving nature of the integration process, the principle of subsi-
diarity and that of economic and social cohesion, and the establishment of a 
union citizenship. The common foreign and security policy would extend to all 
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matters relating to the security of the union. A decision on the union's defence 
identity would be deferred to the final stage of the Conference. Consensus on 
eo-decision would be an important political part of the final agreement. The 
European Council also emphasized the need to strengthen the social dimension, 
with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, and economic and social cohe-
sion - 'an integral part of the general development of the union'. Lastly, it 
agreed on the objectives underlying the proposals made by the German delega-
tion on home affairs and judicial cooperation. 
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At its meeting of 28 April 1990, the European Coun-
cil confrrmed its commitment to political union and 
took the following decision: 
'A detailed examination will be put in hand forthwith 
on the need for possible Treaty changes with the aim 
of strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the 
union, enabling the Community and its institutions 
to respond efficiently and effectively to the demands 
of the new situation, and assuring unity and coher-
ence in the Community's international action.' 
It went on to issue the following instructions: 
'Foreign Ministers will undertake this examination 
and analysis, and prepare proposals to be discussed 
at the European Council in June with a view to a 
decision on the holding of a second Intergovernmen-
tal Conference to work in parallel with the Confer-
ence on economic and monetary union with a view 
to ratification by Member States in the same time-
frame.' 
Following a further in-depth discussion on the basis 
of an examination conducted by the Foreign Minis-
ters, the President of the European Council, at its 
meeting in Dublin on 25 and 26 June, 
'noted the agreement to convene such a conference 
under Article 236 of the Treaty. The conference will 
open on 14 December 1990. It will adopt its own 
agenda and conclude its work rapidly with the objec-
tive of ratification by Member States before the end 
of 1992'. 
The European Council also agreed that: 
'Foreign Ministers will prepare the conference. 
Preparatory work will be based on the results of the 
deliberations of Foreign Ministers (Annex I) and on 
contributions from national governments and the 
Commission, and will be conducted in such a way as 
to permit negotiations on a concrete basis to begin 
from the start of the conference. 
Close dialogue will be maintained with the European 
Parliament both in the preparatory phase and in the 
conference phase on political union as well as on 
economic and monetary union. 
The European Council considered that the necessary 
coherence in the work of the two conferences should 
be ensured by the General Affairs Council.' 
* 
* * 
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Before defining the main lines of the approach that 
the Commission will be defending at the Intergovern-
mental Conference on political union, it is appro-
priate to review the factors behind the growing 
awareness of the need to give the Community a gen-
unine political dimension in the light of experience 
from the recent past. These factors are closely linked 
to recent or ongoing developments in Europe and the 
world. 
(I) The 12 Member States have gradually come to 
accept the need for a higher profile on the interna-
tional scene to enable them to give a collective res-
ponse to a clear demand for Europe, to work together 
to defend their interests, and to contribute to the crea-
tion of a fairer, more efficient world order which res-
pects the values they share, in particular human 
rights. 
(2) The successes achieved through the impetus 
given by the 1992 deadline, the implementation of 
the common policies enshrined in the Single Act and 
the February 1988 agreement, raise the question of 
how the people of Europe can be genuinely involved 
in the shared adventure of European integration or, 
to put it another way, how the challenge of demo-
cratic legitimacy can be met. 
(3) Despite general recognition and sometimes even 
envy of these successes there is still room for legiti-
mate disappointment at the Community's overall 
progress, which falls short of the expectations for 
European integration over the last 40 years. Further-
more, the Community's decision-making process 
needs improvement given the rapidly changing 
world. 
The convening of the Intergovernmental Conference 
on Political Union provides a golden opportunity to 
(a) broaden the Community's powers and (b) 
improve decision-making. 
The basic conclusion lies at the heart of the Commis-
sion's reflections and its contribution to the proceed-
ings of the Intergovernmental Conference. The Ital-
ian Presidency has asked it for its opinion on the 
basis of a proposal for amendment of the Treaty pur-
suant to Article 236 EEC. 
The Commission clearly welcomes the convening of 
the Conference. 
I - A single Community 
In th first place the Commission will strenuously 
defend the thesis -as it did when the Single Act was 
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being negotiated - that both the historic legacy of 
the founding fathers and the cumulative commitment 
to European integration argue in favour of concen-
trating the revision of the Treaty on the integration of 
new objectives into a single Community. 
The osmosis between economic, social, financial and 
monetary policy on the one hand and foreign policy 
on the other is and should continue to be the under-
lying philosophy of a European Union, as atfrrmed 
in the preamble to the Single Act. 
Only a single Community with a single institutional 
structure can bridge the gap that has opened up 
between progress on common policies on the one 
hand and advances on political cooperation on the 
other. Indeed, the challenges that the quickening 
pace of history has presented to the Community have 
highlighted the existence of a 'grey area' where the 
role of the institutions is less than clear. For the Com-
munity this points to the need for consistency 
between the positions it adopts on the world stage 
and the conclusions it draws in the areas of external 
economic policy and relations with developing coun-
tries. 
A single Community implies a single institutional 
structure flexible enough to take account of: 
(a) the state of public opinion on the future of Euro-
pean integration, which varies considerably from 
country to country, and the way Member States per-
ceive the joint exercise of pooled sovereignty; 
(b) the need for caution, which militates against 
defining the final shape of European union at this 
early stage in favour of keeping to the course charted 
by the Treaty of Rome, leading eventually to a fed-
eral-type organization; 
(c) the likelihood of further institutional change to 
accommodate enlargement of the Community. Com-
mon sense dictates that in a much larger Community 
the institutions will have to be radically reformed to 
prevent Europe degenerating into a mere free trade 
area with loose arrangements for foreign policy con-
sultation. 
11 - Ensuring unity and 
coherence in the 
Community's international 
action 
The Commission is optimistic about the Com-
munity's ability to meet the historic challenge of 
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ensuring unity and coherence in the Community's 
international action. 
Three fundamental questions have to be answered in 
this context: 
(I) Do the Member States consider that they share 
vital common interests and do they wish to act 
together to pursue them? 
(2) What are the ambitions of the Community and its 
Member States and are they prepared to accept all 
the economic and financial consequences of their 
decisions? 
(3) Should a common foreign policy also cover 
security matters, given that defence is an essential 
element of security? 
The Commission's answer to all three questions is in 
the atfrrmative. And although it feels that the estab-
lishment of a common foreign and security policy 
will require a flexible and pragmatic approach, it 
nevertheless believes that the Treaty should outline 
the procedures and methods for a common policy 
leading towards European union. 
The term 'common policy' has been chosen deliber-
ately. In these matters it would be unrealistic to speak 
of political union when it is quite clear that, tradition-
ally, Member States have special relations with cer-
tain parts of the world and geopolitical positions 
which are frrmly anchored in their history. More 
importantly, the Twelve do not yet share the same 
assessment of their responsibilities or of their general 
and specific commitments in various parts of the 
world. 
The same considerations have led the Commission to 
recommend a specific approach to security matters. 
The Treaty should include a reference to this subject 
and might incorporate the undertaking contained in 
Article 5 of the 1948 Brussels Treaty on the WEU 
which specifies that, in the event of an armed attack 
against one of the contracting parties, the others are 
obliged to provide aid and assistance. 
More than that, the new Treaty should, in general 
terms, point the way towards a common security 
policy, including defence. 
It is also in the common interest to bring defence 
equipment production and trade fully under the dis-
cipline of the common market, which would involve 
inter alia the removal of Article 223. 
However, security is more than just a matter of mili-
tary defence. It now covers all means of guaranteeing 
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cohesion at national and Community level, from the 
preservation of a common model of society to the 
protection of citizens against terrorism, serious crime 
and the other scourges of the modern world. 
The definition and implementation of a common 
foreign policy raises four questions: 
(I) Who will prepare the decisions? 
(2) Who will take the decisions? 
(3) Who will implement the decisions? 
(4) How can the expression of popular sovereignty, 
first and foremost the European Parliament, be 
involved in this process? 
1. Preparation of decisions 
The preparation of decisions should be based on the 
experience of the existing Community system where-
by an ad hoc institution would act simultaneously as 
a focus for Community action and as the guarantor 
of consistency between the common foreign policy 
and the other common policies. 
This observation, drawn from experience, does not 
mean that the Commission intends to lay claim to a 
monopoly of the right of initiative in this area. In 
fact, the very specific nature of foreign and security 
policy implies that the right of initiative must be 
shared between the Council Presidency, the Member 
States and the Commission, if only because of the 
close links between foreign policy on the one hand 
and external economic policy and development 
cooperation policy on the other. 
For this reason, the body responsible for preparing 
decisions should include the present political secre-
tariat - which will be strengthened - and represen-
tatives of the Commission, so that they can work 
together, with the necessary discretion, to draw up 
decisions on this new common policy. It would be 
attached to the General Secretariat of the Council. 
At the same time, Coreper would be reorganized so 
that it could be apprised of foreign policy matters 
before the Council takes a decision. 
2. The method of decision-making 
The method of decision-making depends on the 
scope of foreign policy. This must be broadened 
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gradually but it also needs to be consolidated quickly 
by joint action. 
Should the scope of foreign policy be clearly defined 
in the Treaty? The Commission feels that this would 
not be the right approach. Any attempt to compile a 
list of areas considered to be of vital common interest 
would come up against insurmountable difficulties of 
interpretation. This being so, it would be preferable 
to leave it to the European Council to decide on the 
areas to be transferred from the scope of political 
cooperation to that of a common or Community 
policy. 
Once these areas had been defined by the European 
Council, the Foreign Ministers, meeting within the 
Council, would take decisions by a qualified majority 
- except on matters directly related to security. 
However, this would be an augmented qualified 
majority requiring the votes of eight Member States. 
In other areas, the consensus rule would apply as it 
already does for political cooperation. 
3. Implementation 
As regards implementation of the most important 
decisions, it would be for the Council to choose from 
a number of formulas depending on the circum-
stances, all of them involving Commission participa-
tion, as in the past. 
The essential requirement is that once a common 
position has been decided on, the Community must 
speak with one voice. 
4. Involvement of the European 
Parliament 
Involvement of the European Parliament in foreign 
and security policy is less a matter of strict institu-
tional rules than of general working practice. It 
would be up to those responsible for the common 
policy to consult Parliament on a regular basis and to 
keep it informed of the implications for the Com-
munity of the most important foreign policy develop-
ments either at a plenary session or in the relevant 
committees. 
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The revision of the Treaty should clarify the scope for 
application of the assent procedure to the most 
important agreements - in particular, association 
and cooperation agreements - whose purpose 
would be to define, within an overall framework, the 
political, economic, financial and cultural dimen-
sions of the Community's relations with its main 
partners. 
On the other hand, this procedure would not apply to 
ordinary trade agreements which involve implemen-
tation in strict compliance with Treaty provisions, 
notably Article 113, of broad principles of external 
economic policy defined by the Community's institu-
tions. 
Ill - Strengthening 
democratic legitimacy: 
Relations between the 
institutions and the 
people of Europe 
Further democratization of the running of the Com-
munity must be seen from the twin standpoint of its 
institutions and its citizens. 
1. The institutions 
Without losing sight of the paramount need to recon-
cile democracy and efficiency, the objective as far as 
the institutions are concerned must be twofold: 
(a) to strengthen the powers of the European Parlia-
ment; 
(b) to increase the involvement of national parlia-
ments. 
(a) Aside from its involvement in foreign policy and 
joint security, the powers of the European Parliament 
must be strengthened vis-a-vis the Council and the 
Commission. 
Notwithstanding the fears expressed in certain quar-
ters, the cooperation procedure introduced by the 
Single Act has not led to disputes between Parlia-
ment and the Council or made decision-making more 
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cumbersome. Parliament has shown that it is willing 
and able to play its full part as joint legislator. The 
Commission considers that a radical reform of the 
Treaty, such as that now under way, should involve 
an increase in Parliament's legislative powers. It 
therefore proposes: 
(i) increasing the part played by Parliament in the 
cooperation procedure; one formula which would 
guarantee that a decision was taken would be a prov-
ision to the effect that, following Parliament's second 
reading, the Commission proposal incorporating Par-
liament's amendments would be deemed adopted 
unless the Council rejected it by a simple majority; 
(ii) extending the cooperation procedure to all the 
new areas where qualified majority voting would 
apply; 
(iii) strengthening the role of Parliament in the 
budget procedure and giving it joint responsibility for 
Community revenue. I 
With regard to the appointment of the Commission, 
the only political body genuinely accountable to it, 
Parliament has consistently demanded the power to 
appoint, or at least to be involved in the appointment 
of, Members of the Commission. The formula which 
seems to have the most support would be a two-tier 
investiture: the ftrst stage would involve investiture of 
the President of the Commission, who would be 
appointed by Parliament on a proposal from the 
European Council; and the second stage, following 
the appointment of the Members by agreement 
between the Member States after consultation of the 
President, would involve investiture of the Commis-
sion as a whole on the basis of its programme. In this 
way Parliament would be able to confirm the 
appointment of the entire Commission. 
(b) A great deal of confusion still surrounds the 
request for more involvement of national parliaments 
in Community affairs. This needs to be dispelled. 
In the case of decisions to transfer sovereignty by 
amending the Treaty, national parliaments are com-
pletely sovereign and, when a vote is taken on 
whether to ratify amendments to the Treaty, approve 
the principle and extent of such transfers in full 
knowledge of the facts. The use of mechanisms 
involving association in decision-making would con-
flict with the solemn, conclusive nature of ratifica-
tion. 
1 See the section on public finances (page 81 ). 
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In the case of assessing the use made of powers 
transferred to the Community, it should not be for-
gotten that in the Community system it is national 
governments, sitting in the Council, that take the 
major decisions. Since national governments are 
accountable to national parliaments, it is for them to 
involve elected representatives in Community affairs 
in a manner which respects national traditions. 
Having said this, the Commission nevertheless recog-
nizes that a number of proposals have been made for 
improving relations between the European Parlia-
ment and national parliaments. 
Should new arrangements prove to be essential, the 
Commission would favour the introduction of an 
information procedure, whereby a delegation from 
national parliaments would be given an opportunity 
to hear an explanation from the Council presidency 
and the Commission before major decisions are 
taken. 
But the Commission believes that it is first and fore-
most for the European Parliament, in consultation 
with national parliaments, to consider what is the 
best way to improve relations between the elected 
representatives of the people. 
Lastly, the Commission notes that on the evidence of 
experience over the last few years, Parliament is still 
dissatisfied with the quality of its bilateral relations 
with the Council of Ministers. 
2. Citizens' involvement 
In the Commission's view, strengthening the institu-
tions will not be enough of itself to ensure that citi-
zens are genuinely involved in the Community's 
activities at every stage of the definition of policies in 
fields directly affecting them. That is why the Com-
mission endorses the proposal put forward by the 
Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, for the 
introduction of the notion of European citizenship. 
This would take shape gradually, without encroach-
ing in any way on national citizenship, which it 
would supplement rather than replace. In short, the 
object would be to encourage a feeling of involve-
ment in European integration. 
The basis for European citizenship along these lines 
could be a statement of rights and obligations focus-
ing on: 
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(i) basic human rights, with a reference to the Stras-
bourg Convention; 
(ii) the rights of European citizens to be written into 
the Treaty, including: 
(a) the right of residence and movement, whether the 
individual is economically active or not, 
(b) voting rights in European and local elections; 
(iii) the setting of targets for the definition of the 
individual's civic, economic and social rights and 
obligations at a later stage. 
It must not be forgotten that citizens are also 
involved in economic and social development. That 
is why, as far back as 1985, the Commission took the 
step of encouraging social dialogue at Community 
level between representatives of employers' organiza-
tions and trade unions. That process is now 
enshrined in the Single Act. But it should be given 
greater emphasis and its organization improved. This 
presupposes, inter alia, enhancing the status of the 
Economic and Social Committee and of its members. 
Lastly, the Commission considers that the Intergov-
ernmental Conference must take account of the 
demand for the creation of a body to represent the 
Community's regions. This is an important parameter 
of subsidiarity. The wide variety of regional structures 
in the Member States precludes - and will probably 
continue to do so -the involvement of such a body 
in the decision-making process. The Commission's 
suggestion therefore is that, pending fresh develop-
ments, it should hold regular consultations with a 
body representing all the regions of Europe. 
IV - Improving the 
effectiveness of the 
institutions 
Four questions arise when considering ways of 
improving the effectiveness of the institutions: 
(I) the question of broadening the Community's 
powers; 
(2) the question of subsidiarity; 
(3) the question of improving the way the institutions 
operate while maintaining a general balance; 
(4) the question of the status of the Community's 
public finances. 
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1. Powers 
As in the case of the Single Act, the question of pow-
ers must not be seen in general terms but rather in 
terms of selecting the means of action the Com-
munity needs to ensure the balanced development of 
common policies. 
As part of this selective approach, the Commission 
proposes that any increase in the Community's pow-
ers should concentrate on social affairs, major infra-
structure networks and the free movement of persons, 
all three having a bearing on the optimum develop-
ment of the single market. As far as the environment, 
research and taxation are concerned, it feels that the 
question is one of improving decision-making, in 
other words the use made of qualified majority vot-
ing, rather than redefining powers. 
(a) For social affairs, the Commission's proposal is 
that the provisions of the Treaty be expanded and 
clarified, in the light of the principles laid down in 
the Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights, to allow the Council to adopt directives by a 
qualified majority in areas such as: 
(i) improvement of living and working conditions, in 
particular the duration and organization of working 
time, forms of employment other than open-ended 
contracts and other aspects of employment regula-
tions which have a bearing on the protection of work-
ers' fundamental rights, particularly in the case of 
cross-frontier operations; 
(ii) basic and further vocational training; 1 
(iii) information and consultation for workers. 
Finally, a legal basis should be provided to allow the 
Community to develop programmes to prevent and 
combat major threats to health such as cancer and 
AIDS, as it has already done at the request of the 
European Council. 
(b) The development of major infrastructure net-
works to facilitate the movement of goods, services, 
persons, capital and information should be encour-
aged by making it possible for the Council to take 
appropriate action and adopt programmes. 
(c) Although the Single Act introduced the concept 
of a frontier-free area, the Community's powers in 
relation to the free movement of persons raise diffi-
culties which need to be resolved. The principle that 
freedom of movement, and the equality of treatment 
needed to exercise it, are rights enjoyed by Com-
munity nationals should be enshrined in the Treaty 
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once and for all, as should the possibility of adopting 
the necessary measures by a qualified majority. This 
does not mean that all the rules would need to be 
standardized. Coordination or approximation should 
suffice. 
Experience has shown that the provisions of the 
Single Act are less than satisfactory as far as non-
Community nationals entering or residing in the 
Community are concerned. The Commission also 
notes that the intergovernmental method, which it 
supported, has failed to produce any meaningful 
results. The Commission suggests that this delicate 
issue, which undermines relations with non-Com-
munity countries, notably in the areas of immigration 
and the fight against drug abuse and serious crime, 
should be resolved by one or other of the following 
solutions: 
(i) an explicit reference in the Treaty to a Com-
munity competence, which would require unanimity, 
at least initially, in relation to non-Community 
nationals to the extent needed for the free movement 
of persons and the creation of a frontier-free area; 
(ii) recognition of the problems raised by the status 
of non-Community nationals, again to the extent to 
which these involve the free movement of persons, :cts 
one of the questions of vital common interest in for-
eign and common security policy. 
(d) In the case of the environment and research and 
technology, the Treaty will have to be rewritten to 
increase the effectiveness of operations conducted at 
Community level and make it possible to create new 
financial instruments where appropriate. These could 
also be used for developing major infrastructure net-
works (see (b) above). 
(e) In the area of taxation the aim must be to facili-
tate the adoption of measures linked to the comple-
tion and effective functioning of the single market. 
(t) As far as energy is concerned, the treaties could 
be consolidated into a single chapter making it poss-
ible to implement a common energy policy or at least 
a common energy market. 
(g) In line with the principle of subsidiarity, cultural 
affairs should continue to be a matter for the Mem-
ber States and the regions. It would be a good idea, 
1 Among other things, this would make it possible to 
develop programmes similar to Erasmus, Cornett and 
Yes for Europe. 
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however, to include an article on the cultural dimen-
sion of Community activities. 1 
2. Subsidiarity 
The question of subsidiarity is closely linked to the 
redefinition of certain powers. The Commission con-
siders that this common-sense principle should be 
written into the Treaty, as suggested by Parliament in 
its draft treaty on European Union. It should serve as 
a guideline for the institutions when, under a new 
Article 235 freed from its purely economic purpose, 
they have to take a unanimous decision of principle 
on new Community action in pursuit of general 
Treaty objectives. Compliance with the principle 
could be checked by a retrospective control of the 
institutions' activities to ensure that there is no abuse 
of powers. 
3. Effectiveness 
In the Commission's view, improving the effective-
ness of the institutions largely depends on extending 
the use of qualified majority voting. In theory, this 
should apply to all areas of Community competence 
except 'constitutional' questions, and with possible 
restrictions in the areas of taxation, social security 
and the status of non-Community nationals. 
Assuming that the cooperation procedure would be 
extended in line with the wider use of qualified 
majority voting, it would be important to define the 
time-limits within which the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament would be required to act. This is a 
precondition for improving the way our democratic 
procedures operate. 
In general terms, with a view to simplifying and clari-
fying Community legislation the Commission 
believes that the common policies can only develop 
sati~factorily if a clear distinction is made between 
legislative and regulatory measures. 
As far as the delegation of power to the Commission 
is concerned, efficiency demands that both the letter 
and the spirit of the Single Act be fully applied in 
practice. Here a distinction has to be made between 
the implementation of decisions and the decisions 
themselves, whether they are legislative or regulatory. 
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The Commission takes the view that only two formu-
las should be allowed under the Treaty: the advisory 
committee and the management committee. 
One disturbing fact remains: in the absence of sanc-
tions, Court of Justice rulings are not always imple-
mented. The Commission may consider proposing a 
system of sanctions to deal with this type of situation. 
4. Status of the Community's 
public finances 
This subject has to be considered in the light of the 
progress made since the adoption of the interinstitu-
tional agreement proposed by the Commission in 
1986, which has brought home a number of lessons: 
(a) the need to reconsider the distinction between 
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, so as 
to combine the retention of certain guarantees with 
greater flexibility in budget management; 
(b) the need to restore the institutional balance to 
allow the Commission to play its full part in the 
budgetary process; 
(c) the possibility of Parliament being given some 
influence on a limited portion of revenue to increase 
not only its powers but also its responsibility towards 
electors; 
(d) incorporation of the principles of budgetary dis-
cipline into the Treaty. 
* 
* * 
The improvements put forward by the Commission 
are designed to maintain the current balance of the 
institutional triangle, since the most sensible course 
in making any substantial changes is to build on the 
existing model. In other words, we should base 
ourselves on the existing institutional structure, since 
its dynamic power is already proven. 
1 In particular, this would highlight the importance of the 
action taken to ensure the free movement of audiovisual 
works, to encourage creative artists in Europe, to promote 
high-definition television, and to expand the Media pro-
gramme, to quote just a few examples. 
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The main advantage of the present system lies in its 
success in maintaining a balance between the institu-
tions. It should therefore be preserved, but adapted to 
meet the needs of ever closer Community integration. 
And with the possibility of Parliament being given 
new legislative powers and the Council having wider 
decision-making powers in foreign and security 
policy, ' it will be important to safeguard the Com-
mission's right of initiative, which has proved to be 
one of the key factors in the Community's dyna-
mism.2 
At all events, the accountability of the executive to 
Parliament is a vital element in the equation, even if 
the executive does not have the right to dissolve it. 
Alongside the traditional institutional triangle, the 
Community's new ambitions in terms of economic 
and monetary union as well as foreign and security 
policy highlight the need to formalize the 'motor' role 
of the European Council, which has proved so inval-
uable in revitalizing the process of European integra-
tion over the past six years. 
Building and expanding on the Treaty of Rome, pol-
itical union would have the task of gradually creating 
the foundations of a future European union through 
the process of economic and monetary integration, 
the furthering of social development, the implemen-
tation of economic and social cohesion and the pur-
suit of a common foreign and security policy. 
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Besides the amendments to Articles 2 and 3 on the 
principles underlying the Treaty, the introduction of a 
title on economic and monetary union, the extension 
of certain powers and the strengthening of demo-
cratic legitimacy and efficiency, the revision of the 
Treaty will involve the inclusion of a new title on a 
common foreign and security policy - quite clearly 
the primary driving force behind the new revitaliza-
tion. 
This common policy will have to comprise three sets 
of provisions: 
(i) a framework for decisions and action in the 
foreign policy field and provisions on security; 
(ii) a new grouping of modified Treaty articles on the 
common commercial policy; 
(iii) provisions strengthening the objectives and 
instruments of cooperation and development aid to 
make it more effective. 
In this way the Community, given genuine political 
will, will be able to face up to its worldwide responsi-
bilities, however varied the circumstances. 
Set frrmly on the foundations of economic, social 
and monetary union, its success and impact will be 
all the more assured, enabling it to satisfy the expec-
tations placed in it. 
Political union and economic, social and monetary 
union are thus inextricably linked. 
1 As in the area of economic and monetary union, which is 
discussed in SEC(90) 1659 final (21 August 1990) . 
2 The same should apply to economic and monetary union 
(see reference above). 
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Contributions by the Commission to the 
Intergovernmental Conference 

Union citizenship 
Draft text 
TITLE 0 
Union citizenship 
Article XI 
I. Every person holding the nationality of a Member 
State I shall be a citizen of the Union. 
2. Union citizens shall enjoy the rights conferred by 
this Treaty and be subject to the obligations imposed 
by it, which shall supplement the rights and obliga-
tions attaching to their status as citizens of a Member 
State. 
Article X2 
Every Union citizen shall be entitled to invoke the 
rights guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, which the Union accepts. 
Article X3 
In the application of this Treaty, any discrimination 
on the basis of nationality, whether by a public auth-
ority or a private person, shall be prohibited. The 
Union and the Member States shall enforce this pro-
hibition. 
Article X4 
I. Every Union citizen shall have the right to move 
and reside freely within Union territory, without limit 
as to duration, whether or not he pursues a gainful 
occupation. 
2. Every Union citizen shall have the obligation to 
comply with the legislation of the Member State in 
which he resides. 
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He may not exercise his right to move and reside 
freely as a means of evading obligations incumbent 
upon him in relation to his State of origin or any 
other Member State. 
Article X5 
Every Union citizen shall have the right to be a mem-
ber of a political association or group and shall have 
the right to vote and stand as a candidate at munici-
pal and European elections held in the place in 
which he has habitually resided for at least [ ... ] 
year(s) without prejudice to the option of exercising 
those rights, if he so wishes, in the Member State of 
which he is a national, providing he enjoys them 
under national law. 
Article X6 
Every Union citizen shall have the right to cultural 
expression and the obligation to respect cultural 
expression by others. 
Article X7 
Every Union citizen shall have the right to enjoy a 
healthy environment and the obligation to contribute 
to protecting it. To this end, he shall have the right to 
information and the right to consultation where 
appropriate. 
Article X8 
Every Union citizen shall, in the territory of a non-
member country, be entitled to Union protection and 
to the protection of any Member State, on the same 
conditions as its nationals. 
1 Each Member State should make a declaration defining 
its concept of nationality. 
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Article X9 
Each Member State shall establish at least one 
national authority, possibly in the form of an office 
of ombudsman to which Union citizens may have 
recourse in defending the rights conferred upon them 
by this Treaty, to assist them in dealings with the 
administrative authorities of the Union and the 
Member States and to defend those rights before 
courts and tribunals on behalf of those upon whom 
they are conferred. 
These authorities shall also be responsible for giving 
Union citizens full and clear information on their 
rights and on the means available for the purpose of 
defending them. 
Article XIO 
Measures to secure compliance with the prohibition 
laid down in Article X3, to facilitate the exercise of 
the rights conferred by Articles X4 and X8, to deter-
mine the conditions in which the rights conferred by 
Article XS are to be exercised and to give effect to 
Articles X7 and X9, shall be adopted [ ... ],acting on 
a proposal from the Commission after obtaining the 
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee. 
Article XII 
The objective of the Union shall be to ensure, by 
gradual stages, that acts adopted for the purpose of 
applying this Treaty: 
(i) guarantee,every Union citizen's right to equal 
treatment and equal opportunities and the enjoyment 
of social rights; 
(ii) reflect every Union citizen's obligation to display 
solidarity with other Union citizens and with nation-
als of non-member countries resident in the Union; 
this obligation entails respect for each person's dig-
nity and the rejection of any form of social marginali-
zation; 
(iii) guarantee every Union citizen's right to protec-
tion of his health and his obligation to safeguard the 
health of others, especially in his working environ-
ment. 
Article XI2 
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission after receiving the assent of the 
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European Parliament, may add rights to those 
conferred by this Title. 
* 
* * 
Explanatory memorandum 
1.1. In its opinion of 21 October 1990 the Commis-
sion endorsed the proposal put forward by the Span-
ish Prime Minister, Mr Gonzalez, for the introduction 
of the concept of European citizenship, which 'would 
take shape gradually, without encroaching in any 
way on national citizenship, which it would supple-
ment rather than replace'. The object was that this 
'would encourage a feeling of involvement in Euro-
pean integration'. 
The Commission was also in favour of making a spe-
cific reference to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of 
writing into the Treaty rights linked specifically to the 
status of European citizens, including freedom of 
movement, freedom of residence, voting rights, and 
civic, economic and social rights and obligations to 
be decided at a later stage. 
1.2. In its resolution of 22 November 1990 on the 
Intergovernmental Conferences, Parliament called 
for the inclusion in the new Treaty of a declaration of 
fundamental rights and freedoms designed for the 
protection of every individual who is subject to Com-
munity law. To some extent the catalogue of rights 
covered in the declaration is much the same as those 
dealt with in the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms and in the constitutions of the Member States. 
However, it also incorporates some rights specific to 
Union citizens, such as the right to move and reside 
freely within Union territory. Furthermore, it empha-
sizes the emergence of rights in connection with the 
exercise of certain Community powers: the promo-
tion of health and safety at the workplace, for in-
stance, or the protection and improvement of the en-
vironment. 
2. The European Council meeting in Rome on 14 
and 15 December 1990 also expressed support for the 
concept of European citizenship and made a specific 
reference to civic rights, social and economic rights 
based on the principle of equal treatment and oppor-
tunity for all Community citizens, and the protection 
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of Community citizens outside the Community's bor-
ders. it also envisaged the possibility of setting up 
some form of ombudsman-type machinery for the 
defence of citizens' rights. 
3.1. The attached draft Treaty Articles incorporate 
the ideas set out at I and 2 above. 
3.2. The subject-matter involved is good reason for 
inserting the Articles on citizens' rights and obliga-
tions early on in the Treaty, and in any event before 
the Titles devoted to the four freedoms. 
It is therefore proposed that the attached Articles be 
included as Title I of Part Two ('Foundations of the 
Union'), rather than in the preamble or in the intro-
ductory Articles setting out the objectives of the 
Union, thereby stressing that these are implementing 
measures and not just declaratory clauses. 
3.3. Nevertheless, a distinction is made in those 
provisions between: 
(i) rights which citizens derive directly from the 
Treaty (such as non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality or freedom of movement), where it is sim-
ply a question of guaranteeing or facilitating the exer-
cise of such rights, as the case may be, on the basis of 
the Court's case-law, and, possibly, by improving 
existing legal provisions; 
(ii) rights which require to be put into effect by legis-
lation, together with the necessary detailed rules and 
conditions (for example, the right to vote, which has 
already been the subject of a Commission proposal, 
or rights related to the environment, taken from exist-
ing or proposed texts); 
(iii) the laying down of objectives for the granting of 
rights in the future and for defining obligations, espe-
cially in the social field. 
4.1. In general terms, the concept of Union citizen-
ship is based on two principles: 
(i) it is a component factor in the move to strengthen 
democratic legitimacy in the Community, both sup: 
plementing and transcending national citizenship; 
(ii) it reflects the aims of the Union, involving as it 
does an indivisible body of rights and obligations 
stemming from the gradual and coherent develop-
ment of the Union's political, economic and social 
dimension. 
4.2. The proposal includes: 
(a) a definition of the concept of citizenship of the 
Union (Article XI); 
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(b) a reference, in the context of the protection of 
fundamental rights, to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, to which the Commission has now 
proposed the Community should accede (Article 
X2); 
(c) a statement of the general principle prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, 
modelled on Article 7 (deleted) but extended to cover 
private persons (Article X3); t 
(d) a list and definition of the rights and correspond-
ing obligations of Union citizens in terms of: 
(i) civic rights and obligations: freedom of move-
ment and residence for all citizens, whether or not 
they pursue a gainful occupation, freedom of politi-
cal association, right to vote and right to stand for 
election (Articles X4 and X5), along the lines of the 
Commission's proposal of June 1982; 2 
(ii) wider social rights and obligations: in the social 
field proper, as defined in the social provisions of the 
Treaty in the light of the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (Article XII), 
as well as in the fields of culture (Article X6) and th~ 
environment (Article X7); these rights and obliga-
tions are based in particular .on the principles of 
equal treatment and opportunity, social solidarity 
and respect for the dignity and diversity of all in-
dividuals; 
(e) the principle of equal protection for Union citi-
zens in non-member countries (Article X8). 
4.3. This list of rights and obligations is accompa-
nied by a number of implementing provisions. 
Firstly, an ombudsman-type function is created in the 
Member States, with the task of advising citizens of 
their rights and the courses of action open to them 
and of promoting the defence of those rights in deal-
ings with the authorities and the courts (Article X9). 
Secondly, provision is made for the adoption of mea-
sures to facilitate or, as appropriate, give effect to the 
rights and obligations of citizens (Article XIO). This 
would cover measures designed solely to guarantee 
or facilitate the exercise of rights directly conferred by 
1 This does not affect the exception provided for in Article 
48(4), as interpreted by the Court, regarding posts involv-
ing the exercise of public authority. 
Detailed arrangements for the exercise of these rights will 
have to be laid down in an implementing regulation. 
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the Treaty (non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality or freedom of movement, for instance) or 
measures laying down detailed arrangements for giv-
ing effect to rights such as the right to vote and stand 
for election, possibly by gradual stages (Article XIO). 
Obviously this in no way precludes the possibility of 
specific provisions in the Treaty laying down and 
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guaranteeing the exercise of particular rights, as pro-
posed in the case of social rights (Article X 11 ). 
Lastly, any subsequent extension of the rights of citi-
zens of the Union would involve exacting procedural 
requirements similar or identical to those provided 
for in the new Article 235. 
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Common external policy 
Draft text 
TITLE Y 
Common external policy 
Article YO 
The common external policy shall cover common 
foreign and security policy, external economic policy 
and development cooperation policy as well as exter-
nal relations in the other areas falling under Union 
responsibility. In the conduct of this policy, the 
Union shall seek to promote democracy, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights. 
Chapter I 
Common foreign and security policy 
Article Yl 
The Union shall pursue a common foreign and secur-
ity policy aimed at maintaining peace and interna-
tional stability, and developing friendly relations with 
all countries, without prejudice to the special rela-
tions of individual Member States. 
This policy shall be governed both by general 
provisions and by specific provisions on security and 
defence. 
SECTION 1 
General provisions 
Article Y2 
Implementation of the common foreign and security 
policy shall rest on a distinction between matters that 
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are deemed to be of vital interest for the Union and 
other matters in this sphere. 
Article Y3 
I. To ensure that common principles and objectives 
are formulated and that effective common action is 
taken by the Union under the common foreign 
policy, the European Council shall, without prejudice 
to powers conferred under the other provisions of the 
Treaties, decide what matters are of vital common 
interest, acting on the initiative of the Presidency, or 
of the Commission or of a simple majority of the 
Member States, after hearing the views of the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
When deciding what matters are of vital common 
interest, the European Council shall specify the con-
ditions under which a Member State may, at its 
request, be given dispensation from the obligations 
which common action entails. The Member State 
concerned shall refrain from taking any measures 
that may affect the implementation of Union deci-
sions. 
2. Except where this Treaty provides otherwise, in 
matters that have been declared to be of vital com-
mon interest, the Council, acting by the majority 
specified in the second indent of Article 148(2) t on 
the initiative of the Presidency or of the Commission 
or of a simple majority of the Member States, shall: 
(i) formulate the principles of the common policy; 
(ii) decide on action to be taken, whether it is to be 
implemented by the Union or by the Member States. 
Article 149(1) shall not apply to Council Decisions 
under this Article. 
1 Where the Treaty does not provide for a Commission 
proposal, this involves an augmented qualified majority, 
which requires at least eight Member States to vote in 
favour. 
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Article Y4 
I. In matters that have not been declared to be of 
vital common interest the Member States and the 
Commission shall coordinate their positions on any 
external policy issue of general interest within the 
Council to ensure that their combined influence is 
exercised as effectively as possible through concerted 
deliberation, convergence of positions, and the pur-
suit of common action. To this end the Member 
States shall consult each other and the Commission 
on all national foreign policy measures they intend to 
take. 
2. To enhance their capacity for joint action, the 
Member States shall work to secure the formulation 
and progressive development of common principles 
and objectives. 
3. The Member States shall refrain from hindering 
consensus and joint action that may flow from it. 
4. In adopting positions and pursuing national ac-
tion, each Member State shall take full account of the 
positions of its partners, shall give due consideration 
to the importance of adopting and implementing 
common positions and shall avoid any action that 
may impair the Union's effectiveness as a cohesive 
force in international relations and in international 
organizations. Decisions on common positions shall 
constitute a point of reference for national policies. 
5. If a Member State deems it necessary to act in res-
ponse to a particularly serious situation or excep-
tional circumstances, it shall, before taking action, 
refer the matter to the Council, which shall decide 
without delay under Article Y3(2) on whether action 
by the Union is called for. 
Article Y5 
The European Parliament shall be closely involved in 
the formulation and conduct of the common foreign 
and security policy. To this end the Council and the 
Commission shall keep the European Parliament 
regularly informed of the matters dealt with under the 
policy and shall make sure that the European Parlia-
ment's views are taken into consideration. 
Each year the European Parliament shall hold a 
debate on the common foreign and security policy, 
during which statements shall be made to it by the 
Council and the Commission. The Council and the 
Commission may also appear before European Par-
90 
liament committees, either at the European Parlia-
ment's request or on their own initiative. 
Article Y6 
The Council's deliberations and decisions shall be 
prepared and their implementation monitored by the 
General Secretariat of the Council in structured coop-
eration with the Commission. 
The Permanent Representatives Committee shall be 
responsible for preparing the deliberations of the 
Council under the common foreign and security 
policy and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by 
the Council to this end. 
Article Y7 
I. In areas that come under the common foreign and 
security policy the Union shall be represented in rela-
tions with non-member countries and in international 
organizations and conferences by the Council Presi-
dency and by the Commission, assisted where appro-
priate by the previous and next Member States to 
hold the Presidency. ' 
The Council, acting by the majority specified in the 
second indent of Article 148(2) on a proposal from 
the Commission or from one of the Member States, 
may entrust one or more Member States with the task 
of presenting the Union's position in specific in-
stances, for example, before the United Nations 
Security Council or the organs of the Atlantic Alli-
ance or Western European Union. 
2. To ensure that the Union is represented as effec-
tively as possible the Member States and the Com-
mission shall furnish each other with assistance and 
information to strengthen cooperation between their 
missions accredited in non-member countries and to 
international organizations. 
Article Y8 
The foreign policies of the Member States and action 
by the Union under the other provisions of this 
1 Following the formula used for the troika, which here 
becomes a 'quadriga', as the Commission is involved as 
well. 
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Treaty shall be consistent with the common foreign 
and security policy. 
Should the danger of inconsistency arise, the Com-
mission or any Member State may call for the Coun-
cil to be convened with a view to taking a decision in 
accordance with the procedure specified in Article 
Y3(2). 
Article Y9 
Wherever it considers it appropriate, the Union shall 
organize a political dialogue with non-member coun-
tries and regional groupings. 
Article YJO 
Articles 164 to 188 of the Treaty shall not apply to 
this Chapter. I 
SECTION 2 
Common security policy 
Article Yl 1 
The common security policy shall constitute an in-
tegral part of the Union's foreign policy. Its purpose 
shall be to strengthen security in Europe and to 
maintain peace in the world in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter. It shall rest on cooperation 
within the WEU. Its long-term objective shall be to 
establish a common European defence in full com-
pliance with commitments entered into in the Atlan-
tic Alliance. 
Article Yl2 
If any of the Member States is the object of an armed 
attack in Europe, the other Member States shall, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, afford it all the military and other aid and 
assistance in their power. 
Article YJ3 
I. Without prejudice to powers conferred under other 
provisions of this Treaty, in the areas of security and 
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defence the Union shall treat as matters of vital com-
mon interest within the meaning of Article Y3 the 
control of armaments, disarmament and related ques-
tions, security questions related to the CSCE or 
debated in the United Nations, including peacekeep-
ing operations, economic and technological coopera-
tion in the field of armaments, and coordination of 
policy on arms exports and non-proliferation. 2 
Under the common security policy, the Union shall 
establish an arms research and production policy. 
2. The European Council may identify other ques-
tions as being of vital common interest. 
3. Where other provisions of the Treaty do not apply 
to questions declared to be of vital common interest, 
the Council shall: 
(i) formulate unanimously 3 the principles of com-
mon policy and the procedures to be followed when 
deciding on action to be taken; 
(ii) decide on action to be taken, whether it is to be 
implemented by the Union or by the Member States. 
4. A Member State may be given dispensation under 
the decisions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 
from some of the obligations flowing from them, if it 
so requests for compelling reasons. The Member 
State concerned shall nevertheless refrain from taking 
any measures that may affect the implementation of 
Union decisions. 
The Council shall review such dispensations regularly 
in the light of common policy developments to assess 
whether they are still compatible with the common 
interest. 
A Member State that has been given dispensation 
shall not participate in Council deliberations on the 
matter in question or on the formulation, extension 
or application of the obligations from which it has 
been dispensed. 
Article Yl4 
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for Defence 
and the Commission shall hold a joint meeting at 
1 This provision is designed to place the policy beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 
z As enumerated by the second Rome European Council. 
J Abstentions shall not prevent the adoption of decisions. 
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least twice each year to develop cooperation between 
the Member States in the field of defence. If necess-
ary, they shall meet immediately, should a Member 
State so request. 
Article Y/5 
I. When deciding on action to be taken pursuant to 
Article Yl3(3), the Council shall also decide whether 
to refer implementation of the guidelines it has estab-
lished to the WEU Council. 
2. For the application of paragraph I the Union shall 
establish with the WEU such arrangements as may be 
necessary to enable Member States which are not 
members of the WEU and the Commission to attend 
meetings of the WEU bodies. 
3. Member States which are members of the Atlantic 
Alliance shall express the Union position there when 
questions declared to be of vital common interest or 
questions dealt with by the WEU are discussed. 
4. The Union shall endeavour to make use of the 
provisions of Article XII of the Treaty of Brussels of 
17 March 1948 to promote the gradual integration of 
the WEU into the Union. 
Chapter II 
External economic policy 
Article Y/6 
External economic action by the Union shall contri-
bute, in the common interest: 
(i) to the harmonious development of the world 
economy and of world trade; 
(ii) to the progressive strengthening of economic rela-
tions in Europe and in the world, notably by abolish-
ing barriers to the liberalization of trade; 
(iii) to the establishment of fair economic and social 
conditions in the world. 
Article Yl6a 
External relations in the areas covered by economic 
and monetary union shall be governed by the specific 
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provisions of Articles 106b(l) and (3), 108(2) and (3), 
and 105e(2), and by Article Yl7. 
Article Y/7 
I. The Union shall pursue a common policy on 
external economic relations covering: 
(i) trade, including export credit and credit insurance 
schemes, 
(ii) economic and commercial measures involving 
services, capital, intellectual property, investment, 
establishment and competition. 
2. The Union shall have sole power to take measures, 
autonomous and conventional, in the field of econ-
omic and commercial policy as referred to in para-
graph I. 
3. The Union may authorize the Member States to 
take some of the measures referred to in paragraph 2, 
within limits and subject to conditions which it shall 
lay down. 
4. The autonomous measures referred to in para-
graph 2 shall be adopted and the authorizations 
referred to in paragraph 3 shall be granted by the 
Commission on the basis of laws enacted under the 
eo-decision procedure by the European Parliament 
and the Council on a proposal from the Commission. 
5. The conventional commitments referred to in 
paragraph 2 shall be entered into in accordance with 
Article Y27. 
6. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this 
Article the Union shall be represented by the Com-
mission in relations with non-member countries and 
in international organizations and conferences. 
Article Y/8 
Where immediate action is needed to preserve Union 
interests, the Commission shall adopt the necessary 
measures. It shall inform the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament accordingly without delay. 
Article Y/9 
I. The Union shall have the power to take any econ-
omic measures in areas other than those referred to in 
Article Yl7(1) with a view to achieving the objectives 
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listed in Article Yl6, notably in the context of finan-
cial and technical cooperation with one or more 
non-member countries not covered by Chapter Ill. 
2. On any issues of general interest involving exter-
nal economic relations the Union shall coordinate 
the positions of the Member States in relations with 
non-member countries and in international forums. 
Chapter Ill 
Development cooperation policy 1 
Article Y20 
The aim of common policy on development coopera-
tion shall be to promote the economic and social 
development of developing countries and their 
peoples and to help resolve the problems of structural 
poverty in those countries. · 
This policy shall seek to achieve a lasting balance 
between economic objectives, rational management 
of the environment, and optimum use of natural and 
human resources. 
Article Y21 
The common policy on development cooperation 
shall cover: 
(i) action by the Union and joint action by the 
Union and the Member States; 
(ii) coordination of other action by the Member 
States. 
Article Y22 
I. Action by the Union shall include: 
(i) the introduction of special arrangements and mea-
sures in the field of commercial policy, without pre-
judice to the action provided for in Chapter 11; 
(ii) measures designed to improve the operation of 
the international markets in commodities of export 
interest to developing countries 2 by increasing trans-
parency and efficiency, taking market trends into 
account, 3 and secondly to contribute to the stabiliza-
tion of export earnings from commodities originating 
in developing countries, in particular in the least-
developed countries. 
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2. Action by the Union and joint action by the 
Union and the Member States shall cover: 
(i) financial and technical cooperation; 
(ii) food aid and humanitarian aid; 
(iii) any other instrument likely to encourage 
development, notably involving establishment and 
services, movement of capital and movement of per-
sons, and measures designed to encourage the prom-
otion and protection of investments. 
3. The instances in which joint action is to be taken 
by the Union and the Member States in the areas 
referred to in paragraph 2 shall be determined by the 
Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission after receiving the assent of the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
4. The European Investment Bank shall contribute 
through its operations to action by the Union and to 
joint action by the Union and the Member States. 
Article Y23 
I. The general guidelines and multiannual pro-
grammes specifying the action to be taken by the 
Union and the joint action by the Union and the 
Member States as determined in accordance with 
Article Y22(3) shall be adopted in the form of laws 
enacted under the eo-decision procedure by the 
European Parliament and the Council on a proposal 
from the Commission. Such guidelines and pro-
grammes shall specify those implementing measures 
which are the responsibility of the Member States. 
2. The Union, acting in accordance with Article Y27, 
shall have sole power to enter into any conventional 
commitments in the areas subject to action by the 
Union and to joint action by the Union and the 
Member States. 
In such areas, the Union shall be represented by the 
Commission in relations with non-member countries 
and in international organizations and conferences. 
1 Possibly insert an Article on what is to happen to the cur-
rent arrangements for overseas countries and territories 
(Part Four of the EEC Treaty), which must in any event 
be aligned on - or incorporated in - the Chapter on 
development cooperation policy. One possibility would 
be a (sole) Article combining Articles 131 (principles) and 
136 (procedures), redrafted accordingly. 
Terminology used for the Unctad integrated programme, 
which covers 18 products (bananas, bauxite, cocoa, cof-
fee, copper, cotton, hard fibres, jute, tea, etc.), oil and 
gold being, therefore, excluded. 
3 As in Article 74 of the fourth Lome Convention. 
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Article Y24 
I. In areas not subject to action by the Union or to 
joint action by the Union and the Member States as 
referred to in Article Y22, the Member States and the 
Commission shall liaise on all issues of general 
interest in the field of development cooperation 
policy. 
2. To this end the Member States shall inform each 
other and the Commission in advance of all mea-
sures envisaged within the framework of national 
development cooperation, and in particular of 
national programmes and draft agreements to be con-
cluded with non-member countries or international 
organizations. 
3. The Member States shall refrain from any initia-
tive likely to impair the consistency and effectiveness 
of action by the Union or joint action by the Union 
and the Member States as referred to in Article Y22. 
They shall, on the other hand, encourage such action 
as may usefully complement the above and enable 
the objectives defined in Article Y20 to be achieved. 
4. In the areas referred to in paragraph I, the Com-
mission shall coordinate the positions of the Member 
States in relations with non-member countries and in 
international forums. 
5. For the purposes set out in paragraphs I to 4 the 
Commission shall forward recommendations to the 
Member States. Where necessary, coordinating mea-
sures shall be adopted on the basis of laws enacted in 
accordance with the procedure specified in Article 
Y23(1). 
Chapter IV 
General provisions 
SECTION I 
Agreements within the area of common foreign 
and security policy 
Article Y25 
I. Where an agreement with one or more States or 
with an international organization needs to be nego-
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tiated in areas in which Chapter I confers powers on 
the Union, the Council Presidency and the Commis-
sion shall jointly make recommendations to the 
Council, which, acting by the majority specified in 
Article Y3(2) or in accordance with Article Yl3(3), as 
the case may be, shall authorize them to open the 
necessary negotiations. 
The Presidency and the Commission 1 shall conduct 
these negotiations within the framework of such 
directives as the Council may issue to them, in con-
sultation with a special committee appointed by the 
Council. 
2. Agreements of the kind referred to in paragraph I 
shall be concluded by the Council, acting in accord-
ance with the procedures referred to in that paragraph 
on the initiative of the Presidency or of the Commis-
sion, after consulting the European Parliament, 
whose opinion shall be given within the time-limit 
determined by the Council. 
SECTION 2 
Agreements falling within other areas of Union 
powers 
Article Y26 
I. In areas not covered by the common foreign and 
security policy 2 and in areas where the Union has 
exclusive powers in external relations expressly con-
ferred on it by this Treaty, 3 the Union shall enjoy 
sole power to conclude, under Article Y27, agree-
ments with one or more States or with international 
organizations provided it has already exercised those 
powers internally. 
In areas where the Union has the sole power to 
conclude international agreements, it shall be repre-
sented by the Commission in relations with non-
1 Duopoly. 
2 Article Y25 regulates the conclusion of agreements in the 
field of common foreign and security policy; all other 
specific provisions governing that area are to be found in 
Chapter I. 
3 This means external economic relations for areas covered 
by Article Yl7(1), development cooperation policy for 
those covered by Article Y22(1) and EMU provisions 
where the Union has sole power. 
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member countries and in international organizations 
and conferences. 
2. The Union may also conclude international agree-
ments in accordance with Article Y27 in areas where 
powers are conferred on it by Article 3 or by virtue of 
Article 235 but where it has not yet exercised them. 
Where it has not made use of the option provided for 
in the first subparagraph, the Union shall coordinate 
the position of the Member States in relations with 
non-member countries and in international forums. 
3. When concluding a multilateral international 
agreement the performance of which entails adminis-
trative and operating expenditure, the Union shall act 
with the same status and by the same procedure as 
the signatory States. 
Article Y27 
l. Where an agreement with one or more States or 
with an international organization needs to be nego-
tiated, the Commission shall make recommendations 
to the Council, which, acting by a qualified majority, 
shall authorize the Commission to open the necessary 
negotiations. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations 
within the framework of such directives as the Coun-
cil may issue to it, after consulting a special com-
mittee appointed by the Council. 
2. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission after receiving the 
assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by 
an absolute majority of its members, shall conclude, 
on behalf of the Union, agreements the content of 
which: 
(i) involves amendment of a Union law; 
(ii) involves amendment of the financial perspective; 
(iii) establishes the basis for the Community's multi-
lateral external relations in matters of trade or econ-
omic cooperation or the basis for development coop-
eration; 
(iv) establishes an association between the Union 
and one or more non-member countries or a regional 
international organization involving durable links, 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and 
special procedures; ' 
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(v) organizes, within a multilateral framework, the 
protection of human rights and the fundamental 
rights of workers, or global protection of the atmos-
phere, water or natural resources, 2 or defines, within 
a multilateral framework, the fundamental principles 
of international law; 
(vi) makes provision for accession by the Union to a 
universal or regional international organization other 
than an organization set up to administer a multila-
teral convention; 
(vii) makes provision for participation by non-mem-
ber countries or international organizations in bodies 
set up by Community law. 3 
However, the Council shall act unanimously where 
the agreement covers matters for which unanimity is 
required at internal level. 
3. Other agreements shall be concluded by the Coun-
cil acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission after consulting the European Par-
liament. 
4. The Commission shall approve modifications to 
any agreement which provides for them to be 
adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body set 
up by the agreement. 
In accordance with the procedure specified in the 
first subparagraph the Council may authorize the 
Commission to conclude, on behalf of the Union, 
certain other agreements or categories of agreement. 
5. The provisions set out in paragraphs l and 3 shall 
apply subject to the powers conferred on the Com-
mission by Article Y30. 
6. The Commission shall administer the agreements 
concluded by the Union. 
1 Criteria set out in Article 238 (which may possibly be 
modified). 
2 This may be expanded if the areas of Community com-
petence are increased (health, culture, etc.) on condition 
obviously that the agreements in question are 'very 
important'; those not falling within this category will, 
irrespective of subject-matter, be covered by the proce-
dure in paragraph 3. 
J Agencies. 
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SECTION 3 
Agreements in the field of foreign policy and 
other areas 
Article Y28 
I. Where agreements are to be negotiated which 
would lay durable and structured foundations for 
political relationships of cooperation or association 
between the Union and one or more States and 
which would also have an economic, financial and 
cultural dimension the procedure specified in Article 
Y25(1) shall apply;' however, the Commission shall 
conduct the negotiations in conjunction with the 
Council Presidency, after consulting a special com-
mittee appointed by the Council. 
2. These agreements shall be concluded in accord-
ance with the procedure specified in Article Y27(2). 2 
However, the Presidency shall also have the right to 
take the initiative in requesting the Council to con-
clude an agreement. 
3. the Commission shall administer these agreements 
in the areas referred to in Article Y26(1). 
SECTION 4 
Common provisions 
Article Y29 3 
I. The European Parliament, the Council, the Com-
mission or a Member State may seek the opinion of 
the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement 
envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this 
Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is 
adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in 
accordance with Article 236. 
2. Agreements concluded under these conditions 
shall be binding on the institutions of the Union and 
on the Member States. 
Article Y30 
The Commission shall maintain all appropriate forms 
of cooperation with international organizations. 
It shall, inter alia, contribute to the development of 
regional integration organizations. 
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Article Y31 
Articles 110 to 116, 130n, 130r(5), 223, 224, 4 228 to 
231 and 238 are repealed. 
Article Y32 
Title Ill of the Single Act is repealed. 
* 
Explanatory memorandum 
One of the foremost prerequisites for the European 
Union identified by the Commission in its opinion of 
21 October 1990 was the emergence of a common 
foreign policy that would serve, through the osmosis 
between it and economic, social, and financial and 
monetary policy, to ensure unity and consistency in 
the Community's international action. 
It concluded that such a policy would have to rest on 
a firm consensus among the Member States as to the 
extent of their common ambitions in broadening the 
international responsibilities of the Union, and 
should embrace their vital common interests and 
include security and defence. 
The European Parliament, in its Resolution of 
22 November 1990 on intergovernmental conferences 
in the framework of its strategy for European union, 
took a stand in favour of a common foreign and 
security policy. 
On 14 and 15 December 1990 the European Council 
spoke of 'the vocation of the Union to deal with 
aspects of foreign and security policy, in accordance 
with a sustained evolutive process and in a unitary 
manner ... '. It instructed the Intergovernmental 
Conference to 'address the Union's objectives, the 
1 Duopoly. 
2 Prior assent of Parliament. 
3 Text based on the second subparagraph of Article 228 (I) 
and on Article 228 (2). 
4 The question of 'serious internal disturbances' referred to 
in Article 224 is out of place in the Title on common 
foreign policy. 
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scope of its policies and the means of ... ensuring 
their . . . implementation within an institutional 
framework'. 
The Commission, the European Council and the 
European Parliament agreed on the need for, inter 
alia, a single decision-making centre (namely the 
Council), the harmonization of preparatory work, a 
non-exclusive right of initiative for the Commission, 
procedures for informing and, as a rule, consulting 
Parliament - and obtaining its prior approval (in 
other words, assent) for the conclusion of major 
agreements - and procedures to ensure that the 
Union speaks with one voice in international organi-
zations and vis-a-vis non-member countries. 
Revision of the Treaty with a view to the creation of 
the European Union thus involves not only amend-
ments to Articles 2 and 3 on the tasks and scope of 
the Treaty, the establishment of economic and mon-
etary union, the extension of powers in specific areas 
and the strengthening of democratic legitimacy and 
the institutions' effectiveness, but also the incorpora-
tion of a new title on a common external policy. 
A - The common external policy- general 
The rules governing the common external policy 
comprise substantive provisions in three broad areas: 
common foreign and security policy (section B); 
external economic policy (section C); 
development cooperation (section D). 
They also include procedural provisions for the con-
clusion by the Union of international agreements 
(section E) both in these areas and in any field where 
it already has powers internally (transport, environ-
ment and research, for instance), or might acquire. 
them following revision of the Treaty, and within the 
limits of those powers. The new arrangements for-
mally state that for every power conferred on the 
Union internally there is a corollary external power 
and that for any given area this power becomes 
exclusive once the Union exercises it internally. This 
constitutes the expression in the Treaty of the princi-
ple established by the Court in the AETR case, which 
is now an established part of the Community legal 
order. 
The overall balance of the external policy provisions 
thus rests on an approach involving two indissociable 
elements. 
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In the areas of new powers (i.e. common foreign and 
security policy) specific decision-making procedures 
wiii apply, giving recognition to the European Coun-
cil's fundamental role in setting the limits of the 
Union's powers and to the role of the Council (Gen-
eral Affairs) as the decision-maker on implementa-
tion. 
Elsewhere, on the other hand, especially in the area 
of economic integration, the powers of the Union will 
be confirmed, resting on clear legal bases spelled out 
in the Treaty. The general use of qualified majority 
voting for decisions will also serve to secure effi-
ciency and effectiveness. 
B - Common foreign and security policy 
1. Basic principles 
The incorporation of rules on a common foreign and 
security policy serves a fundamental objective, 
namely to ensure unity and consistency in the 
Union's international action by giving it new powers 
in areas of foreign relations not covered by the pres-
ent Treaty. 
This common policy will centre on the idea of an 
evolutive process: it would be for the European 
Council to lay down and extend the Union's powers 
as the need arises. This approach amounts to applica-
tion of the principle of subsidiarity, leaving the Mem-
ber States with full power to act in areas where there 
is felt to be no need for the Union to take responsi-
bility, subject to intergovernmental cooperation on 
matters of general interest. 
It is clear, then, that a common policy does not mean 
a single policy. Where Member States enjoy special 
relationships with certain parts of the world or hold 
positions rooted in their past history, the aim would 
be to coordinate national action inside a common 
framework rather than to replace it by a unitary 
approach. Here, too, subsidiarity would have to play 
a part. The essential point is that the Member States 
fulfil their obligation to act. 
The policy would be implemented using the existing 
institutional framework so as to avoid the emergence 
of dual structures in the Union that is to take the 
place of the present Community, while making 
allowance for adjustments in the role of the institu-
tions where warranted by the subject areas in ques-
tion and the stage now reached in the process of 
European integration. 
97 
Unlike European political cooperation, which is no 
more than a form of intergovernmental cooperation, 
the new common foreign and security policy would 
involve the adoption and implementation of deci-
sions that are binding on the Member States, taken 
unanimously or by augmented qualified majority, as 
the case may be, and with some scope for opting out. 
2. Rules 
Chapter I (Common foreign and security policy) 
encompasses general provisions covering both 
foreign and security policy (Section I) as well as spe-
cific provisions relationg to security, including de-
fence (Section 2). 
(a) The implementation of foreign policy, the objec-
tives of which are defined in Article Yl, rests on a 
distinction between: 
(i) matters identified as being of 'vital common 
interest' by the European Council, where the Council 
would decide what common action should be pur-
sued and how it should be implemented, acting by a 
qualified majority augmented by the requirement that 
at least eight Member States must vote in favour; the 
European Council would lay down conditions under 
which a Member State may, at its request, be granted 
dispensation from the obligations flowing from com-
mon action; 
(ii) other matters, where joint action is a matter for 
intergovernmental cooperation as at present, but with 
stricter provisions than Article 30 of the Single Act so 
that abstention by a Member State would not prevent 
joint action and consistency would be guaranteed 
between national action and action by the Union. 
A provision is also included whereby, in particularly 
serious or exceptional circumstances, any Member 
State must refer a matter to the Council to seek a 
swift decision on possible comm~n action. 
(b) In matters of vital common interest, in other 
words those falling within the scope of the common 
foreign and security policy, the right of initiative for 
Council decisions would be shared between the 
Member States and the Commission, while responsi-
bility for preparatory work and follow-up would rest 
on structured cooperation, via Coreper, between the 
Council's General Secretariat and the Commission. 
Democratic control would be ensured by the close 
involvement of the European Parliament in formulat-
ing and implementing the common policy. Acts 
adopted would not be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice. 
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In dealings with the outside world, especially in inter-
national organizations, the Union would be repre-
sented jointly by the Council Presidency and the 
Commission, the essential aim being that the Union 
should speak with a single voice. 
(c) Common security policy, the objectives of which 
are laid down in Article Yll, involves a number of 
specific provisions (Section 2). 
The scope of the policy would be defined in the 
Treaty itself and would comprise: 
(i) a guarantee of automatic assistance through the 
incorporation of Article V of the Brussels Treaty 
establishing the Western European Union, which 
would give substantive expression to the will of the 
Member States to link their destinies in the field of 
security and defence; in the event of an armed attack 
on one of the Member States of the Union, the others 
would provide all the military and other aid and 
assistance in their power; 
(ii) a list of matters of vital common interest in the 
field of security and defence, as defined by the Rome 
European Council in December 1990, which the 
European Council could subsequently expand: 
arms control and disarmament; 
security matters covered by the CSCE and the UN; 
cooperation on the production, export and non-proli-
feration of arms; 
the Commission also proposes the establishment of 
an arms research and production policy, since the 
present Treaty makes no provision for this although 
aspects falling under the competition rules, for exam-
ple, or the common commercial policy are already 
covered; 
(iii) a mechanism for regular meetings of Foreign 
and Defence Ministers with a view to developing 
cooperation and making it possible to convene an 
immediate meeting if necessary, i.e. in the presence 
of a threat or danger to the Union. 
In contrast to decision-making on matters falling 
under the common foreign policy, responsibility for 
defining the principles and deciding what action 
should be pursued under the common security policy 
would lie with the Council acting unanimously. 
However, the Council might be able to use other 
forms of decision-making for implementing certain 
measures. 
A Member State may, if it so requests, be granted dis-
pensation from some of the obligations flowing from 
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such decisions where there are compelling reasons -
i.e. because of its own constitutional provisions or 
because of international commitments entered into 
previously; such dispensations would be re-examined 
periodically by the Council. 
Some of these decisions, in particular those relating 
to defence cooperation, could be implemented, in 
compliance with NATO commitments, by means of 
specific arrangements with the WEU, which might 
act on behalf of the Union with a view to its gradual 
integration into the Union. 
The introduction of a common security policy 
requires Articles 223 and 224 to be repealed, since 
their field of application now comes under the new 
policy. 
The general provisions discussed in point (b) above 
would apply to both security and foreign policy, as 
would the possibility of dispensation for a Member 
State from certain obligations. 
C - External economic policy 
I. Chapter 11 on external economic policy, which 
will replace Articles 110 to 116 of the EEC Treaty, 
reiterates the Community's current objectives and 
powers under the common commercial policy, incor-
porates the external aspects of economic and mon-
etary union, and maintains the applicability of the 
provisions specific to this area. 
Setting as objectives the development of the econ-
omy and trade at world and European level means 
conferring a central role on the Union not only in 
promoting the prosperity of its Member States, busi-
nesses and citizens but also in contributing towards 
shaping the world economy and in generating 
momentum for the economic integration of Europe 
as a whole. 
These objectives define the areas in which the Union 
can act explicitly and comprehensively enough to put 
an end to the constant controversy surrounding the 
scope of Article 113 and formally determine the posi-
tion in accordance with the rulings of the Court of 
Justice. It should become possible for the Union, 
among other things, to work towards economic 
objectives such as reciprocal investment protection, 
access to production, and the reduction of disparities 
and imbalances between national legislation relating 
to capital. 
The exclusive competence of the Union in such areas 
is confrrmed, making the Commission, and the Corn-
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mission alone, responsible for representing the Union 
on the external scene, notably in dealings with inter-
national organizations. 
The Union should also be given power, though not 
necessarily sole power, to take the action needed to 
attain the objectives of external economic policy, in 
particular through bilateral and multilateral economic 
cooperation with non-developing countries: struc-
tural intervention (for example, in the G-24 context), 
participation in regional development banks (such as 
the EBRD), and debt relief. 
2. The machinery for implementing this policy will 
be covered, in the case of measures other than inter-
national agreements, 1 by the general legislative pat-
tern (law/regulation) to be incorporated in the new 
Treaty; with the law as the instrument providing the 
general framework enabling the Commission to 
adopt the regulations and decisions needed for the 
day-to-day management of the common policy, the 
Commission must also be in a position to adopt 
urgent measures if necessary. 
The specific possibility of authorizing Member States 
to act in this area, by inter alia concluding interna-
tional agreements, should help reconcile exclusive 
Union competence - capable of encompassing 
national action if necessary - with the desire to 
leave a certain role for the Member States. 
D - Development cooperation policy 
I. Chapter Ill will at long last enshrine development 
cooperation policy in the Treaty; up until now, 
except in the case of certain forms of association, all 
action under this policy has had to be based on 
Article 235 given the absence of any other provision 
in the Treaty. 
It will consequently be possible to state clearly the 
objectives of development cooperation, and in parti-
cular the importance and indeed the priority attached 
to the concept of poverty and the attention paid to 
the idea of balanced and durable development, tak-
ing account of environmental constraints. These are 
part of the general objectives of the common external 
policy, which explicitly refer to the promotion of 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights. 
' The procedure governing the conclusion of international 
agreements is set out in Chapter IV of Title Y. 
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Moreover, development cooperation policy can be 
made more consistent and effective, notably by 
stressing the fact that the powers of the Union com-
plement rather than compete with those retained by 
the Member States in this area. For this reason both 
action specific to the Union and joint action by the 
Union and its Member States will be an integral part 
of common policy provided that the principle of such 
joint action has been approved by special procedure, 
with the Council acting unanimously after receiving 
the assent of Parliament. 
2. The machinery for implementing the common 
policy will include all the instruments normally used 
in this area (financial and technical cooperation, 
humanitarian aid, commercial provisions, and so on) 
as well as action designed to encourage investment 
and debt relief measures for the developing countries. 
In areas covered by the common policy the action to 
be undertaken by the Union and the joint action to 
be implemented by the Union and the Member 
States will be defined in general guidelines and mul-
tiannual programmes adopted in the form of laws 
enacted under the eo-decision procedure by Parlia-
ment and the Council, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
The Union, which will have the sole power to con-
clude international agreements in areas where it acts 
either alone or jointly with the Member States, would 
also be so represented as to speak with a single voice 
in all international forums. 
3. In areas not covered by Union action or by joint 
action by the Union and the Member States, provi-
sion will be made for close coordination, under the 
aegis of the Commission, in order to encourage 
potential complementarity, to avoid the risk of incon-
sistency and to demonstrate the specifically Euro-
pean nature of the action in. question at international 
level. 
E - General provisions 
I. The general provisions in Chapter IV of the Treaty 
(common foreign policy) lay down rules applicable 
to international agreements concluded by the Union 
with non-member countries or international organiza-
tions. 
2. As regards the common foreign and security 
policy, in accordance with the general scheme of 
things set out under A above, the Member State hold-
ing the Council Presidency and the Commission will 
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have a joint right of initiative - the duopoly - at 
the various stages - requesting authorization to open 
negotiations, conducting negotiations and proposing 
conclusion of the agreement at the end of the nego-
tiations. 
Agreements would be concluded by the Council, act-
ing by augmented qualified majority, or unanimously 
in security matters. 
3. Outside the areas covered by the common foreign 
and security policy, in other words in external econ-
omic relations, development cooperation and all 
other areas where the Treaty confers powers on the 
Union, the principle of the single procedure would be 
confirmed and the broad outlines of the current 
Treaty would be preserved. Thus there would no lon-
ger be any need for specific provisions governing the 
conclusion of international agreements in those parts 
of the Treaty dealing with specific policies. 
The Commission would have a monopoly of the 
right of initiative regarding the opening and conduct 
of negotiations and the conclusion of the agreement 
(after consulting a committee composed of represen-
tatives of the Member States); as a rule the Council 
would conclude the agreement by qualified majority 
after consulting the European Parliament. 
However, the conclusion of important agreements, 
defined as such exhaustively by the Treaty itself, 
would require the assent of Parliament, currently 
required only for association agreements (Article 238 
EEC). I 
Lastly, in order to put an end to a situation which 
provokes controversy and hampers decision-making, 
it would be provided that the Commission could con-
clude certain agreements specified in the Treaty 
(adjustments to existing agreements) or covered by a 
Council decision empowering it to do so; 2 it would 
also be provided that the Commission would admin-
ister agreements. 
4. A clear indication is also given that where acces-
sion to a multilateral convention has a financial 
impact, the Union will sign the convention on an 
equal footing with the signatory States. 
1 Most agreements currently concluded under Article 113, 
for example, would not be within this category, but asso-
ciation agreements under Article 238 and general agree-
ments resulting from GATI rounds would inevitably be 
within it. 
The Commission's powers under Article 229 EEC are 
unchanged. 
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F - Overall consistency 
I. The fundamental question of ensuring consistency 
between the Union's common foreign and security 
policy and its other external policies is dealt with in a 
general fashion by a clause imposing an obligation to 
ensure such consistency and providing for a decision 
to be taken, on the initiative of the Commission or of 
a Member State, by the Council acting by the same 
procedure as applies generally to foreign policy ques-
tions. 
The same procedure will be used to avert the risk of 
inconsistency between common foreign and security 
policy and national foreign policies, in addition to 
the rules governing the coordination of national poli-
cies. 
There are also specific provisions relating to external 
economic relations and development policy to ensure 
that the Member States take a coordinated line on the 
international scene in matters which are not directly 
within the Union powers. 
2. Provision is made for the case of international 
agreements with a content covered partly by foreign 
policy and partly by other external policies. 
The procedure is a combination of those applicable 
to the two categories. Among other things, there is a 
diluted form of the duopoly of Commission and 
Council Presidency in the conduct of negotiations. 
These agreements, which provide a general frame-
work for relations with non-member countries in all 
their aspects, are of such a nature that the assent of 
Parliament should be required in the same way as for 
important agreements outside the foreign policy con-
text. 
The Commission would administer agreements in all 
areas other than foreign policy. 
G - Conclusion 
The changes that would flow from the guidelines set 
out above would make it possible to remedy the cur-
rent difficult situation: 
(i) frrst, the original Treaty was sketchy in its treat-
ment of the external aspect of Community activities 
(being confined to commercial policy and association 
agreements); the gaps have had to be filled in by the 
Court of Justice and controversy and disagreement 
have always been the order of the day; 
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(ii) secondly, the Single Act went only part of the 
way towards solving this by adding specific refer-
ences to external relations in a few areas (environ-
ment, research) while mixing up the two political 
contexts of intergovernmental political cooperation 
and decisions by the Community institutions. 
:!· 
* ::-
Commentary 
Title V: Common external policy 
Article YO 
Reflecting the importance which the Union attaches 
to playing an active part in its own right on the inter-
national scene, this Article begins by stating that the 
Union shall formulate and implement a common 
external policy. The wording bears witness to the 
recognition that in every task assigned to the Union 
by the Treaty, the internal aspect of Union action is 
necessarily mirrored by a corresponding external 
aspect. While encompassing the entire range of poli-
cies which the Union has to conduct in its relations 
with non-member countries and their peoples and 
with international organizations, the common exter-
nal policy nevertheless has to make allowance for the 
particular nature of the various fields in which it will 
have to act. Separate arrangements therefore have to 
be laid down for: 
(i) foreign and security policy, the conduct of which 
constitutes one of the principal new tasks assigned to 
the Union by the Treaty; 
(ii) external economic policy, development coopera-
tion policy, and the Union's other areas of external 
responsibility, including those .under EMU: this thus 
covers every external aspect of Union action. These 
external policies, though viewed in more global and 
evolutive terms, correspond more closely to the tradi-
tional aspects of action pursued hitherto by the Com-
munity; consequently it seems more appropriate to 
implement common arrangements more in the tradi-
tional mould. As regards these policies, then, the new 
Treaty - besides encompassing the external aspects 
of the Union's tasks, broadening their perspective 
and modifying procedures to enhance their effective-
ness - serves primarily to confirm and rationalize 
current practice and the principles hitherto spelled 
out by the Court of Justice. 
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As the Article indicates, the common foreign and 
security policy on the one hand, and external econ-
omic policy and development cooperation policy on 
the other are each governed by a separate chapter. 
Chapter/: Common foreign and 
security policy 
Article Yl 
The seeds of a common foreign and security policy 
were already contained in Title Ill of the Single 
European Act relating to European cooperation in 
the sphere of foreign policy. But there the policy was 
intended to develop alongside Community activity 
proper - in the wings, so to speak. Here it is fully 
incorporated as one of the tasks of the Union as 
such. The inclusion of foreign and security policy in 
the sphere of Union action through this Article repre-
sents one of the major innovations of the new Treaty 
on the path towards European Union. The provisions 
of this Article thus form a bedrock and occupy a 
place of cardinal importance. 
Article Yl, the wording of which is largely based on 
the fifth point of the preamble to the Single Act, 
states that the Union shall conduct a common 
foreign and security policy and defines the aims and 
principles it is to pursue. These aims and principles 
are those to which the Member States of the Union 
- and every civilized nation - have long subscribed 
in their relations with other countries and peoples. 
They are an expression of their fundamental beliefs 
as to the essential foundations for improved interna-
tional relations: the preservation of peace and inter-
national stability, the development of friendly rela-
tions with all countries and the furtherance of democ-
racy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Union intends to take 
its place on the international stage by pursuing a 
common foreign and security policy does not mean 
that the Member States themselves cease to have any 
role in international relations. Due heed must be paid 
to the legacy of the past so that the fabric of links that 
each Member State has woven with other nations 
may be knit together in a rich new tapestry. Article 
Yl therefore makes explicit reference to the need for 
the Union to take account of the special relations of 
individual Member States. 
Equally a common foreign and security policy does 
not necessarily mean a single policy. Its implementa-
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tion would involve both action by the Union and 
individual action by the Member States. 
A common foreign and security policy involves two 
aspects: 
(i) the first concerns the general question of the 
Union's attitude towards the outside world; 
(ii) the second more specifically concerns defence 
and security and involves the implementation of spe-
cific provisions. 
This is laid down in the second paragraph of Article 
Yl. 
Section 1 : General provisions 
Article Y2 
Reflecting the gradual process through which the 
common foreign and security policy is intended to 
develop and be conducted, this Article defines the 
components which go to make up that policy: 
(i) common action on matters that have been 
declared to be of vital common interest in accord-
ance with the procedure laid down in Article Y3; 
(ii) foreign policy action which remains in the 
national domain in principle, but where the Member 
States are bound to act in close cooperation. 
Article Y3 
This Article deals with common action by the Union. 
It is one of the key provisions of this Chapter. It lays 
down the procedure by which foreign policy matters 
are defined as falling within the common domain. 
A special decision-making procedure is instituted for 
this purpose, without prejudice to the exercise of the 
Union's external powers under the other Treaty pro-
visions (Article Yll et seq. as regards common secur-
ity policy; Article Yl6 et seq. as regards external 
economic policy and Article Y20 et seq. as regards 
development cooperation policy; Article 108(2) and 
(3) as regards monetary policy; Article Y26 as regards 
agreements falling under the other fields of Union 
responsibility referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty). 
This mechanism operates in two stages, as proposed 
by the Commission in its opinion. 
(a) Paragraph 1 deals with the method for deciding 
what matters are to be the subject of common action 
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by the Union. These will be matters that have been 
declared to be of vital common interest. 
To promote the gradual emergence of fields of com-
mon action, the Treaty does not specify what matters 
are of vital common interest. It assigns the task of 
deciding what these should be to the European 
Council after hearing the views of the European Par-
liament. This confrrms the role of the European 
Council in providing impetus and general political 
guidelines, in line with the Solemn Declaration of 
Stuttgart of 19 June 1983. When giving political 
approval for the Treaty, the European Council would 
be expected to decide on an initial list of such mat-
ters, so as to give effect to the provisions of this 
Chapter. The right of initiative for such decisions is 
shared between: 
(i) the Presidency; 
(ii) the Commission: here, unlike in other areas of 
Union action, the Commission does not enjoy sole 
right of initiative; 
(iii) a simple majority of the Member States. 
In deciding what matters are of vital common 
interest, the Union must take account of the special 
relations of the Member States and of the specific 
aspects of their external action. It could happen that 
some of the obligations entailed by common action 
might pose a difficulty for a particular Member State. 
this has to be avoided. The second subparagraph of 
paragraph I therefore provides that the European 
Council is to lay down the conditions under which 
one or more Member States may be granted dispen-
sation from some of the obligations involved in com-
mon action at their request. The European Council 
would, of course, have to make sure that any such 
dispensation is compatible with the principle of the 
common action in question and that the Member 
State(s) concerned come back into line as soon as 
possible. 
Any such dispensation would also involve certain 
constraints for the Member States to which it is 
granted. They may not do anything that is likely to 
affect the implementation of Union decisions. 
(b) Once the European Council has decided that a 
matter is of vital common interest, responsibility for 
defining the necessary principles for the common 
policy and the type of action to be pursued in imple-
mentation of the policy passes to the Council. Such 
action may be taken by the Union itself or by the 
Member States. Paragraph 2 confers the necessary 
powers on the Council; here too, special procedures 
apply: 
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(i) as under paragraph I, the initiative for decisions 
may come from the Member State holding the Presi-
dency or the Commission or a simple majority of the 
Member States; 
(ii) on the procedural side, it is proposed that the 
Council should act by a qualified majority, but that 
this should be the augmented majority specified by 
the second indent of Article 148(2) for Council deci-
sions where there is no proposal from the Commis-
sion. This requires 54 votes in favour from at least 
eight Member States. For the sake of realism, where 
the initiative for a decision comes from the Commis-
sion, the last sentence of Article Y3(2) stipulates that 
Article 149(1) shall not apply; this is the provision 
whereby, if the Council acts on a proposal from the 
Commission, unanimity is required for an act consti-
tuting an amendment to that proposal. Clearly there 
is little point in retaining the rule where the Commis-
sion does not have the sole right of initiative. The 
augmented qualified majority specified in the second 
indent of Article 148(2) would always be sufficient to 
ensure that the Council reaches a decision. 
Article Y4 
In contrast with Article Y3, which deals with matters 
that have been declared to be of vital common 
interest and therefore involve common action by the 
Union, Article Y4 concerns the other areas of foreign 
policy - including security - which have not been 
declared to be of vital common interest and so 
remain within the sphere of the individual Member 
States' foreign policy. 
Nevertheless it is important for the Member States to 
cooperate and endeavour to act in concert even in 
these matters. The Single Act made provision for 
such cooperation, most notably in Article 30(2). 
Article Y4, while largely based on that paragraph, 
seeks to tighten and make more explicit the Member 
States' obligation to coordinate their action. 
Paragraph I broadly follows the wording of Article 
30(2Xa) on the obligation to coordinate action on 
foreign policy matters of general interest. However, it 
also includes the Commission, alongside the Member 
States, among those on whom this obligation rests. 
As specified in Article 30(2), one of the foremost 
requirements for coordination is prior mutual infor-
mation regarding planned action. The second sub-
paragraph therefore requires the Member States to 
inform their partners in the Union and the Commis-
sion of any foreign policy measures they intend to 
take beforehand. 
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Beyond this, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 aim to encourage 
the Member States to pursue common action. Para-
graph 2 requires them to ensure the formulation and 
progressive development of common principles and 
objectives. However, in matters that remain within 
the national sphere for the time being at least, the 
Treaty must allow for the possibility that a Member 
State might feel unable to abide by the common posi-
tion and should not force it to do so. In this event, 
however, the Member State concerned would still 
have to comply with the obligations entailed by 
membership of the Union. 
A Member State that felt unable to go along with the 
general position would not be able to make use of its 
prerogatives in the form of a veto. Under paragraph 3 
Member States must refrain from hindering the 
emergence of consensus and any action that may 
flow from it. 
Paragraph 4 spells out the discipline which the Mem-
ber States must observe in adopting positions and 
pursuing national action. They must always bear in 
mind the need for coordination and cohesion by tak-
ing account of the positions of their other partners, by 
endeavouring to arrive at common positions and 
treating those agreed as a point of reference for 
national policies, and by showing loyalty to the 
Union through compliance with the obligation not to 
take action which impairs the effectiveness and cohe-
sion of positions taken by the Union in international 
relations. 
Lastly, paragraph 5 makes provision for an eventual-
ity that may arise with the gradual introduction of the 
common foreign and security policy, especially in the 
initial stages. A very serious situation may occur in 
an area that has not yet been declared to be of vital 
common interest where a particular Member State 
feels bound by earlier commitments to act or react. 
the prime requirement is that before taking individual 
action, the Member State in question should leave 
room for common action by the Union. Paragraph 5 
requires a Member State to refer the matter to the 
Council before taking action in such an event; the 
Council would then have to act without delay in 
accordance with Article Y3(2). This would afford it 
the opportunity to decide whether action by the 
Union was called for. 
Article Y5 
In line with the desire to strengthen the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union which underlies the entire 
Treaty, this Article lays down the manner in which 
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the European Parliament, like its national counter-
parts, is to be closely involved in the definition and 
conduct of the common foreign and security policy. 
Besides the right to make its views known before the 
European Council takes a decision identifying vital 
common interests, as provided by Article Y3(2), Par-
liament should enjoy certain specified prerogatives. 
The Council and the Commission will be required to 
keep Parliament regularly informed of the subjects 
dealt with under the common foreign and security 
policy and must make sure that its views are duly 
taken into consideration. The first paragraph is 
largely based on Article 30(4) of the Single Act, 
which deals with European foreign policy coopera-
tion. 
Going beyond this, the second paragraph enumerates 
more explicitly the rights needed to ensure the close 
involvement of the European Parliament. At least 
once a year Parliament is to hold a debate on the 
common foreign and security policy, during which 
the Council and the Commission will have to give 
explanatory statements. Moreover, in view of the fact 
that Parliament's committees offer the most appro-
priate framework for cooperation between Parliament 
and the executive, especially in foreign policy mat-
ters, this Article explicitly recognizes the right of the 
appropriate Parliament committees to hear the Coun-
cil or the Commission, either at the initiative of the 
Council or the Commission or at Parliament's own 
request. 
Article Y6 
The Single Act dealt with European foreign policy 
cooperation separately from other Community activi-
ties, and the preparation and implementation of such 
cooperation rested with separate administrative struc-
tures from those of the Community institutions. In 
particular, the Political Committee and the Secretariat 
provided for in Article 30(10) of the Single Act oper-
ated alongside the Permanent Representatives Com-
mittee and the Council's General Secretariat. 
With foreign and security policy now coming within 
the sphere of the Union, it is logical to unify the 
structures involved in preparing and implementing it. 
It is therefore laid down that the General Secretariat 
of the Council, strengthened if necessary and incor-
porating the Political Secretariat, will be responsible 
for preparing the Council's decisions and monitoring 
their implementation. It will work in close coopera-
tion with the Commission, liaising closely with the 
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Presidency, and exercising full diplomatic discretion 
initiatives where the traditional preparatory proce-
dures might be inappropriate. 
In addition, the Permanent Representatives Com-
mittee is given responsibility for preparing the ground 
for the Council's deliberations under the common 
foreign and security policy, as it does in other areas 
of Community activity under Article 4 of the Treaty 
establishing a Single Council and a Single Commis-
sion of the European Communities. 
Article Y7 
The existence of a common policy - for both for-
eign policy and security issues - implies that the 
Union must be represented as such on the interna-
tional scene. Article Y7 makes provision for such 
representation. Unlike in the other areas of Com-
munity responsibility, where the main role is gener-
ally played by the Commission, special rules apply 
here which reflect the particularly sensitive nature of 
foreign policy and security issues. 
In relations with non-member countries and in inter-
national organizations and conferences the first sub-
paragraph of paragraph I provides for the Union to 
be represented by a 'duopoly' (this also applies for 
the negotiation and conclusion of agreements coming 
under the common foreign and security policy -
Article Y25), comprising the Council Presidency and 
the Commission. In order to involve the Member 
States as closely as possible alongside the institutions, 
especially in the eyes of the outside world, provision 
is also made for the duopoly to be assisted, where 
necessary, by two Member States - the next and 
previous holders of the Presidency, following the 
'troika' formula - thus forming what now becomes 
(with the involvement of the Commission) a 'quad-
riga'. 
The second subparagraph of paragraph I is designed 
to deal with a difficulty that might arise with certain 
international organizations or certain organs of such 
organizations where not all of the Member States are 
members or have seats (UN Security Council, bodies 
of the Atlantic Alliance or WEU). It may prove 
impossible for the Union to be represented in these 
organizations or bodies under the rules of the frrst 
subparagraph. To cover this eventuality, procedural 
provision is made to enable the Council, acting by an 
augmented qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission or a Member State, to entrust the task of 
presenting the Union's position to one or more Mem-
ber States in those organizations or their organs. 
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Here, too, the essential requirement is for the Com-
munity to speak with a single voice. 
Paragraph 2 deals with the question of diplomatic 
representation in non-member countries and at inter-
national organizations. The incorporation of foreign 
and security policy, in so far as matters of vital com-
mon interest are concerned, within the sphere of 
Union responsibility under the Treaty does not mean 
that the aim is to replace overnight the diplomatic 
links that the Member States have built up over many 
years. Far from it. The Member States' missions 
accredited in non-member countries and to interna-
tional organizations are not affected. However, they 
should act in close cooperation and might, where 
appropriate, pool their resources together with the 
offices established by the Commission. The Member 
States and the Commission are required to intensify 
their cooperation and to furnish each other with all 
the assistance and information needed to ensure that 
the Union is represented as effectively as possible. 
Article Y8 
Article 30(5) of the Single Act was already concerned 
with the need for consistency between the external 
policies of the Community and the policies agreed in 
European political cooperation. It conferred special 
responsibility on the presidency and the Commission, 
each within its own sphere of competence, for ensur-
ing that such consistency was sought and maintained. 
This requirement is even more imperative once there 
is a common foreign and security policy. It applies 
not only to Union action under the other provisions 
of the Treaty but also to foreign policy action by the 
individual Member States, especially in areas outside 
those covered by matters that have been declared to 
be of vital common interest. 
The second paragraph is designed to deal with the 
potential danger of inconsistency with the common 
foreign and security policy from two quarters: from 
action by the Union under other policies, and from 
intended action by a Member State. It allows the 
Commission or any Member State, if it considers 
such a danger exists, to request a meeting of the 
Council to be convened to discuss the problem and, 
if necessary, take a decision in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Article Y3(2). 
Article Y9 
Essentially taken over from Article 30(8) of the Single 
Act, this provision on political dialogue between the 
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Union and non-member countries and regional 
groupings emphasizes the spirit of openness to the 
world which should guide the Union's action in 
foreign and security policy. 
Article YJO 
Article YIO places the field covered by this Chapter 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under 
Articles 164 to 188 of the Treaty, since action taken in 
pursuance of foreign or security policy is pre-
eminently a matter of political decisions and not, 
generally speaking, a matter for the judiciary. 
Section 2: Common security policy 
Article Yl 1 
The Union's foreign policy must also embrace secur-
ity in the broad sense, including defence. The objec-
tives spelled out are dissociable and the Union has to 
be given all the necessary powers. 
This Article sets out the general purpose of the com-
mon security policy, which is to strengthen security in 
Europe and to maintain peace in the world in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
which has a recognized security function. 
It also defines the relationship between the common 
policy and the WEU, reflecting the WEU's pivotal 
role in European integration in security matters. 
The Article goes on to describe the long-term objec-
tive as being to establish a common European de-
fence in full compliance with commitments entered 
into in the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. 
Europe's specific defence interests were set out in the 
WEU Platform adopted in The Hague on 27 October 
1987, in which nine of the Union's Member States 
expressed the conviction that security and defence 
are of central concern to the Union. 
Article Y12 
This Article determines the general commitment to 
solidarity which gives practical expression to the will 
of the Member States to pool their destiny as regards 
security and defence. It reproduces the commitment 
made in Article V of the revised 1948 Treaty of Brus-
sels, which established the WEU: if a Member State 
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is the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other 
Member States must afford it all the military and 
other aid and assistance in their power. 
Reproducing this fundamental WEU Article in the 
Treaty, without prejudicing the maintenance of the 
Member States' existing commitments, expresses the 
identity of Europe in security matters. The assurance 
of mutual assistance is the least that the Union Treaty 
can do in the way of a political commitment and 
gives substance to the Member States' will to link 
their destinies in the field of security and defence. 
Article Y13 
This Article introduces an 'evolutive' process to en-
able the common security and defence policy to be 
established in stages. 
Where matters to be dealt with are not covered by 
other Treaty machinery, this Article takes a specific 
approach to security questions by providing them 
with their own decision-making machinery which to 
some extent derogates from that established by 
Article Y3. The differences lie, first, in the decision-
making procedure, sensitivity and specific import-
ance attached to security and, second, in the fact that 
vital common interests in this area will have to be 
determined as soon as the Treaty enters into force. 
Paragraph I proceeds on the basis of the conclusions 
of the December 1990 Rome European Council to 
give the Union an identified security role, specifying 
forthwith that certain matters are of vital common 
interest and will fall to be dealt with in the Union 
context. These are arms control, disarmament and 
related questions (meaning confidence-building and 
security measures which are not necessarily consid-
ered exclusively in the CSCE), security questions 
dealt with in the CSCE or the United Nations, the 
latter to include UN peacekeeping operations and 
the possibility of joint intervention forces, coopera-
tion in the field of armaments and policy on arms 
production and exports, inspired by the non-prolifer-
ation concept. 
As part of its security policy the Union ought also to 
establish a research policy, especially for arms tech-
nology, and pool efforts in the field of arms produc-
tion with a view to achieving savings, agreeing stan-
dards and avoiding duplication. 
This could be implemented under paragraph 3 
(generally requiring unanimity) and - bearing in 
mind, in particular, that it is proposed to delete 
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Article 223 - should be developed so as to comple-
ment any action the Union may take in the area of 
the internal market (opening up government pro-
curement), the common commercial policy (customs 
tariff) and competition. 
Paragraph 2 of this Article, like the general provision 
in Article Y3, gives the European Council responsi-
bility for progressively identifying other areas of vital 
common interest. 
Paragraph 3, like Article Y3(2), establishes decision-
making machinery for the second stage. Within areas 
declared to be of vital common interest, the guide-
lines and principles of the common policy have to be 
formulated and action to implement the policy has to 
be decided. Given the specific character of security 
policy, it is provided that guidelines and principles 
will be adopted unanimously by the Council, though 
abstentions will not prevent the adoption of deci-
sions. There is no specific provision as to who will 
have the right of initiative, for it is felt that the grea-
test latitude should be left here. 
While basic decisions are to be taken unanimously, 
there should be a degree of flexibility as to the proce-
dure for deciding on action to be taken. The Council, 
therefore, will have to decide unanimously whether 
to keep the unanimity rule or opt for a less cumber-
some procedure. 
As under Article Y3, action under the common 
policy may be implemented either by the Union or 
by its Member States so as to preserve the possibility 
of responding to different types of situation. 
Paragraph 4 allows the European Council and the 
Council to dispense Member States who so request 
from the obligations which flow from common action 
if they can show cogent reasons based either on their 
own constitutional requirements or on pre-existing 
international commitments. 
There are three riders on this proviso. First, to ensure 
that decisions can be effective and that joint action is 
consistent, the Member State concerned must refrain 
from taking any measures that may affect the imple-
mentation of Union decisions. 
The second rider seeks to ensure balance in the exer-
cise of such dispensations. The Council will periodi-
cally review them to assess whether the relevant 
States should continue to enjoy them. The review will 
have regard to common policy developments and 
should enable a Member State to join in subse-
quently. 
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Lastly, a Member State that has been given dispensa-
tion will not be allowed to participate in Council 
deliberations on the scope or application of its part-
ners' obligations. 
Article Yl4 
This Article was drafted in the same spirit as Article 
Yl2 and seeks to give the Union the benefit of pro-
gress towards integration of foreign policy and secur-
ity policy achieved by the WEU, without actually 
shifting the centre of gravity of the construction of 
the European identity. 
The principle of joint meetings of Foreign and Def-
ence Ministers has already been tested since the 
WEU Council's Rome Delcaration of October 1984; 
the aim is to provide the Union with a cooperation 
and decision-making forum combining foreign policy 
and defence elements and involving the Commis-
sion. The scheduling of these meetings - twice 
yearly and when requested - is the same as for 
WEU Council meetings and reflects both the per-
manence of the functions exercised by the relevant 
ministers and the need to meet quickly in an emer-
gency. 
Article Y15 
This Article aims to ensure that possibilities of coop-
eration available in the WEU can be used for the 
benefit of the common policy. The idea is that the 
various European security structures should reinforce 
each other, without prejudice to the differing security 
commitments of the various Member States. 
Paragraph I gives the Council the possibility of 
deciding unanimously, under the procedure of Article 
Yl3(3), to refer a matter to the WEU Council where 
WEU resources might valuably be used to implement 
Council guidelines. The WEU then acts on behalf of 
the Union. This provision adds to the machinery 
already available under the WEU Treaty and to the 
specific cooperation facilities available there. 
Paragraph 2 reflects the need to ensure consistent ac-
tion while bearing in mind that there are different 
forms of security partnership among the Member 
States; at the same time it follows from the general 
scheme of the Treaty and from the spirit of the Single 
Act that the Commission must be given a role. This 
paragraph consequently provides for Union Member 
States which are not WEU members and the Corn-
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mission to be represented where WEU meetings pro-
ceed on the basis of a Union initiative. Arrangements 
will have to be agreed between the Union and the 
WEU to establish the relationships that are needed if 
action is to be undertaken on behalf of the Union 
with a view to gradual integration. The requisite 
arrangements could be made by means of a Protocol 
comparable to those governing relations between the 
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. 
This Article aims to prepare for the gradual formula-
tion of a European common security policy. Para-
graph 4 illustrates this option in favour of a gradual 
approach. The rules set out in paragraphs I and 2 
preserve the specific character of the Union and of 
the WEU while highlighting the convergence of their 
objectives. 
Paragraph 3 applies to those Union Member States 
which are also members of the Atlantic Alliance. The 
idea is that the Member States will speak with one 
voice in the Alliance and NATO when questions 
declared to be of vital common interest by the Union 
or questions dealt with by the WEU are discussed. 
This will help strengthen the Atlantic Alliance's 
European pillar. 
Paragraph 4 confrrms the long-term objective of inte-
grating the WEU into the Union and for this purpose 
uses Article XII of the revised 1948 Treaty of Brus-
sels. At the end of the 50-year time-limit set in that 
Article, the contracting parties each have the right to 
withdraw, subject to one year's notice. This will give 
a chance to take stock of security cooperation with a 
view to the eventual integration of the WEU into the 
Union. The exercise will begin in 1998. 
Chapter 11: External economic policy 
Article YJ6 
I. Article Yl6 lays down the principles governing 
external economic action by the Union, which -
combining the Community's current competences, 
primarily economic, with the wider powers conferred 
upon it by the new Treaty - will play an increased 
international role commensurate with its responsibili-
ties and mission. 
2. The conduct of such action pursuant to the legisla-
tion and policies which it is designed to implement is 
geared essentially to the common interest of the 
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Union, in other words to the economic prosperity of 
its Member States, its businesses and its citizens. 
Within this framework it will be for the Union to 
affrrm its presence and to play a key role in the drive 
to improve the world economy. 
3. The aim of such action will basically be threefold: 
(i) the general improvement of macroeconomic struc-
tures and the liberalization of world trade; the 
Union's role here will not only be to represent a pow-
erful factor for economic growth through implemen-
tation of its policies in general and completion of the 
internal market in particular but also, by extension, to 
contribute towards shaping the world economy, nota-
bly through participation in the Western Economic 
Summit and the OECD and through the increased 
role it will be called upon to play in the IFM as and 
when economic and monetary union progresses; 
(ii) the progressive strengthening of the links and 
relations between the different - and increasingly 
interdependent - countries and economies; this 
particular aim highlights the Union's key role in 
generating momentum for European economic inte-
gration; 
(iii) the establishment of fair economic and social 
conditions throughout the world through the pursuit 
of these economic objectives; this concern is clearly 
reflected not only in development cooperation as 
such but also in measures to assist the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and in the preferential 
treatment given to the developing countries in multi-
lateral negotiations (see Part IV of GATT). I 
Articles YJ6a and 17 
I. Article Yl7, like Article 113, which preceded it, 
becomes the nucleus of the external economic policy, 
the basis for the Union's exclusive competence in the 
area of external economic relations. 
2. The proposed amendments have three main aims: 
(i) the consolidation of the present position by con-
frrming the Union's exclusive competence and the 
Commission's negotiating role in the areas in ques-
tion; 
1 International action in the interests of solidarity not 
related to development cooperation (e.g. disaster relief) 
would also be covered by this general aim. 
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(ii) the codification of the interpretation of the con-
cept of commercial policy in line with the rulings of 
the Court of Justice and with Community practice 
and legislation; 
(iii) the introduction of the concept of 'common 
policy on external economic relations' encompassing 
the exclusive powers conferred on the Union (Article 
Yl7(1), the powers conferred on it in the areas cov-
ered by economic and monetary union (Article 
Yl6a), and the powers to take any other external 
measure needed to achieve the Union's economic 
objectives (Article Yl9). 
Paragraph 1 
3. The new external economic relations policy is pri-
marily a common policy based on experience of the 
Community's commercial policy and on the way in 
which it has developed. 
4. This is followed by a list of the areas in which 
exclusive competence is conferred on the Union, pro-
viding what is in effect a legislative codification of 
the principles established by the rulings of the Court 
of Justice already applied in practice on numerous 
occasions. Most of the areas in question are covered 
by the current Uruguay Round of the GA TI negotia-
tions. 
5. Even if powers in the field of commercial policy 
have evolved in a process which will doubtless con-
tinue (Court rulings, implicit powers, application of 
Article 235 EEC), the need for a proper statement of 
the respective positions of the Union and its Member 
States brings with it, in particular in the interests of 
legal clarity, the need to specify in constitutional 
terms the areas in which exclusive competence is 
conferred on the Union. 
6. The areas covered by the external economic policy 
include: 
(i) trade, including export credit and credit insurance 
schemes: this basically covers the current commercial 
policy as defined by Article 113(1) and successive 
Court rullings; 
(ii) economic and commercial measures involving 
services, capital investment, establishment, intellec-
tual property and competition. 
The aim here is to grant the Union jurisdiction not 
only in areas directly linked to trade 1 but also in res-
pect of other economic objectives, whose insertion in 
the common commercial policy has resulted in diver-
gent interpretations; these include reciprocal invest-
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ment protection, access to production, the reduction 
of disparities and imbalances between national legis-
lation relating to capital. 
It is essential for the Union to be given sole jurisdic-
tion in such areas in the interests of maximum effec-
tiveness and coherence. 
As far as intellectual property is concerned, the 
absence of harmonized protection for intellectual 
property on an international scale has highlighted the 
problems facing the industrialized countries in parti-
cular as a result of the increase in industrial piracy 
and counterfeiting. 
On the basis of the GA TI experience (TRIP negotia-
tions) the idea is to consolidate and extend Union 
powers in an area which, given the proliferation of 
the new technologies (computer software, etc.), is 
likely to undergo much more dramatic developments 
than the more 'traditional' problem areas (protection 
of geographical names). That said, the legal complex-
ities involved, notably the existence of rights and 
obligations which cannot be fully integrated into the 
economic dimension (cultural aspects, protection of 
individual rights, intellectual rights, etc.), militate in 
favour of restricting exclusive competence in this 
particular area. 
Paragraph 2 
7. States quite clearly that the Union is to have sole 
power to take measures, autonomous and conven-
tional, in the areas referred to in paragraph I. It is 
totally consistent with the Court rulings on Article 
113 and complies with the same operational require-
ments. 
Paragraph3 
8. Keeps open the current option of delegating 
power to the Member States to adopt specific mea-
sures in accordance with the objectives of the Union 
and subject to its authorization. 2 
As we are talking here about implementing measures 
for which the Member States would receive a specific 
1 Already covered by the GAIT negotiations: TRIMs, ser-
vices, etc. 
2 This clause could also be used for dealing with outstand-
ing aspects of commercial policy (e.g. coordination of 
national export credit schemes), as well as for the appli-
cation of measures - to be specified - adopted in line 
with the principle of subsidiarity. 
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mandate from the Union, this clause in no way 
prejudices the exclusive competence conferred on the 
Union, which will grant the necessary authorizations 
and lay down the requisite limits and conditions. 
Such measures consequently fall fully within the 
common policy. 
Paragraph4 
9. Provides the legislative framework for the adop-
tion of ad hoc autonomous measures (anti-dumping, 
safeguards, management of tariff quotas, etc.) and for 
the granting of the authorizations referred to in para-
graph 3. It will be for the Union acting under the eo-
decision procedure to lay down the criteria and gen-
eral conditions for applying such measures, which 
will subsequently be administered by means of regu-
lations and decisions adopted by the Commission. 
ParagraphS 
10. Refers to the procedures laid down in Article Y27 
governing conventional commitments entered into in 
areas other than common foreign and security policy. 
Paragraph6 
11. Establishes the principle of Union representation 
by the Commission on the external scene in areas 
covered by the common policy. The aim is to en-
hance the Union's effectiveness by ensuring that it 
speaks with a single voice in international organiza-
tions on all issues that come under the common 
policy. 
12. It is in fact essential to establish quite clearly the 
principle of single representation wherever the Union 
has sole power to act, not only in relations with the 
typically 'economic' organizations (GAIT, OECD, 
etc.) but also in dealings with non-economic or 
'mixed' organizations (United Nations, CSCE, etc.). 
Article Yl8 
I. This Article introduces a procedure for dealing 
with unforeseeable circumstances demanding urgent 
action in the economic and commercial field. The 
most likely scenarios would be the need to defend 
the Union's economic interests or to deal with other 
threats (e.g. to public health) by adopting trade mea-
sures similar to those taken at the time of the Cherno-
byl disaster. 
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2. Responsibility for assessing whether the circum-
stances warrant such action will lie with the Commis-
sion, which is given the power to adopt the necessary 
measures. But it has to inform the Council and Par-
liament of what has been done without delay. 
3. Urgent protective measures (e.g. provisional 
imposition of anti-dumping duties) will be governed 
by the ad hoc procedures laid down pursuant to 
Article Yl7(4). 
Article Yl9 
I. Article Yl9 is designed to meet two basic needs in 
areas where the Union does not have exclusive com-
petence: 
(i) the need to confer on the Union concurrent com-
petence to take economic measures in areas other 
than those referred to in Article Yl7; 
(ii) the need to make provision for general coordina-
tion on any issues of general interest involving exter-
nal economic relations. 
Paragraph 1 
2. Geopolitical changes and the development of 
international economic relations, notably within 
Europe, have already forced the Community to face 
up to increased responsibilities within a rigid legal 
and institutional framework ill-suited to the new 
challenges. 
3. The Union must therefore be given wider powers 
commensurate with its international responsibilities 
and geared to a broader range of operations. 
4. The clause in question enables the Union to take 
'atypical' measures with a view to achieving the 
objectives listed in Article Yl6, in particular through 
bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation with 
non-developing countries: structural intervention (for 
example, in the G-24 context), participation in 
regional development banks (such as the EBRD), 
and debt relief. 
Paragraph2 
5. Meets the need to coordinate action by the Mem-
ber States, particularly in respect of the positions they 
adopt as members of international organizations 
(IMF, World Bank, etc.) or as participants at infor-
mal international conferences (economic summits, 
meetings of the Paris Club, etc.). 
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6. In view of the growing importance for world 
economic relations of the guidelines produced by all 
these bodies provision is made for permanent coordi-
nation between the Member States and the Commis-
sion on economic issues of general interest; this will 
mean among other things that the position of Union 
members not represented in all the international 
organizations will be duly taken into account. 
Chapter Ill: Development 
cooperation policy 
The importance attached by the European Council to 
development cooperation policy in the wider context 
of international action is reflected in the decision to 
devote a separate chapter to it (Articles Y20 to Y24). 
This also serves to stress that development coopera-
tion policy, albeit a significant component of the 
common external policy, has specific objectives and 
characteristics of its own. 
The European Council also established the need for 
a stronger Community identity and more coherent 
Community action commensurate with the new chal-
lenges and responsibilities facing the Community on 
the international stage. 
In the face of the major challenge represented by the 
need to promote development and to fight poverty, 
the responsibilities taken on by the Community and 
its Member States are impressive, both in commercial 
terms (leading outlet for exports from the developing 
countries) and in financial terms (European public 
aid granted on concessionary terms - EEC+ Mem-
ber States - accounts for 42% of world aid, as 
against 15% in the case of the USA and 17% in the 
case of Japan) and must not be overlooked. 
The main aim of this particular chapter is to provide 
the common cooperation policy and its objectives, 
component elements, decision-making procedures 
and machinery with the legal and political basis 
which they deserve. 
A further aim is to strengthen - through Union ac-
tion, joint action by the Union and its Member 
States, and coordination of other action by the Mem-
ber States - the identity and coherence of Union 
efforts in this area. 
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Article Y20(0bjectives of the common policy 
on development cooperation) 
This Article defines - of necessity in general terms 
- the main objectives of the common policy. Three 
points deserve special attention: 
(i) the importance and priority attached to the con-
cept of poverty, whether it be the poverty suffered by 
the most disadvantaged sections of the population in 
the countries concerned or the general economic and 
social poverty suffered by what the international 
community terms the least-developed countries; 
(ii) the attention paid to the idea of balanced and 
durable development, taking account notably of en-
vironmental constraints; 
(iii) the place given to respect for human rights and 
dignity and the promotion of democracy as part of 
the general objectives of the common external policy. 
Article Y21 (Components of the common policy 
on development cooperation) 
The aim of this Article is to differentiate between the 
two components of the new common policy: action 
by the Union and joint action by the Union and the 
Member States; and coordination of other action by 
the Member States. The substance and implementing 
procedures for the former are spelled out in Articles 
Y22 and Y23 and for the latter in Article Y24. 
Article Y22(Areas, instruments and scope of 
action by the Union and of joint action by the 
Union and the Member States) 
Paragraph I 
The action falling within the sole jurisdiction of the 
Union obviously includes measures covered by the 
common commercial policy. It also includes manage-
ment of the instruments for the stabilization of export 
earnings from commodities of export interest to 
developing countries (Stabex, Compex, Sysmin) as 
well as measures (at the planning, negotiation or 
implementation stage) designed to improve the oper-
ation of the markets in such products. This particular 
clause largely enshrines existing competences and 
takes over the wording already approved by the 
Community in the fourth Lome Convention and in 
the positions adopted at Unctad. 
Ill 
Paragrapm 2 and 3 
The list of action by the Union and of joint action by 
the Union and its Member States is not comprehen-
sive but includes the instruments generally used to 
back up the development policies undertaken by the 
developing countries. EIB operations are also 
included. 
Paragraph3 
The aim of this paragraph is to introduce a procedure 
for defining the nature and scope of joint action by 
the Union and the Member States in the areas 
referred to in paragraph 2. Such joint action is essen-
tial to provide the common cooperation policy with 
the minimum critical mass needed to ensure its credi-
bility and to give it a specific identity in the eyes of 
its beneficiaries as well as in the eyes of the other 
donors. 
There are two points worth making as things stand at 
present: first, action by the Community as such 
(Lome Convention and other operations funded by 
the budget) accounts for only just over 10% of the 
total aid granted by the Member States; and 
secondly, despite efforts already made to produce 
overall guidelines in certain areas, bilateral action by 
the Member States is still virtually uncoordinated. 
Hence the procedure introduced by paragraph 3 
(decision by the Council acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission after receiving the 
assent of Parliament), which should make it possible 
to identify general objectives and to define joint ac-
tion for implementation by the Union and the Mem-
ber States on a significant scale and in an effective 
and coherent manner. For example, the Council 
could decide to launch a plan to combat poverty or 
desertification; or, should the Union and the Mem-
ber States so wish, it could decide to take action 
aimed at relieving indebtedness. It would then select 
which of the instruments listed in paragraph 2 should 
be used for the purpose. 
Article Y23 (Definition of general guidelines 
and multiannual programmes specifying action 
to be taken by the Union and joint action to be 
taken by the Union and the Member States; 
conventional commitments; Union 
representation) 
~icle ~22(~) lays down the procedure for defining 
JOint actiOn m the field of development cooperation. 
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The next stage is to translate these relatively broad 
outlines into specific operations by: 
(i) defining general guidelines to ensure that the ac-
tion taken by the Commission and the Member 
States is consistent; 
(ii) establishing multiannual programmes specifying 
what action is to be taken, how, on what scale, and 
by whom (Commission or the Member States). 
Paragraph 1 
This defines the procedure for taking the above deci-
sions: qualified majority, eo-decision by Parliament 
and the Council, proposal from the Commission. 
The effectiveness of the cooperation policy is ensured 
by combining the various operations in a single pro-
gramme and by constant coordination. 
Paragraph2 
The general provisions governing conventional com-
mitments are set out in Article Y27. The Union will 
have sole power to enter into such commitments in 
areas subject to action by the Union or to joint action 
by the Union and the Member States as defined in 
acC<?rdance with Article Y22(3). Given the thinking 
behmd the new Treaty, the Lome Convention would 
be covered by this paragraph. 
The Commission will represent the Union when 
these areas come up for discussion by international 
organizations or at international conferences. This 
would apply for instance in the case of Unctad or 
FAO discussions, or meetings of the Conference on 
the Special Action Programme on behalf of the 
Least-Developed Countries). 
Article Y24 (Coordination) 
Paragrapm 1, 2 and 3 
As the Member States will continue to take national 
action in broad areas of development cooperation 
~~t covered by Union action or by joint action, prov-
ISion has to be made for machinery which will ensure 
consistency and improve effectiveness as a result. 
This machinery is duly provided for in Article Y24: 
(i) mutual information on all plans for action at 
national or Union level in the field of development 
cooperation policy; 
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(ii) liaison necessary as a result of such information 
or in the interests of general consistency. 
Paragraph 3 stresses the need for overall consistency 
between Union cooperation policy as a whole and 
action by the Member States in a national frame-
work. The action taken by the Union and national 
action must complement each other. In any event 
national action must avoid impairing Union coopera-
tion policy. 
Paragrapb5 
It will be for the Commission to take any action 
needed to ensure that the system operates properly, 
including the sending of recommendations to the 
Member States. 
This does not preclude the adoption of specific and 
more binding measures by the Council in accordance 
with the procedures set out in Article Y23(1) in areas 
not subject to Union action or joint action but 
deemed to be of special importance. This could apply 
for instance in the case of discussions organized at 
periodic meetings of IMF or World Bank bodies 
(general assemblies, Development Committee, 
BIRD/IMF, etc.). 
Paragrapb4 
Similarly, the Commission will be responsible for 
coordinating the positions of the Member States in 
international forums in areas not specifically covered 
by the common cooperation policy. 
Chapter IV: General provisions 
Section 1 
Article Y25 
Paragrapb 1 
This paragraph transposes the traditional Community 
mechanism into the new common foreign and secur-
ity policy but adds a role for the Council Presidency. 
Where the Commission already has powers in areas 
of Community concern, the right of initiative is con-
ferred jointly on the Council Presidency and the 
Commission as regards requests for authorization to 
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open negotiations and the conduct of negotiations 
(the 'duopoly'). 
The Council, which decides to open negotiations by 
augmented qualified majority, or in certain cases 1 
unanimously if the agreement relates to security mat-
ters, may always issue a negotiating brief to the nego-
tiators, who will be assisted by a special committee 
appointed by the Council. 
Paragrapb2 
The initiative in proposing that the agreement be 
concluded lies with the Council Presidency or the 
Commission; either of them may make the proposal 
to the Council. 
It is the Council which, after consulting Parliament, 
concludes the agreements by an augmented qualified 
majority, or in certain cases I unanimously if the 
agreement relates to security matters. 
Section 2 
Article Y26 
Paragrapbs 1 and 2 
These provisions, which amplify the specific provi-
sions in the chapters on external economic policy 
and development cooperation policy, specify that the 
procedure of Article Y27 will apply to all agreements 
other than those covered in whole or in part by the 
common foreign and security policy, which are dealt 
with by Articles Y25 and Y28 respectively. Para-
graphs I and 2, which expressly refer to those Arti-
cles, confer power on the Union to conclude interna-
tional agreements with non-member countries and 
international organizations. 
Paragrapb 1 
This paragraph, relating to the exclusive power of the 
Union, incorporates into the Treaty the principles of 
the judgment given by the Court of Justice in the 
AETR case, 2 which is part of the established body of 
1 Wbere tbe Council has not exercised its possibility of 
deciding on a different decision-making procedure as 
provided in Article Yl3(3). 
2 Judgment of 31 March 1971 in Case 22/70 Commission v 
Counci/[1971] ECR 263. 
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Community law. The Union, then, is given the sole 
power to conclude international agreements in cases 
other than those expressly provided for by the Treaty, 
meaning part of the EMU agreements, agreements 
under Article YI7(1) relating to external economic 
policy and agreements under Article Y22( I) relating 
to certain development cooperation activities. Fol-
lowing the AETR rule, the Union acquires sole 
power to act externally as soon as it has exercised its 
power internally. In other words, if there are internal 
rules in whatever form in some particular area, the 
Member States lose their right to enter into commit-
ments vis-a-vis non-member countries or international 
organizations since, as the Court has held, these 
commitments could have an impact on Community 
provisions or affect their scope. 
As a corollary of this exclusive treaty-making power, 
it is provided that the Union, in areas where it has 
already exercised its powers internally, is substituted 
for the Member States in relations with non-member 
countries and in international organizations and con-
ferences. this will put an end to the development of 
grey areas which have been a source of confusion 
and have reduced both the Community's influence 
on the international scene and the international 
dimension of its common policies. 
Paragraph2 
Paragraph 2 deals with what are known as shared 
powers and complements paragraph I. In areas 
where the Union has not yet exercised its powers 
internally it may, since it enjoys full status as a sub-
ject of international law, conclude international 
agreements in all areas covered by the Treaty -
which means those listed in Article 3 and those 
added to the Union's area of power by decision 
under Article 235 because they are necessary for the 
attainment of a Treaty objective. 
This principle was stated clearly by the Court in Opi-
nion No 1176. 1 The concept here is the concept of 
potential or latent powers actually exercised by the 
Union only when the time is felt to be ripe; the exer-
cise of concurrent powers by the Member States is 
not excluded, provided the Member States do not 
enter into commitments which conflict with Union 
objectives. 
Where it has not yet exercised its exclusive external 
power the Union, acting under express provisions of 
the Treaty or under the AETR rule enshrined in para-
graph I, will coordinate the positions of the Member 
States in relations with non-member countries and in 
international forums. This means that the Union can 
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speak with one voice on the international scene in all 
areas covered by the Treaty and that the Commission 
can assess on a case-by-case basis whether it should 
present a recommendation to the Council seeking 
authorization to open negotiations for an agreement 
in a given area. 
Paragraph3 
The purpose of this paragraph is to make it clear that 
the Union must have the financial resources needed 
to meet the obligations flowing from the agreement 
on an equal footing with signatory States under 
multilateral agreements. The treaty-making power 
conferred on the Union must not be restricted by 
financial constraints. 
Article Y272 
Paragraph 1 
This paragraph broadly takes over Articles 228 and 
113(3), applied in practice to all types of agreement 
concluded by the Community. 
It is now, however, provided that the Commission 
will be the sole negotiator; it will regularly consult 
the special committee, but the committee will not 
have to be involved in the actual negotiations. 
Paragraph 2 
The important novelty is to be found in this 
paragraph, for certain agreements will require the 
authorization (assent) of Parliament before they can 
be concluded by the Council. 
This provision relates to the most important agree-
ments, exhaustively defined as such in this para-
graph. The categories listed here could be reviewed 
following the Intergovernmental Conference in order 
to add the more important classes of agreement relat-
ing to new powers conferred on the Union. 
This expansion of Parliament's role in the conclusion 
of certain international agreements by no means 
I 26 April 1977 [1977] ECR 741. 
2 This Article was already transmitted to the Intergovern-
mental Conference by letter dated 14 February 1991 
(SG(91) D/255) entitled 'Provisions extending Parlia-
ment's powers in respect of international agreements'. 
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implies that existing practices should be abandoned, 
particularly as regards the transmission of informa-
tion to Parliament during negotiations; there is no 
actual provision for this in the text of the Treaty, but 
the Commission has given Parliament a commitment, 
particularly in the February 1990 Code of Conduct. 
Paragraph3 
Agreements not falling within the categories set out 
in paragraph 2 will be concluded by the Council, act-
ing by qualified majority after consulting Parliament. 
Paragraph4 
This paragraph provides that the Commission may be 
authorized to conclude certain agreements, auto-
matically where they modify early agreements, or 
otherwise by powers delegated case by case by the 
Council. 
This would cover, for instance, standards issued by 
international organizations such as the ILO or the 
FAO Codex Alimentarius. 
ParagraphS 
This paragraph preserves the Commission's powers 
under Article 229 of the EEC Treaty, which is sub-
stantially repeated in Article Y30 and covers agree-
ments such as liaison or administrative cooperation 
agreements with international organizations. 
Paragraph6 
This paragraph confirms that the Commission will 
administer agreements, representing the Union for 
that purpose. The concept is broader than manage-
ment in the strict sense and extends to representing 
the Union in bodies such as joint committees set up 
by agreements. 
Section3 
Article Y28 
This Article deals specifically with 'multidimensional' 
agreements covered partly by common foreign policy 
and partly by Union external powers under other pol-
icies (such as agriculture, transport or the environ-
ment). There is a particularly sensitive problem here. 
The proposed solution is extensively inspired at pre-
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conclusion stages by the procedure for foreign policy 
agreements (Article Y25), conclusion being subject to 
the procedure for important agreements in other 
areas of Union power. 
The procedure thus combines elements of the proce-
dure applying to the two categories of agreement. 
Paragraph 1 
The Council Presidency and the Commission will 
jointly take the initiative in proposing that negotia-
tions be opened, as is the case in the foreign policy 
area. Negotiations will be conducted by the Commis-
sion in conjunction with the Presidency after consul-
tation with a special committee: the formula partly 
follows the traditional Community set-up but seeks 
to reflect the dual nature of these agreements. As in 
the case of foreign policy, conclusion will be pro-
posed jointly by the Presidency and the Commission. 
This, then, is a diluted form of the duopoly. 
Paragraph2 
These agreements are by definition important agree-
ments establishing general relations with certain of 
the Union's partners, which means that Parliament's 
assent will be necessary for their conclusion. 
Paragraph3 
The Commission will be responsible for administer-
ing these agreements, except those in the foreign 
policy area, and this will include representing the 
Union in bodies set up by them. 
Section4 
Article Y29 
This reproduces the part of Article 228 which pro-
vides for the Court of Justice to be consulted where 
there is doubt as to whether an agreement is compa-
tible with the Treaty. 
Parliament's external relations role has been substan-
tially expanded and the Court has recognized its 
capacity to bring actions where its prerogatives are at 
stake; Parliament is consequently added to the insti-
tutions which may seek the Court's opinion. This 
Article is otherwise unchanged. 
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Article Y30 
Articles 229 to 231 are updated here without changes 
of substance beyond removing the reference to spe-
cific organizations. 
The emphasis is placed on support for regional 
integration organizations as the Union has a family 
relationship with them. 
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Articles Y3J and Y32 
These Articles repeal a series of provisions which are 
replaced by the new Title on common external 
policy. This means specific EEC Treaty provisions 
relating to the common commercial policy (Article 
113), to security matters (Articles 223 and 224), t to 
research agreements (Article 130n), to the environ-
ment (Article 130r(5)) and to association agreements 
(Article 238) as well as the Articles on political coop-
eration in the Single Act. 
1 This is without prejudice to the question of internal dis-
turbances, which are out of place in the foreign policy 
context. 
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Democratic legitimacy: 1 Hierarchy of norms, 
executive powers, legislative procedure 
(eo-decision) 
Draft text 
Hierarchy of norms - Executive 
powers 
Deletion of Article 145, third indent. 2 
Deletion of Article 149.3 
Article 155 
In order to ensure the proper functioning and 
development of the union, the Commission shall: 
(i) ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the 
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto 
are applied; 
(ii) formulate recommendations or deliver opinions 
on matters dealt with in this Treaty, if it expressly so 
provides or if the Commission considers it necessary; 
(iii) have its own power of decision and participate 
in the shaping of measures taken by the Council and 
by the European Parliament in the manner provided 
for in this Treaty; 
(iv) adopt, in the manner provided for in Article 
189b, the regulations and take the decisions necessary 
to implement laws, without prejudice to the provi-
sions of Article 189b(l) conferring a power of substi-
tution on the European Parliament and the Council. 
It shall also adopt the administrative provisions 
necessary to implement the regulations. 
Article 189 
In order to carry out their task the institutions of the 
Union shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, adopt laws and regulations, take decisions, 
make recommendations or deliver opinions. 
A law shall have general application. It shall be bind-
ing in its entirety; any provisions which do not call 
for implementing measures shall be directly appli-
cable in all Member States. 
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Action to be taken to apply the provisions of this 
Treaty shall be defined by laws. Laws shall determine 
the fundamental principles, general guidelines and 
basic elements of the measures to be taken for their 
implementation. Laws shall determine inter alia the 
rights and obligations of individuals and firms and 
the nature of the guarantees they should enjoy in 
every Member State. Implementation may be 
entrusted in whole or in part to the Member States, 
acting in accordance with their own constitutional 
requirements. 
A regulation shall have general application. It shall 
be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States. 
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those 
to whom it is addressed. 
Recommendations and opinions shall have no bind-
ing force. 
Article 189a(new) 
(Legislative (eo-decision) procedure as set out here-
after). 
Article 189b(new) 
I. Where a regulation implements a law, a power of 
substitution shall be reserved to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council in all cases where no provision 
1 Parliamentary assent to international agreements is cov-
ered in the Chapter on common external policy. 
2 The delegation of executive powers to the Commission is 
determined in a general fashion; exceptions cannot be 
made to it by a Jaw. 
J Since the eo-decision procedure takes over from the 
cooperation procedure this no longer appears in Article 
149 (included in a second section, entitled 'The Council' 
in Chapter I 'The institutions') but in Chapter 2 'Provi· 
sions common to several institutions' of Title I of Part 
Five of the Treaty, Article 189a. 
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is made for recourse to one of the procedures referred 
to in paragraph 2. 
The following procedure shall apply: 
(i) the Commission shall adopt the regulation in 
question and forward it to the European Parliament 
and the Council; 
(ii) the Commission regulation shall enter into force 
on expiry of a period of two months reckoned from 
the date of transmission unless the European Parlia-
ment, by a majority of its members, or the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, rejects the measure 
within that period; 
(iii) in that event the Commission may either adopt a 
new regulation, which shall be subject to the substitu-
tion procedure, or submit a proposal for a regulation; 
in the latter case the procedure laid down in Article 
189a shall apply. 
2. A law may provide that, in the exercise of the 
powers referred to in the fourth indent of Article 155, 
the Commission shall be assisted by an advisory 
committee composed of representatives of the Mem-
ber States, whose role shall be to deliver an opinion 
on the draft of the measures to be taken; where the 
measure to be taken is a regulation, a law may pro-
vide that the Commission shall be assisted by a man-
agement committee and that in the event of the Com-
mittee delivering a negative opinion by the majority 
provided for in the first indent of the second subpara-
graph of Article 148(2), the Council, acting by a quali-
fied majority, may take a different decision within a 
given period. 
For the record 
NB: Consequential amendments (addition of 'laws' 
and deletion of 'directives') must be made to Articles 
190 and 191. 
Legislative procedure 
(Co-decision) 
Article 189a 
Where a law is enacted in pursuance of this Treaty, 
the following procedure shall apply: 
I. (a) The Council, acting by a qualified majority 
under the conditions set out in paragraph 5, on a pro-
posal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
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opinion of the European Parliament, shall adopt a 
common position; the European Parliament shall 
have a period of four months from transmission of 
the proposal to give its opinion; if the European Par-
liament does not react within this period, it shall be 
deemed to have given a favourable opinion. 
(b) If its common position is compatible with the 
European Parliament's opinion, the Council shall 
definitively enact the law. If not, the Council's com-
mon position shall be transmitted to the European 
Parliament within a period of four months following 
delivery of the European Parliament's opinion or, in 
the absence of an opinion, expiry of the period 
referred to in point (a). The Council and the Com-
mission shall inform the European Parliament fully 
of the reasons which led the Council to adopt its 
common position and also of the Commission's posi-
tion. 
(c) If the Council fails to adopt a common position 
within the time allowed and if the European Parlia-
ment fails to deliver an express opinion, the proce-
dure shall be closed. 
If the Council fails to adopt a common positiOn 
within the time allowed although the European Par-
liament has delivered an express opinion, the proce-
dure laid down in paragraph 2 shall apply. 
2. Within one month of transmission as provided for 
in paragraph l(b), the proposal shall be subject to a 
conciliation procedure within a committee composed 
of representatives of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission. 
If the conciliation procedure leads to agreement 
within two months on the drafting of a joint text, this 
text shall be deemed to be approved on expiry of a 
period of one month reckoned from the declaration 
that agreement has been reached unless the European 
Parliament, acting by an absolute majority of its 
members, or the Council, acting by a qualified major-
ity, rejects it within that period. 
3. If the conciliation procedure does not lead to 
agreement within a period of two months, the Com-
mission shall re-examine its proposal within one 
month. The re-examined proposal shall be transmit-
ted to the European Parliament, except where it 
incorporates Parliament's amendments, and to the 
Council. 
If the European Parliament rejects a re-examined 
proposal within a period of two months by an abso-
lute majority of its members, the procedure shall be 
closed. 
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If the European Parliament approves the re-exam-
ined proposal or fails to react within the time 
allowed, or if there is no need to refer it to the Euro-
pean Parliament pursuant to the ftrst subparagraph, 
the Council may adopt the re-examined proposal by 
a qualified majority, amend it unanimously or reject 
it by a simple majority. If the Council has not acted 
on expiry of a period of two months reckoned from 
transmission of the European Parliament's approval 
or of the re-examined proposal incorporating the 
European Parliament's amendments, the re-examined 
proposal as approved by the European Parliament 
shall be deemed adopted. The declaration to that 
effect shall be made by the President of the European 
Parliament. 
Where the Council amends the re-examined propo-
sal, it shall be deemed adopted if, within a period of 
one month from transmission of the amended propo-
sal to the European Parliament, the European Parlia-
ment has not rejected it by an absolute majority of its 
members. The declaration to that effect shall be made 
by the President of the Council. 
4. I Unanimity shall be required for the Council to 
amend a proposal when adopting a common posi-
tion or definitively enacting a law. 
As long as a law has not been enacted, the Commis-
sion may alter its proposal at any time during the 
procedures provided for in paragraphs I to 3. 
5. The periods referred to in this Article may be 
reduced by common accord between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission. They 
shall be reduced by half where the European Parlia-
ment or the Council exercise their power of substitu-
tion in respect of an act adopted by the Commission, 
pursuant to Article 189b(l). 
Present text of the cooperation procedure 
Article 149(2) 
2. Where, in pursuance of this Treaty, the Council acts in 
cooperation with the European Parliament, the following 
procedure shall apply: 
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(a) The Council, acting by a qualified majority under the 
conditions of paragraph I, on a proposal from the Commis-
sion and after obtaining the opinion of the European Parlia-
ment, shall adopt a common position. 
(b) The Council's common position shall be communicated 
to the European Parliament. The Council and the Commis-
sion shall inform the European Parliament fully of the rea-
sons which led the Council to adopt its common position 
and also of the Commission's position. 
If, within three months of such communication, the Euro-
pean Parliament approves this common position or has not 
taken a decision within that period, the Council shall defini-
tively adopt the act in question in accordance with the com-
mon position. 
(c) The European Parliament may within the period of three 
months referred to in point (b), by an absolute majority of its 
component members, propose amendments to the Council's 
common position. The European Parliament may also, by 
the same majority, reject the Council's common position. 
The result of the proceedings shall be transmitted to the 
Council and the Commission. 
If the European Parliament has rejected the Council's com-
mon position, unanimity shall be required for the Council to 
act on a second reading. 
(d) The Commission shall, within "a period of one month, 
re-examine the proposal on the basis of which the Council 
adopted its common position, by taking into account the 
amendments proposed by the European Parliament. 
The Commission shall forward to the Council, at the same 
time as its re-examined proposal, the amendments of the 
European Parliament which it has not accepted, and shall 
express its opinion on them. The Council may adopt these 
amendments unanimously, 
(e) The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt 
the proposal as re-examined by the Commission. 
Unanimity shall be required for the Council to amend the 
proposal as re-examined by the Commission. 
(f) In the cases referred to in points (c), (d) and (e), the 
Council shall be required to act within a period of three 
months. If no decision is taken within this period, the Com-
mission proposal shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 
(g) The periods referred to in points (b) and (f) may be 
extended by a maximum of one month by common accord 
between the Council and the European Parliament. 
1 This paragraph takes over the substance of paragraphs I 
and 3 of Article 149, which is replaced in its entirety by 
the new Article 189a. 
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U: unanimity 
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Explanatory memorandum 
Democratic legitimacy: 
Hierarchy of norms, executive 
powers, legislative procedure 
(eo-decision) 
I. In its opinion of 21 October 1990 the Commission 
spoke in favour of strengthening democratic legiti-
macy, particularly by giving the European Parliament 
greater powers: 
(i) in the legislative process, by making changes to 
the cooperation procedure to introduce powers of 
eo-decision, albeit confined to legislative acts; dead-
lines would be added to guarantee effectiveness and 
the scope of the procedure would be widened; 
(ii) by requiring Parliament's assent to the conclusion 
of major international agreements, with provision for 
informing and consulting Parliament in the new area 
of foreign and security policy; 
(iii) in the budget procedure and in relation to own 
resources; 
(iv) in relation to the investiture of the President and 
Members of the Commission. 
2. Parliament's resolution of 22 November 1990 on 
the Intergovernmental Conferences and the conclu-
sions of the Rome European Council of 15 Decem-
ber 1990 adopted what is essentially the same line, 
adding that Parliament should play a greater part in 
monitoring the application of Community policies 
and that the rights of petition and inquiry should be 
consolidated. The European Council advocated, inter 
alia, the development of a eo-decision procedure for 
legislative acts in the hierarchy of Community acts, 
and Parliament is currently considering this question. 
This paper deals solely with Parliament's powers in 
relation to the adoption of legislative acts. 
The same approach has been adopted for internal 
legislation and international acts, namely increasing 
Parliament's role in relation to legislative acts in the 
strict sense and major international agreements. This 
increased involveme111t in the adoption of essential 
Community acts prempposes less cumbersome pro-
cedures for secondary or implementing legislation. 
3.1. As far as legislation is concerned, it is clear that, 
if democratic legitimacy is to be strengthened while 
enhancing the effectiveness of Community decision-
making, the following conditions must be met: 
S.2/91 
(i) the Parliament/Council eo-decision procedure 
must be confined to the adoption of primary legisla-
tion, the laws of the union; implementation of these 
laws would be a matter for national governments or 
the Commission; however, as the Commission indi-
cated in its 21 October 1990 opinion, the Council 
would continue to be central to the institutional sys-
tem in the context of the overall balance of the 
revised Treaty, which would provide for a significant 
increase in its powers in relation to economic and 
monetary union and a common foreign policy; 
(ii) the eo-decision procedure must facilitate deci-
sions and promote dialogue between the three institu-
tions involved in decision-making. 
3.2.1. Hierarchy of norms 
A hierarchy of norms, already existing in the legal 
systems of most Member States, must be introduced: 
Treaty, law, national implementing measures or 
Community regulations, and administrative imple-
menting provisions. 
3.2.2. The revised version of Article 189 defines a law 
as an act covered by the eo-decision procedure, 
meaning that the procedure can be applied in every 
field of Community activity, but only in relation to 
the basic elements of the matter to be dealt with. It 
therefore introduces the principle of a hierarchy of 
norms. 
This distinction should make it easier to adapt to the 
foreseeable pattern of Community legislative activity. 
This is expected to decline somewhat from 1993 
onwards and the nature of Community legislation 
will change, basic regulations gradually becoming as 
permanent and fundamental as national legislation. 
It should also make it possible: 
(i) to give Parliament a greater part to play in the 
exercise of what is one of its natural functions, the 
legislative function in the proper sense, by removing 
technical questions and matters of detail from its 
agenda; 
(ii) to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is 
adhered to, by providing an opportunity, as a general 
rule, for the adoption of national implementing mea-
sures, to be laid down in each law on a case-by-case 
basis; 
(iii) to place relations between the institutions on a 
rational, balanced footing and thereby increase the 
overall effectiveness of the Community's decision-
making process; 
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(iv) to simplify and clarify the system of Community 
acts, thereby making it easier for national parliaments 
and authorities to take them into consideration; in 
particular, it should make it possible to do away with 
the directive, currently a hybrid instrument of ambig-
uous status. 
As a new category of Community act, the law would 
be at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of secondary legis-
lation: 
(i) from the formal, organic point of view, a law 
would be an act of the Community's legislature, i.e. 
Parliament and the Council acting in accordance 
with the eo-decision procedure; its intervention 
would be confined to the adoption of laws; 
(ii) a law would be defined first and foremost by 
reference to its content; in the words used by the 
Court of Justice in its judgment in the Koster case, 
the sole purpose of a law would be to determine prin-
ciples and general guidelines and 'the basic elements 
of the matter to be dealt with'; this means that the 
basic principles would have to be determined by a 
law in all sectors; furthermore, certain rules would 
have to be enshrined in a law because of their intrin-
sic legal value; the rule could be, for instance, that 
provisions creating new obligations and liabilities to 
be borne by private individuals or businesses and 
determining the guarantees the latter should enjoy in 
any Member State should be laid down in a law; 
there would therefore be a double (cumulative) cri-
terion for defining matters to be dealt with by a law: 
the 'basic elements' in all cases plus sufficiently 
detailed rules in the case of provisions affecting the 
rights and obligations of those subject to the law; by 
contrast, all measures, even those of general and per-
manent effect, covered by the notion of implementa-
tion would not be covered by a law; 
(iii) as for its effects, a law should be of the same 
kind and scope in the Community's legal order (it 
should be binding, enjoy primacy and be directly 
applicable), irrespective of whether it is implemented 
by the Member States or by the institutions. 
3.2.3. Another key feature of the proposed reform is 
that a law could be implemented in whole or in part 
by Member States. 
In this way the essence of the directive would be 
retained, and the instrument restored to its initial sta-
tus. Since a law would deal with the basic elements 
rather than with the detail of an issue, Member States 
would have considerable discretion in the choice of 
the method to be used to achieve the objective set out 
in the law. It goes without saying that these objec-
tives would retain all their significance and that the 
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Commission would continue, as at present, to ensure 
that Member States complied with the provisions of 
Community law. 
Similarly, the principle of subsidiarity would be res-
pected in full since each law would specify, on a 
case-by-case basis, the division of tasks between the 
Member States on the one hand and the Com-
munity's institutions on the other (see 3.2.4 below). 
The subsidiarity principle states that what cannot be 
done better at Community level at the implementa-
tion stage should be left to the national authorities. It 
would therefore be for the Commission in its propo-
sals, and for Parliament and the Council in their 
amendments to them, to bear this in mind. 
The main criteria applicable to this division of tasks 
will be the extent of the need for uniformity given the 
objective to be achieved to comply with a law - that 
is to say the requirements of non-discrimination and 
legal certainty - and the relative complexity of the 
matter being dealt with. 
3.2.4. In the absence of a specific reference to imple-
mentation at national level, implementation would 
be a matter for the Community's institutions, an 
approach which is close to the arrangement for regu-
lations at present. 
Executive powers would be vested in the Commis-
sion by the Treaty, in the case of both regulatory 
measures and administrative provisions. A law could 
not depart from this general rule. This confirms 1 the 
principle already recognized in Article 145, third 
indent, of the EEC Treaty, doing away with the 
option now open to the Council of reserving the right 
to exercise implementing powers itself in 'specific 
cases', in other words, with no clear or verifiable 
limit, or using committee procedures which are either 
too cumbersome or provide no guarantee that a deci-
sion will be taken. 
One consequence is that a law could only stipulate 
that the Commission be assisted by an advisory com-
mittee or a management committee, the latter being 
possible only in the case of regulations (see (new) 
Article 189b(2) ). 
3.2.5.1. However, in all cases where no provision is 
made for a committee procedure, a substitution 
mechanism would be introduced for secondary legis-
lation (regulations) adopted by the Commission pur-
suant to primary legislation (laws). 
1 See Article 155, fourth indent. 
S.2/91 
Parliament and the Council could avail themselves of 
the substitution mechanism at the stage preceding 
entry into force of a Commission regulation. If the 
legislature considered that the Commission was 
exceeding its powers or straying from the guidelines 
laid down in a law, or indeed for reasons of expe-
Jiency, this mechanism would allow it to act in place 
of the Commission. The relevant procedure is 
defined in Article 189b( I). It stipulates that, following 
adoption of a regulation, the Commission would for-
ward the text to Parliament and the Council. Entry 
into force would be suspended for two months. 
During this interval both Parliament (by a majority of 
its members) and the Council (by a qualified major-
ity) could challenge the measures adopted by the 
Commission. If either institution exercised this 
option the Commission, depending on individual cir-
cumstances, could either adopt a new regulation 
(which would again be subject to the substitution 
mechanism) or present a proposal for a regulation. As 
an exception to the general rule that only a law is 
subject to the eo-decision procedure, this proposal 
would be subject to the full legislative process. This 
solution would come into play above all in cases of a 
wide divergence of opinion between Parliament and 
the Council, or between one of these institutions and 
the Commission. 
This would not exclude the possibility, in certain 
areas, of the Commission informing Parliament and 
the Council of its rules and regulations either in ad-
vance (in the case of agriculture for instance) or after 
the event (in the case of research for instance). 
3.2.5.2. The substitution mechanism would be in 
addition to the possibility already open to each of the 
institutions (Parliament, Council and Commission) 
of asking the Court to annul an act of another institu-
tion on grounds of illegality, particularly where that 
institution has acted ultra vires (Article 173, first para-
graph). 
3.2.5.3. The right to challenge regulatory acts could 
also be made more widely, indeed generally, avail-
able to private individuals, provided they could 
invoke a sufficiently flagrant infringement of a higher 
legal provision designed to protect them. I This 
would not only safeguard the principle of legality, 
which is the basis of any democratic legal order, but 
also guarantee the effectiveness of the Community's 
decision-making process. 
3.3.1. The eo-decision procedure 
The object here is to move on from the cooperation 
procedure introduced by the Single Act to genuine 
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joint decision-making by the two branches of the 
legislature, Parliament and the Council. 
3.3.2. The eo-decision procedure described in Article 
189a (new), applicable to the enactment of a law, is 
therefore based on the existing cooperation proce-
dure, a device which has proved its worth. 2 Two key 
elements of interinstitutional dialogue are retained, 
namely the Commission's right to amend its proposal 
at any time and the rule stipulating that the Council 
may only amend a Commission proposal by unani-
mous vote (paragraph 4). 
But this legislative procedure would involve genuine 
joint decision-making, that is to say, express power of 
rejection by both Parliament and the Council at the 
final stage of the procedure, which would prevent an 
act being adopted (see Article 189a(3), second, third 
and fourth paragraphs). 
This means that Parliament could exercise its power 
of amendment (or an equivalent power) at two 
points: on first reading - as is now the case under 
the cooperation procedure - and in the context of 
the conciliation procedure (see 3.3.3(b) below), where 
it could influence the content of the text on equal 
terms with the Council and the Commission. In cer-
tain circumstances, therefore, Parliament would 'have 
the last word', whereas under the present system the 
final say always rests with the Council. 3 
However, the entire procedure has been designed to 
facilitate agreement and avoid rejection. The danger 
of deadlock has been reduced to a minimum and 
effectiveness increased. In the first place, binding 
time-limits have been fixed for each stage of the pro-
cedure. These will be adhered to because failure to 
do so will have precise consequences, making it 
impossible for the offending institution to make its 
views known at that stage of the procedure. Time-
limits could be reduced by agreement between the 
institutions: an interinstitutional agreement will be 
needed to settle the problem of emergencies and 
cases where minor amendments have to be made to a 
law. Time-limits would be automatically reduced by 
half in the event of substitution (paragraph 5). 
1 This solution would entail amending Article 173, under 
which private individuals may institute proceedings for 
annulment only in respect of acts which are 'of direct and 
individual concern' to them, in other words usually mea-
sures applicable solely to an individual. 
2 The text of Article 149(2), which codifies the cooperation 
procedure, is reproduced after the (new) Article 189a. 
3 In Member States with bicameral parliaments, the final 
say does not always rest with one of the two chambers. 
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In addition, there is provision at the second stage for 
a conciliation procedure in the event of Parliament 
and the Council failing to reach complete agreement 
(Article 189a(2)). This if successful will lead to tacit 
approval of the act (rejection by contrast would have 
to be explicit) (see 3.3.3(b) below). 
It follows that, even with the introduction of a con-
ciliation procedure, there would be no danger of 
making the procedure longer than it is at present. The 
existing cooperation procedure imposes no time-lim-
its for the successive stages. Even assuming the worst 
scenario - i.e. conciliation fails and the Council 
amends a re-examined proposal at the end of that 
stage - the eo-decision procedure would be shorter 
on average than the cooperation procedure. 1 Thus 
the decision-making process becomes more effective 
and gains increased legitimacy at one stroke. 
3.3.3. The eo-decision procedure would operate as 
follows: 
(a) In essence the first reading would be the same as 
under the cooperation procedure, except that the 
Council would be entitled to enact a law immediately 
by qualified majority, or by unanimous vote if it 
amends a Commission proposal, provided it is 
entirely in conformity with Parliament's opinion 
(paragraph l(b)). 
However, the fixing of binding time-limits as early as 
the first reading stage (paragraph l(a) and (b)) means 
that arrangements need to be made for dealing with 
the consequences of any failure to adhere to time-
limits. 
If neither Parliament nor the Council acts before the 
time-limit expires, the procedure will be regarded as 
closed (paragraph l(c), first subparagraph). 
If only Parliament fails to act, it will be deemed to 
have delivered a favourable opinion (paragraph l(a)), 
whereupon the Council can adopt its common posi-
tion and proceed to the next stage of the interinstitu-
tional dialogue, the conciliation procedure. 2 
If only the Council fails to meet the deadline, the 
same applies (paragraph I( c), second paragraph). 
(b) At this stage a conciliation process will be ini-
tiated in a tripartite committee (representing Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Commission). 3 A time-
limit will apply to this procedure (paragraph 2). 
Contrary to the recommendations of the Martin 
report, the Commission would be represented at the 
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conciliation stage and could therefore exercise its 
right of initiative, including the right to amend its 
proposal, throughout the procedure to facilitate a 
consensus. In the Commission's view the conciliation 
procedure should minimize the danger of deadlock or 
outright rejection. It provides a better guarantee than 
a bipolar Parliament/Council relationship of protect-
ing the interests of all the Member States. 
Within the conciliation committee the Council would 
be able to take immediate account of Parliament's 
amendments, it being understood that the Commis-
sion would retain the right to withdraw its proposal. 
It should be noted that there is no provision for a 
decision or a vote by the conciliation committee. The 
aim here is to promote the emergence of a consensus 
between the three institutions and do away with any 
problem of the representativeness of members. 
If conciliation succeeded within the tripartite com-
mittee the only course left open to Parliament and 
the Council would be to reject the resulting text by a 
given deadline (silence being taken to signify 
approval) (second subparagraph of paragraph 2). 
Constitutional law requires that the text while 
'favourably viewed' within the committee should at 
least be given official tacit approval by the institu-
tions themselves. 
If conciliation failed (paragraph 3), the final stage of 
the existing cooperation procedure, updated in line 
with the Tindemans-Delors proposal, would be com-
bined with the proposal set out in the Belgian 
Government's memorandum, i.e. Parliament could 
reject the Council's final text. In this way the Council 
would no longer be the only institution with a final 
say. 
Under the existing cooperation procedure, following 
the second reading, the re-examined proposal, 
1 The cooperation procedure takes 20 months on average. 
In exceptional cases (Gennan unification for instance) it 
takes much less time. But in others there is still no out-
come several years after the initial proposals were sub-
mitted (see two 1986 proposals on insurance (annual 
accounts -liquidation) and two 1988 proposals on intel-
lectual property (protection for computer programs and 
biotechnology products)). 
2 Where the common position is in line with Parliament's 
opinion (or the Commission's proposal where Parliament 
does not deliver an opinion), the Council could enact the 
law at this point (paragraph l(a)). 
3 The exact composition of the conciliation committee will 
have to be enshrined in an interinstitutional agreement. 
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whether or not it takes account of some or all of Par-
liament's amendments, can be adopted by the Coun-
cil acting by a qualified majority, or amended by 
unanimous vote; if no decision is taken within the 
time-limit, the procedure is closed. Under the new 
eo-decision procedure, the Council could take a deci-
sion on a re-examined proposal only if it incorpor-
ated all Parliament's amendments or if the proposal, 
having been referred to Parliament again, was not 
rejected by an absolute majority of its members. Con-
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trary to the present arrangement, the procedure 
would be closed if Parliament rejected a proposal at 
this stage. 
If the proposal was not rejected, the Council could 
either adopt it by a qualified majority, amend it by 
unanimous vote or reject it by a simple majority. If 
the Council amended the revised proposal, Parlia-
ment would have a further opportunity to reject it by 
an absolute majority of its members. 
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The social dimension and the development of 
human resources 
Draft text 
TITLE Ill 
The social dimension and the 
development of human resources 
Chapter l 
Social provisions 
The provisions of Chapter I of Title Ill of Part Three 
of the Treaty are replaced by the following Articles. 
Article 117 
The Union's objectives shall be to improve living and 
working conditions, to guarantee fair social protec-
tion, to encourage the dialogue between management 
and labour, to develop human resources and to com-
bat social marginalization. 
These objectives shall be pursued through the com-
pletion of the internal market and economic and 
monetary union. They shall also be implemented 
through structural policies, the adoption of common 
rules and through agreements concluded between 
management and labour. 
In pursuing these objectives, the Union shall have 
regard to the competitiveness of companies and the 
diversity of national practices, especially in the area 
of contractual relations. 
Article 118 
I. In order to attain the objectives set out in Article 
117, the Union shall complement and support the ac-
tion of the Member States in the following areas: 
(i) the working environment and protection of the 
health and safety of workers; 
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(ii) living and working conditions, so as to ensure the 
protection of basic rights of workers; 
(iii) basic and advanced vocational training; 
(iv) levels of skills; 
(v) information for and consultation and participa-
tion of workers; 
(vi) the functioning of the labour market, in so far as 
this is made possible by economic convergence and 
the approximation of social practices in the Member 
States. 
2. To this end the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, acting on a proposal from the Commission in 
accordance with the eo-decision procedure and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, 
shall adopt, by means of laws, minimum require-
ments applicable in each Member State. 
3. Before presenting proposals in accordance with 
paragraph 2, the Commission shall consult ... on the 
possibility of attaining the objectives set out in para-
graph I through framework agreements in accord-
ance with Article 118b. Where the Commission es-
tablishes that a framework agreement is possible, it 
shall take the initiative of initiating the procedure 
provided for in Article 118b.' 
If such an agreement cannot be reached within a 
reasonable time, the procedure provided for in 
paragraph 2 shall apply. 
4. Where a law is not to be implemented by the 
Member States, the Commission shall be assisted by 
a ... 2 acting as a management committee within the 
meaning of Article 189b(2) in respect of such imple-
menting regulations as it is to adopt. 
1 The Commission may adjust the proposed provisions of 
Articles 118(3) and 118b(2) in the light of: 
(i) the outcome of discussions in the ad hoc Group on 
Social Dialogue; 
(ii) the involvement in the procedure of a consultative 
body, the nature of which remains to be determined. 
2 A consultative organ of a type to be determined. 
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A law may, however, in the first instance, leave the 
responsibility for implementation of all or some of its 
provisions to management and labour. 
5. Provisions adopted pursuant to this Article shall 
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
introducing more stringent protective measures com-
patible with this Treaty. 
6. This Article shall not apply to measures regarding 
the harmonization of social security systems, the right 
of association or the conditions governing the right to 
strike, nor to provisions regarding access to employ-
ment for nationals of non-member countries. 
Measures in these areas shall be adopted in accord-
ance with the procedure provided for in Article 235. 
Article 118b I 
I. The Commission shall endeavour to develop the 
dialogue between management and labour at Euro-
pean level which could, if the two sides consider it 
desirable, lead to relations based on agreements, 
including [framework] agreements applying through-
out a trade or industry at European level. 
2. At the request of the parties concerned, [frame-
work] agreements may be the subject of a Commis-
sion recommendation or of a decision taken by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission after consulting the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
and addressed to the Member States so as to make 
them mandatory for the duration of their validity. 
Article 119 
I. Each Member State shall ensure equality of treat-
ment between men and women at work. In parti-
cular, it shall ensure the application of the principle 
that men and women should receive equal pay for 
equal work and enjoy equal opportunities on the 
labour market. 
2. For the purpose of this Article, 'pay' means the 
ordinary basic or minimum wage and any other con-
sideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the 
worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his 
employment from his employer. 
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex 
means: 
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(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be 
calculated on the basis of the same unit of measure-
ment, 
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same 
for the same job. 
3. Measures to facilitate the implementation of the 
principles laid down in paragraph I shall be taken in 
the form of laws adopted in accordance with the eo-
decision procedure by the Council and the European 
Parliament, acting on a proposal from the Commis-
sion after consulting the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. 
Article 120 
A law adopted in accordance with the eo-decision 
procedure by the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, acting on a proposal from the Commission 
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, 
shall define the conditions in which actions to prom-
ote the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 
117, (especially) through exchanges of information 
and experience, may be launched in the framework 
of multiannual programmes. 
Article 121 
The Commission shall each year make a report on 
the evolution of the social situation in the union. It 
shall transmit this report to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. 
The European Parliament may invite the Com-
mission to draw up reports on specific problems 
concerning the social situation. 
* 
* * 
1 The Commission may adjust the proposed provisions of 
Articles 118(3) and 118b(2) in the light of: 
(i) the outcome of discussions in the ad hoc Group on 
Social Dialogue; 
(ii) the involvement in the procedure of a consultative 
body, the nature of which remains to be determined. 
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Explanatory memorandum 
The objectives of social policy, which is inseparable 
from economic policy, are to ensure a high level of 
employment, to improve living and working condi-
tions with a view to harmonizing them while main-
taining the improvement, to develop human 
resources, to enhance solidarity and to combat all 
forms of social marginalization. These objectives are 
sacrosanct. 
Object and methods of social regulation: changes 
and permanent features 
However, in recent years the circumstances in which 
social policy is conducted have changed considerably 
and deep-set trends, common to all the Member 
States, have become apparent. In all likelihood, these 
trends will continue over the next few decades. 
(a) In broad terms, the trends can be described as 
follows: 
(i) The internationalization of economies, in some 
cases even their globalization, has intensified. In the 
Community, the removal of internal frontiers will 
lead to substantial transnational integration of firms 
and increased workforce mobility. Indeed, this is 
already well under way. 
(ii) In this context, improvement of the competitive-
ness of frrms by keeping costs under control and 
seeking greater flexibility in working conditions and 
the organization of work is now a generally recog-
nized imperative. This is to be perceived as the result 
of the acceptance of economic constraints by all 
those involved. The introduction of new technologies 
is of major significance here. 
(iii) The quest for competitiveness is being pursued 
along specifically national lines. But it entails major 
changes in all the Member States, with considerable 
qualitative and quantitative effects on employment 
and labour relations. 
Indeed, all the principal variables in the world of 
employment have altered as a result: the proportion 
of the labour force accounted for by the tertiary sec-
tor and by women has increased; forms of employ-
ment and methods of remuneration have become 
more diverse; the organization of work and working 
time has become more flexible; recognition has been 
given to the fundamental role of training, both initial 
and continuing; the mix of qualifications required is 
changing; geographical and occupational mobility is 
on the increase, and so on. 
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(iv) At the same time, the aspirations of workers -
in fact, of the public at large- have also altered and 
diversified. In this way, the needs of frrms and the 
aspirations of individuals have found new areas of 
convergence (e.g. new forms of employment). 
(b) A basic feature of European patterns of change 
and of Europe's social model is that, in most cases, 
these developments have been kept under control 
and in balance by bargaining between the two sides 
of industry. Of course, this has caused adjustments to 
be made in the way in which developments are 
handled. 
The main change has been a clear move to decentral-
ize the handling of problems and in particular a shift 
towards negotiation at frrm level. In some cases, 
direct relations (dialogue, participation) have been 
established between employers and workers. 
In practice, decentralization takes the form of a new 
interplay between levels of negotiation: a wider range 
of issues is dealt with at frrm level, though the higher 
levels are not abandoned. The role of the latter is 
developing: for example, framework or coordination 
agreements, which are essential for the development 
and harmonious application of company agreements, 
are tending to be worked out at interoccupational or 
industry level (e.g. the May 1990 agreement on work-
ing time in the German metal-working industry or the 
Italian labour costs agreement of January 1990). 
At the same time, in several Member States central 
government has intervened, using a variety of meth-
ods, to change the rules and mechanisms of industrial 
relations (in France the Auroux Act of 1982; in Spain 
the Representation of Trade Unions and Employers 
Act of 1984; in the United Kingdom the 1984 Trade 
Union Act) or to regulate wage bargaining (indexa-
tion relaxed or dropped altogether in Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Italy and the Netherlands). 
(c) Despite these developments and regardless of all 
the specifically national considerations, the fact 
remains that the autonomy of the two sides of indus-
try - an autonomy conceded by the public auth-
orities- has been maintained: negotiation at differ-
ent levels has remained a basic component of regula-
tion in all the Member States, which is something 
specific to the industrial relations field. The reasons 
why this is still the case are as much political as 
social or economic. As one of the recitals to the 
Charter states, 'the social consensus contributes to the 
strengthening of the competitiveness of undertakings, 
of the economy as a whole and to the creation of 
employment; ... in this respect it is an essential 
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condition for ensuring sustained economic develop-
ment'. 
Furthermore, in the attempt to keep change under 
control and to make structures and human resources 
more adaptable, the field covered by industrial agree-
ments has been extended - to take in matters which 
had previously been dealt with separately (e.g. nego-
tiations on flexibility) and to go beyond the limited 
context of the firm to encompass certain fundamen-
tal social values: for instance, anticipating social 
problems (particularly connected with employment) 
caused by decisions to invest or disinvest; the 
environment; lifestyles and family life; equal oppor-
tunities; solidarity and measures to combat social 
deprivation. 
Over and above national initiatives and practices, the 
Community most certainly has a role to play in serv-
ing the purposes of social policy and in regulating 
certain changes. 
But it has to adjust to developments, to changed cir-
cumstances, both in its own legislation and in 
encouraging regulation based on agreement. In other 
words, the Community's social policy has to provide 
the appropriate framework for the shared and bal-
anced control of change while also helping to con-
solidate and improve the European social model. 
The grounds for revision 
With this in view, there are a number of arguments 
which plead in favour of modifying and extending 
the scope of the Community's social policy. 
(a) First, there is the very nature of the process of 
European integration: the establishment of a single 
economic and social area in which economic and 
social advances are made in step. We need to keep 
up the momentum provided by the European Coun-
cils of Hanover (June 1988) and Madrid (June 1989: 
'the same importance must be given to social aspects 
as to economic aspects and they should consequently 
be developed in a balanced fashion'). 
(b) The Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers adopted by the Strasbourg 
European Council reflects the urge to establish and 
build upon a platform of fundamental rights shared 
by all the Member States. This solemn declaration 
voices two ambitions: 
(i) it is a proclamation of European identity, reaf-
frrming the plan to ensure the harmonious develop-
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ment of the Community on the basis of social pro-
gress, underlining the imperative need for increased 
solidarity and a refusal to allow changes to result in 
more and more people with outdated skills; 
(ii) it is an expression of the determination to combat 
social dumping. 
The enforcement of these rights - through the 
introduction of minimum provisions, for instance -
is partly a matter for the Community, as far as its 
powers extend. The implementation of the social ac-
tion programme to give effect to the Charter has 
shown how inconsistent and inappropriate (e.g. legal 
basis for the proposal for a Directive on non-stan-
dard forms of employment), how anachronistic (Arti-
cles 120 and 122) or how incomplete (Article 119) the 
Treaty is. 
(c) Completion of the internal market and economic 
integration have clearly shown the need (given the 
transnational nature of the problems involved) for 
Community action in areas which have hitherto not 
been very sensitive or whose importance has been 
disputed, such as: 
(i) the protection of workers' rights in the case of 
transfrontier operations (company mergers, takeover 
bids, bankruptcies, collective redundancies); 
(ii) information/consultation, or even participation 
(industrial democracy and/or financial participation) 
of employees in transnational businesses; 
(iii) new obstacles to mobility within the Community 
(supplementary pensions, etc.). 
(d) In addition, steps must be taken to ensure that 
the economy of the internal market develops without 
any distortion of competition (examples of sensitive 
variables: health and safety, non-standard forms of 
employment, social security, equal treatment), and 
this calls for greater vigilance. 
(e) More generally, at microeconomic level, con-
sideration for the social dimension is increasingly 
becoming an integral part of management, and this 
contributes to added value and to competitiveness. 
(f) The extension and/or redefinition of the Com-
munity's powers in the social field is/are not imcom-
patible with the current trends towards decentraliza-
tion of collective bargaining to be seen in the Mem-
ber States (see above). The need to determine a 
Community framework for tackling the problems we 
have referred to remains. 
Consequently, the wide gap between the powers 
available under the current legal bases and the 
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ambitions set out in the Charter and the new con-
straints arising from completion of the internal mar-
ket warrant a revision of the social provisions of the 
Treaty. 
Assigning new powers to the Community in the 
social field is hardly an adventurous undertaking. 
Indeed it should be stressed that in those very fields 
in which new powers have been accorded by the Sin-
gle Act, regulation at Community level has worked 
satisfactorily, has operated largely by consensus and 
has proceeded at a steady rate (e.g. application of 
Article 188a, health and safety for workers). 
It is true, none the less, that the method and princi-
ples underlying any modification and extension of 
the Community's powers have to be clearly defined. 
Principles and method 
(a) There are three principles which should underpin 
the new Community social framework: 
(i) Subsidiarity, with due regard for the specific 
nature of social matters. 
First of all, the application of this principle lies not so 
much in choosing between social issues, distinguish-
ing those for which Community jurisdiction is recog-
nized, as in suggesting what, in the light of the needs 
identified and the potential value added by Com-
munity action, is the most appropriate in each case 
- harmonization, coordination, convergence, coop-
eration, etc. 
It is true that the Community has means and 
resources other than regulation for pursuing social 
policy objectives. For example, completion of the 
internal market, backed up by the structural policies, 
is 'the most effective means of creating employment 
and ensuring maximum well-being' (Charter). 
Secondly, it has to be borne in mind that social issues 
are resolved not only by means of legislation but also 
on the basis of collective bargaining - through the 
autonomy of the two sides of industry, recognized by 
the public authorities. In social matters, then, there is 
a 'dual subsidiarity', requiring a choice to be made: 
between Community action and national (or infra-
national) action; and 
between legislation and collective bargaining. 
At Community level, then, the two sides of industry 
must be given the widest possible room for man-
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oeuvre and precedence must be given to settlement 
by collective agreement. 
(ii) Respect for the diversity of national systems, cul-
tures and practices, provided this is constructive, i.e. 
consistent with the requirements of completing the 
single market and with the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Charter. Constructive diversity is 
something to be exploited, making the various 
national models better known, tracing similarities 
between them and in some cases drawing inspiration 
from them. 
(iii) Care to refrain from impairing the competitive-
ness of firms and to safeguard flexibility by reconcil-
ing economic and social considerations: whatever is 
done, there is a balance to be sought and found. 
If then, it is to conform as closely as possible to the 
new realities which condition the approach to social 
matters, the Community will have to show great dis-
cernment in selecting from the whole range of func-
tions and instruments available to it, whether they be 
mandatory or act as incentives, by choosing between 
Community level and national level on the one hand 
and between legislation and collective agreement on 
the other. 
(b) The involvement of the two sides of industry in 
Community social regulation could take two forms: 
one was already proposed by the Commission in 
1990 in connection with the implementation of the 
action programme - for example, with the proposal 
for a Directive on non-standard forms of employ-
ment (based on Article lOOa); this would allow Mem-
ber States to entrust the task of achieving the objec-
tives of a binding instrument adopted by the Council 
primarily to the two sides of industry; 
the other would stipulate that certain objectives of the 
Treaty might be attained via framework agreements 
drawn up directly at European level. 
(c) Lastly, qualified majority voting should be 
extended to certain fields, notably some of those cov-
ered by the Charter, with the proviso that other parti-
cularly sensitive areas - with too diverse an organ-
ization and with too varied national practices - will 
still be subject to unanimous voting (harmonization 
of social security systems, access to employment for 
nationals of non-member countries). 
There are two main, connected reasons which mili-
tate in favour of qualified majority voting: 
(i) a concern for effectiveness - to ensure that the 
economic and the social actually do move ahead in 
step; 
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(ii) the desire to secure consistency and balance 
within the Treaty itself by ensuring that a fundamen-
tal area such as the social field is not treated any dif-
ferently from other fields. 
The new articles 
Modernizing the legal framework along the lines 
sketched out above entails substantial amendment of 
the Treaty Articles that already exist, the incorpora-
tion of new Articles and the removal of obsolete or 
inadequate Articles. This can be done within the 
basic structure of the existing Chapter, which will 
help to make matters clearer. 
Inspiration has been drawn from three sources: 
(i) certain provisions of the Community Charter of 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers; 
(ii) the Commission opinion on Political union; 
(iii) the results of the social dialogue, chiefly in the 
form of joint opinions on the introduction of new 
technology, the organization of work and the adapta-
bility of the labour market. 
The following basic structure is therefore proposed: 
(a) The objectives set out in Article 117 would be 
updated in conformity with the far-reaching transfor-
mation of the social field. 
(b) A new version of Article 118 would expand the 
potential offered by the existing Article 118a, in 
accordance with the guidelines in the Commission 
opinion of 21 October 1990; this could provide a 
basis for most of the provisions needed to implement 
the Charter and control the process of economic and 
social change. I 
This new legal basis has been drafted in such a way 
as to fully respect subsidiarity in relation to the Mem-
ber States and the two sides of industry, and is con-
fined to those areas which really are suitable for the 
eo-decision procedure. 
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(c) Additional text in Article 118b provides a frame-
work for collective bargaining at European level and 
for the approval of the resultant agreements, thus 
providing legal backing for the autonomy enjoyed by 
the two sides of industry in this respect. 1 
It is provided that, before submitting its proposals, 
the Commission would consult a consultative body, 
whose nature remains to be determined, on the pros-
pect of attaining the objectives by means of a frame-
work agreement between management and labour as 
provided in the new Article. 
The Union would act by means of legislation only if 
it were not found possible to achieve results through 
collective bargaining. 
(d) Article 119 is rewritten for two purposes: 
to establish a legal basis for legislation to guarantee 
equal treatment for women and men; 
to extend its scope to cover all aspects of equal 
opportunities on the labour market. 
The new Article is largely inspired by the old one so 
as to preserve the practical benefits of the extensive 
body of Court of Justice case-law. 
(e) A new Article 120 would provide a foundation 
and a framework for operational activities (multian-
nual programmes) as an alternative or a supplement 
to legislative measures. 
(t) The existing Article 122 becomes Article 121. Its 
aim is to ensure broader dissemination of informa-
tion on the social situation. 
(g) The existing Articles 118, 120 and 121 would be 
repealed since they would have no purpose in the 
new context. 
The Commission reserves the right to adjust the pro-
posed provisions of Articles 118(3) and 118b(2) in the 
light of: 
(i) the outcome of discussions in the ad hoc Group 
on Social Dialogue; 
(ii) the involvement in the procedure of a consulta-
tive body, the nature of which remains to be deter-
mined. 
I The wording of this Article may have to be changed in 
the light of the outcome of discussions in the ad hoc 
Group on Social Dialogue. 
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Economic and social cohesion 
Draft text 
PART THREE 
Economic and social cohesion 
TITLE V 
The provisions of Part Three, Title V, of the Treaty 
are replaced by the following Articles. 
Articles 123 to 127 of the Treaty shall remain in force 
until application of Article 130d. 
Article 130a 
In order to promote its overall harmonious develop-
ment, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions 
leading to the strengthening of its economic and 
social cohesion. 
In particular the Union shall aim at reducing dispari-
ties between the various regions and the backward-
ness of the least-favoured regions. 
Article 130b 
Member States shall conduct and coordinate their 
economic policies in such a way as to attain the 
objectives set out in Article 130a. The implementa-
tion of the common policies and the internal market 
shall take into account the objectives set out in 
Article 130a and Article 130c and shall contribute to 
their attainment. The Union shall support the attain-
ment of these objectives by the action it takes 
through the structural Funds (European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section, 
European Social Fund, European Regional Develop-
ment Fund), the European Investment Bank and the 
other financial instruments. 
The Union and the Member States shall work 
together to promote harmonious development of the 
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regions, in particular through the structural policies 
- based on Fund operations in the less-favoured 
regions and areas- major trans-European networks 
and joint action. 
The Commission shall report to the Council every 
five years on progress towards the achievement of 
economic and social cohesion. 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a pro-
posal from the Commission after consulting the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, shall define the guidelines and condi-
tions necessary for balanced progress. 
Article 130c 
The structural Funds shall contribute to the attain-
ment of the objectives set out in Article 130a and 
shall, without prejudice to the application of Article 
130d, pursue the following priority objectives in the 
context of their specific tasks for the purpose of 
promoting: 
(I) the development and structural adjustment of 
regions whose development is lagging behind; 
(2) the conversion of industrial regions and urban 
areas in decline; 
(3) employment, the geographical and occupational 
mobility of workers, initial and continuing training 
and the integration into employment of those 
excluded from the working world; 
(4) rural development. 
Article 130d 
A law adopted under the eo-decision procedure by 
the European Parliament and the Council on a pro-
posal from the Commission, after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, shall: 
(a) make such amendments as are necessary to clar-
ify and rationalize the tasks of the structural Funds in 
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order to contribute to the attainment of the objectives 
set out in Article 130a and Article 130c, to increase 
their efficiency and to ensure coordination between 
the Funds and between them and the financial 
instruments; 
(b) create new structural Funds or amalgamate exist-
ing Funds. 
Article 130 
The following is added at the end of the Article: 
In its task the Bank shall facilitate the financing of 
programmes in conjunction with the operations of 
the structural Funds and the Community's financial 
instruments. 
* 
* * 
Explanatory memorandum 
I. The Rome European Council on 14 and 15 
December 1990 instructed the Intergovernmental 
Conference on political union to take 'economic and 
social cohesion between the Member States' into 
account in the context of the 'extension and streng-
thening of Community action'. 
In the context of revision of the Treaty, cohesion 
must be seen first and foremost in terms of the effec-
tiveness of our structural policy. But because Article 
130b links it to the conduct of economic policy by 
the Member States, structural policy is viewed by a 
number of delegations as an element of economic 
and monetary union with an eye in particular to 
increased funding from the Community budget to 
support steps taken to adapt their economies. The 
Commission tried to provide an initial response by 
suggesting a shock-absorbing mechanism to support 
the adjustment process. 
It is essential therefore to make a clear methodologi-
cal distinction between the question of amending 
Treaty provisions on cohesion and the question of 
increased funding for these policies, which would 
require an agreement along the lines of that of Febru-
ary 1988 (Delors package). 
For the time being the Commission intends to con-
tribute to the debate within the Intergovernmental 
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Conference on political union on amendment of the 
Articles introduced by the Single Act with a view 
to increasing the effectiveness of policies designed 
to promote cohesion. 
2. A complete balance sheet of the achievements of 
the structural policies will not be available until the 
end of 1991. It is therefore premature to envisage any 
radical change in the philosophy or the principles 
underlying the structural policies. 
On the contrary, the principles underlying these poli-
cies, as set out in the basic 1988 regulation rather 
than the Treaty - that is to say concentration, pro-
gramming, additionality, partnership, etc. - are 
being implemented more or less correctly by the 
Member States. 
However, cohesion goes far beyond the scope of act-
ion under the structural policies even if it is too often 
regarded as synonymous with assistance from the 
Funds. 
The problem is not the concise definition of cohesion 
in Article 130a. There is no need to rewrite the provi-
sion, but it could be expanded to make it clear that 
cohesion must be seen in the much broader context 
of the harmonious development of the Community. 
To this end it is proposed that the concept of bal-
anced development of the regions be introduced, to 
be promoted not only by assistance from the struc-
tural Funds, in particular in the less-favoured regions 
and areas, but also by major infrastructure networks 
and joint action (such as improvement of the envi-
ronment or vocational training). 
Care will also have to be taken to see that the promo-
tion of cohesion is incorporated in the list of basic 
aims of the Union in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, 
bearing in mind that objectives such as sustainable 
development and gu~ntee of a sound environment 
will be proposed. 
3. One of the main difficulties in applying the Single 
Act stems from the fact that the express provision of 
Article 130b to the effect that the objectives of econ-
omic and social cohesion be taken into account in 
the implementation of common policies and the 
internal market is not fully complied with. We need 
to decide whether and how the Treaty can provide a 
better guarantee that cohesion will be taken into 
account in other Community policies. 
Responsibility for this lies with the institutions in the 
day-to-day conduct of Community business. The 
Commission has a particular responsibility, frrstly by 
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drafting proposals to take account of the diversity of 
situations (for example, varying the time allowed for 
adjustment to uniform application of Community 
rules), and secondly by exercising its management 
powers. 
It is difficult to see how the Treaty itself could intro-
duce monitoring machinery to ensure that each 
policy takes cohesion into account. This could open 
the door to repeated applications for further interven-
tion by a given Fund and, in the event of assistance 
being refused, to requests for exceptional treatment. 
The Treaty could however make provision for regular 
reviews to produce a detailed balance sheet of pro-
gress towards cohesion. It is therefore proposed that 
the Treaty should require the Commission to report 
every five years on progress towards the achievement 
of economic and social cohesion. This report would 
be used by the Council as a basis for defining the 
guidelines needed to guarantee balanced progress. 
4. The Single Act specified that the priority objec-
tives of the structural policies would be set out in a 
framework regulation, which was adopted in 1988. It 
would now be a good idea - without drawing up 
exhaustive lists - to write some of these objectives 
into the Treaty, paying attention notably to the need 
to improve conditions governing education and 
health (which should feature more prominently in the 
secondary legislation determining the conditions of 
eligibility for assistance) for the purpose of promot-
ing: 
(i) the development and structural adjustment of 
regions whose development is lagging behind; 
(ii) the conversion of industrial regions and urban 
areas in decline; 
(iii) employment, geographical and occupational 
mobility of workers, initial and continuing training 
and the integration into employment of those 
excluded from the working world; 
(iv) rural development. 
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These objectives would be referred to in the new 
Article 130c, drawing on the experience acquired in 
pursuing the objectives specified in Article I of Regu-
lation No 2052/88 currently in force. Special stress 
needs to be laid on the role of the Funds in counter-
ing the dereliction of certain urban areas affected by 
the decline of economic activity. 
Provision also needs to be made for specific mea-
sures to promote the mobility of workers (in the spirit 
of the present Article 123 of the Treaty) or to facili-
tate the social integration of those excluded from the 
working world, given that general job-creation mea-
sures do not cater for their particular situation. 
The recital of these priority objectives in the Treaty in 
no way rules out the definition of new missions by 
secondary legislation under Article 130d. In this con-
nection the Commission believes that special atten-
tion should be given to the conversion of areas 
depending heavily on fishing. 
Similarly Article 130d could be relied on to tackle 
problems of environmental decay affecting certain 
regions in particular. 
5. As to institutional adjustments linked to the deci-
sion-making process, the effectiveness of structural 
policies could be improved by: 
(i) the introduction of qualified majority voting 
instead of unanimity for the framework regulation 
provided for in Article 130d, which could be a law 
adopted under the eo-decision procedure; 
(ii) the option open to the legislator of creating 
Funds whose number would no longer be determined 
by the Treaty; the creation and amalgamation of 
Funds would be governed by a law. 
6. The addition of a provision to Article 130 will also 
allow the European Investment Bank to be asso-
ciated more closely with the various types of opera-
tion of the structural Funds. 
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Research and technological development 
Draft text 
Research and technological 
development 
Article 130/ 
I. The Union's aim shall be to strengthen the scien-
tific and technological basis of European industry 
and to encourage it to become more competitive at 
international level. 
2. In order to achieve this, it shall encourage under-
takings including small and medium-sized undertak-
ings, research centres and universities in their 
research and technological development activities; it 
shall support their efforts to cooperate with one 
another, aiming, notably, at enabling undertakings to 
exploit the Union's internal market potential to the 
full, in particular through the opening up of national 
public contracts, the definition of common standards 
and the removal of legal and fiscal barriers to that 
cooperation. 
3. In the achievement of these aims, special account 
shall be taken of the connection between the com-
mon research and technological development effort, 
the establishment of the internal market and the 
implementation of common policies, particularly as 
regards competition and trade. 
4. Any research, technological development or 
demonstration activities undertaken by the union 
with a view to attaining the objectives assigned to it 
by the Treaty shall comply with the provisions of this 
Title. 
Article 130g 
In pursuing these objectives the Union shall carry out 
the following activities, complementing the activities 
carried out in the Member States: 
(a) implementation of research, technological 
development and demonstration programmes, by 
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promoting cooperation with undertakings, research 
centres and universities; 
(b) promotion of cooperation in the field of Com-
munity research, technological development, and 
demonstration with third countries and international 
organizations; 
(c) dissemination and utilization of the results of 
activities in Community research, technological 
development, and demonstration; 
(d) stimulation of the training and mobility of 
research scientists within the Union. 
Article 130h 
The Union shall work to coordinate the Member 
States' policies on research and technological 
development so as to ensure that those policies are 
consistent with one another and with Community 
policy. In close contact with the Member States, the 
Commission may take any useful initiative to pro-
mote such coordination. 
Article 130i 
I. The Union shall adopt a multiannual framework 
programme setting out all its activities. The frame-
work programme shall comprise a limited number of 
specific programmes and shall lay down the necess-
ary activities to promote, back up and monitor Com-
munity research and technological development 
policy. The framework programme shall lay down the 
scientific and technical objectives, define their res-
pective priorities, establish the rules applicable to the 
dissemination of knowledge resulting from the activi-
ties envisaged and fix the amount deemed necessary, 
the detailed rules for financial participation by the 
Union in the programme as a whole and the break-
down of this amount. The framework programme 
shall also establish the detailed arrangements for car-
rying out the specific programmes and shall indicate 
the rules for the participation of undertakings, 
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research centres and universities, which may include 
unsolicited projects. 
2. The framework programme may be adapted or 
supplemented, as the situation changes. 
3. The specific programmes provided for in para-
graph I shall be put into effect by the Commission 
pursuant to the fourth indent of Article 155. 
Article 1 30k 
In implementing the multiannual framework pro-
gramme, supplementary programmes may be decided 
on involving the participation of certain Member 
States only, which shall finance them subject to pos-
sible participation from the Union. 
Where supplementary programmes are adopted, rules 
shall be adopted regarding the dissemination of 
knowledge and the access of other Member States. 
Article 1301 
In implementing the multiannual framework pro-
gramme, the Union may make provision, with the 
agreement of the Member States concerned, for parti-
cipation in research and development programmes 
undertaken by several Member States, including par-
ticipation in the structures created for the execution 
of those programmes. 
Article 1 30m 
In implementing the multiannual framework pro-
gramme, the Union may make provision for coopera-
tion in Community research, technological develop-
ment and demonstration with third countries or inter-
national organizations. 
Article 1 30n 
The Union may set up joint undertakings or any 
other structure necessary for the efficient execution of 
programmes of Community research, technological 
development and demonstration. 
Article 130o 
The amount of the Union's annual contribution to 
the activities provided for under the multiannual 
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framework programme shall be laid down under the 
budgetary procedure, without prejudice to other poss-
ible methods of financing by the Union. 
Article 1 30p 
I. The provisions referred to in Article 130i and 130n 
shall be adopted in the form of laws by eo-decision 
of the European Parliament and the Council, acting 
on a Commission proposal and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee. 
2. The provisions referred to in Articles 130k, 1301 
and BOrn shall be adopted by the Commission pur-
suant to the fourth indent of Article 155. 
3. At the beginning of each year the Commission 
shall send a report on Community research and tech-
nological development policy to the Council and to 
the European Parliament. The report shall include 
information on activities carried out during the pre-
vious year and on the work programme of the current 
year. 
* 
* * 
Explanatory memorandum 
I. At its meeting in Rome on 14 and 15 December 
1990, the European Council noted that among the 
specific areas in which it recognized the need to 
extend or redefine the Community's powers, 'a 
research effort commensurate with the development 
of the Community's competitive capacity' was one of 
the aspects to be borne in mind. 
Similarly, the Commission, in its opinion of 21 Oct-
ober 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity with a view to political union, emphasized 
that the Treaty needed to be rewritten so as to make 
research and technology . activities carried out at 
Community level more effective. 
Experience gained in implementing Articles 130f to 
130q of the Treaty has shown that they are cumber-
some and lead to malfunctioning, which must be 
rectified. 
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2. The first point concerns the objectives which the 
Treaty assigns to the Union in respect of research and 
technological development activities. Article l30f(l) 
states that this objective is to strengthen the scientific 
and technological basis of European industry and to 
encourage it to become more competitive at interna-
tional level. It quite rightly emphasizes the vital 
importance of industrial activity. However, this word-
ing of the objective has proved too restrictive. It has 
made it difficult to undertake research activities, 
which are hard to justify in terms of making industry 
competitive, but which are none the less useful with 
regard to the Community's other tasks (including 
research on the environment, health and improve-
ment of the quality of life). Now, a fundamental 
requirement for consistency is that all Community 
research activities be coordinated and follow the 
same rules. 
This is what the new Treaty must try to achieve; on 
the one hand, by stipulating that whenever research 
activities are provided for by specific provisions 
(provisions on health, energy), such activities should 
be carried out under Article 130f et seq., and on the 
other, by adding a new paragraph to Article l30f con-
frrming the general scope of the provisions relating to 
research and technological development. 
Lastly, it goes without saying that the union's 
research and technological development policy must 
accord with the aims of the harmonious development 
of the Union as a whole and the strengthening of its 
economic and social cohesion. 
3. The second problem concerns the coordination of 
the Member States' policies on research and techno-
logical development. Article l30h lays down merely 
that the Member States themselves must coordinate 
them in liaison with the Commission. This provision 
has proved unsatisfactory. The proposed new word-
ing is designed to step up this coordination, by plac-
ing responsibility more clearly on the Union itself 
and by stipulating that the aim is to ensure that the 
national policies are consistent both with one another 
and with Community policy. 
4. The main difficulty in implementing the Treaty's 
provisions on research and technological develop-
ment is of an institutional nature. The problem is that 
the Treaty provides for a two-stage decision-making 
process in the adoption of the programmes, involving 
the Council and the European Parliament. 
The first, for the adoption of the multiannual frame-
work programme, requires the Council to act unani-
mously on a proposal from the Commission, having 
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consulted the European Parliament and the Econ-
omic and Social Committee (Articles 130i and 
l30q(l)). 
The second, for the adoption of the specific pro-
grammes, requires the Council to act by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission, having 
consulted the Economic and Social Committee and 
in cooperation with the European Parliament (Arti-
cles 130k and 130q(2)). 
These procedures are extremely cumbersome and 
have led to long delays, to the point where it has 
become almost impossible to complete a proposed 
programme within the period originally planned. 
It would be expedient to remove this major obstacle 
and to take account of the new rules to be included 
in the Treaty, concerning the hierarchy of norms and 
the decision-making process within the Union. 
To this end, the new Article l30p lays down that the 
multiannual framework programme is to be adopted 
by eo-decision of the European Parliament and the 
Council. Its implementation, and thus the specific 
programmes, are part of the executive function and 
are the responsibility of the Commission. This is laid 
down in the new paragraph 3 of Article 130i. 
With regard to the adoption of supplementary pro-
grammes (new Article 130k), participation in pro-
grammes undertaken by several Member States (new 
Article 1301) and cooperation with third countries or 
international organizations (new Article l30m), the 
Commission will be responsible for taking decisions. 
5. The revised text of Article 130i(l) stipulates that 
the multiannual framework programme must com-
prise a limited number of specific programmes and 
lays down the necessary promotion, back-up and 
monitoring activities. These activities are not in them-
selves research activities as such, but it is clear that, 
whether in the preparation or in the promotion stage, 
Community research and technological development 
activities call for measures of this type. For instance, 
preliminary studies and activities, initiatives on 
trans-European networks, application of research in 
support of other Community policies, support for 
and exploitation of the activities of the scientific 
community, and international cooperation. 
The first paragraph of the new Article 130i also indi-
cates the various constituent elements of the frame-
work programme. In particular, it refers to the 
detailed arrangements for carrying out the specific 
programmes and the rules applicable to the dissemi-
137 
nation of knowledge. This means that the provisions 
of Article 130k become redundant and can be dis-
pensed with. 
Article 130i also takes account of the need to allow a 
place in Community programmes for possible con-
sideration of projects drawn up directly by undertak-
ings, research centres and universities, e.g. large inter-
disciplinary integrated projects likely to fall within 
the scope of several specific programmes. 
6. The new Article 130k (which replaces Article 1301) 
has been reworded to take account of the new rules 
laid down in Article 130p regarding powers and the 
decision-making process. 
The text of the new Article 130m, which replaces 
Article 130n, does not include the second paragraph 
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of the old Article since the detailed arrangements 
regarding international cooperation are given in that 
part of the new Treaty dealing with the Union's exter-
nal relations. 
7. The new Article 130p sets out the procedures 
already referred to in respect of Article 130i. The eo-
decision procedure also applies to the setting-up of 
joint undertakings, provided for in Article 130n. 
Lastly, in order that the European Parliament and the 
Council be properly informed, paragraph 3 lays 
down that the Commission must send them a report 
at the beginning of each year on Community research 
and technological development policy. The report 
must include information on the previous year's 
activities and the work programme of the current 
year. 
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Energy 
Draft text 
Energy 
Article 1 
The objectives of this Treaty shall, in matters gov-
erned by this Title, be pursued within the framework 
of a common energy policy. 
The common energy policy shall be closely 
coordinated with the policies pursued in the frame-
work of the ECSC and EAEC Treaties. 
Article 2 
The common energy policy shall have the following 
objectives: 
(a) to guarantee security of supplies throughout the 
Union under satisfactory economic conditions; 
(b) to contribute to the stability of energy markets; 
(c) to complete the internal market in the energy 
field; 
(d) to define the measures to be taken in respect of 
each energy source in the event of a crisis; 
(e) to promote energy savings and the use of new 
and renewable energy sources. 
It shall ensure a high level of protection in relation 
both to the environment, and to health and safety. 
Article 3 
The measures required to implement the objectives 
specified in Article 2 shall be adopted in the form of 
a law on a joint decision of the European Parliament 
and the Council on a proposal from the Commission 
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and after consulting the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. Any Community research which may prove 
necessary shall be carried out within the framework 
of Articles 130fto 130q. 
Article4 
I. The provisions of Article 85(1) may be declared 
inapplicable to any agreement in the energy field 
which contributes to guaranteeing security of supplies 
in the Union, provided that the restrictions involved 
are indispensable to the attainment of that objective 
and do not afford the enterprises concerned the 
means to eliminate competition in respect of a sub-
stantial part of the products in question. 
2. Aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) making an 
effective contribution to ensuring security of supplies 
in the Union shall be considered compatible with the 
common market where it does not distort the opera-
tion of the internal energy market to an extent con-
trary to the common interest. 
* 
* * 
Explanatory memorandum 
The ECSC, EEC and Euratom Treaties apply to the 
energy sector depending on the type of energy source 
concerned. 
In the case of the ECSC Treaty, which will expire in 
2002, the Commission takes the view that, in the light 
of the conclusions of the European Council held in 
Rome on 14 and 15 December 1990, it is not appro-
priate, at this stage, to amend it in the context of this 
Intergovernmental Conference. Equally, it does not 
propose any amendment of the Euratom Treaty. 
It does consider, however, that a specific provision 
concerning energy policy should be inserted in the 
EEC Treaty, in order to: 
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(i) introduce in that Treaty the concept of security of 
supplies in the Union, 
(ii) affirm the need to complete the internal market 
also in the field of energy, and to make decision-
making in that area more effective. 
It was considered appropriate at this juncture to clar-
ify the situation as regards the application of the 
competition rules to the energy sector. 
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Environment 
Draft text 
TITLE VII 
Environment 
Article 130r 
I. Action by the Community relating to the environ-
ment shall have the following objectives: 
(i) to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the 
environment; 
(ii) to contribute towards protecting human health; 
(iii) to ensure a prudent and rational utilization of 
natural resources. 
2. Action by the Community relating to the environ-
ment shall be based on the principles that preventive 
action should be taken, that environmental damage 
should as a priority be rectified at source, and that the 
polluter should pay. Environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the Community's other poli-
cies. 
3. In preparing its action relating to the environment, 
the Community shall take account of: 
(i) available scientific and technical data; 
(ii) environmental conditions in the various regions 
of the Community; 
(iii) the potential benefits and costs of action or of 
lack of action; 
(iv) the economic and social development of the 
Community as a whole and the balanced develop-
ment of its regions. 
4. The Community shall take action relating to the 
environment to the extent to which the objectives 
referred to in paragraph I can be attained better at 
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Community level than at the level of the individual 
Member States. 
Article 130s 
The measures required under Article 130r shall be 
adopted as laws by the Council and the European 
Parliament under the eo-decision procedure on a pro-
posal from the Commission and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee. 
Article 130t 
The protective measures adopted jointly pursuant to 
Article 130s shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent protective 
measures compatible with this Treaty. 
* 
Explanatory memorandum 
At its meeting in Rome on 14 and 15 December 1990, 
the European Council noted that protection of the 
environment was one of the specific areas in which it 
recognized the need to extend or redefine the Com-
munity's powers. It noted that environmental protec-
tion needed to be improved 'in order to ensure sus-
tainable growth'. 
Similarly, the Commission, in its opinion of 21 Oct-
ober 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity with a view to political union, emphasized 
that the provisions dealing with the environment 
needed to be rewritten so as to make the decision-
making process more effective, and proposed use of 
qualified-majority voting in this area. 
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The amendments proposed by the Commission (11) 
are designed to meet two essential requirements (1), 
namely to ensure more effective action by the Union 
to protect the environment and to facilitate and 
encourage consideration of environmental impera-
tives in the other policies. 
I. The following objectives are to be attained: 
A. Recourse to the Treaty's provisions on the 
environment must be made more effective 
This calls for: 
I. A better decision-making process: 
(i) In this respect, the shift to qualified-majority vot-
ing should speed up decision-making. It should also 
put an end to disputes on legal bases (I OOa to 130s ). 
(ii) In this connection, when formulating its propo-
sals the Commission will take into account objec-
tively different situations in the Member States or in 
the regions, in accordance with Article 130r(3), in 
order to allow adjustment periods where necessary. 
2. Greater implementing powers for the Commis-
sion: 
(i) In a general manner, the need to step up the 
Commission's implementing powers is mentioned in 
the conclusions reached by the European Council in 
Rome, 'so that it may ... help to make Community 
action more effective'. 
(ii) With regard to environmental protection, this 
should, in particular, enable the Commission to make 
a better contribution towards the funding of Com-
munity action, both within the Community and in 
the context of international cooperation. The possi-
bility of setting up new financial instruments (for the 
environment and research) is brought up in the Com-
mission's opinion of 21 October 1990 (p. 13). More-
over, the Commission has recently proposed a spe-
cific financial instrument for the environment 
(LIFE). 
3. Greater compliance with environmental legisla-
tion: this point could be examined within the frame-
work of the broader discussion on the idea of penal-
ties put forward in the Commission opinion to 
encourage greater compliance with the judgments of 
the Court of Justice. 
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B. Greater consideration of the environment in 
the other policies 
One of the chief aims of the Union must be 'sustain-
able growth'. This cannot be attained unless environ-
mental imperatives are taken fully into account in the 
other policies of the Union (policies pursued both 
within the Union and internationally). 
The Commission is therefore proposing the follow-
ing: 
I. A statement in the opening prov1s1ons of the 
Treaty (Articles 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty) that pro-
tection of the environment is one of the objectives of 
the Union. 
The essential objectives of the Union's action on the 
environment must be set out in those articles. 
The terms employed at the European Councils (sus-
tainable growth, guarantee of a healthy environment 
for this and future generations) could be retained. 
These amendments will be included, in due course. 
2. The wording of the last sentence of Article 130r(2) 
needs to be made tighter and more forceful in order 
that genuine account be taken of the environment in 
the definition and implementation of the other poli-
cies. 
3. Provisions on the Union's external action to pro-
tect the environment to be included in the general 
articles of the future Treaty which deal with the com-
mon external policy, since action to protect the envi-
ronment is merely one aspect of a common external 
policy. 
In addition, reference to the general articles relating 
to the Union's external policy is desirable in order to 
clarify the Union's external powers and simplify pro-
cedures. 
11. The following amendments to Title VII of the 
EEC Treaty are therefore being proposed: 
A. To improve effectiveness 
I. Amendment of Article 130s: 
Introduction of qualified-majority voting under the 
eo-decision procedure. 
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2. Deletion of the last sentence of Article 130r( 4): 
'Without prejudice to certain measures of a Com-
munity nature, the Member States shall finance and 
implement the other measures'. 
This sentence does not appear to add anything useful 
to the general rules on implementation of the Treaty 
and secondary legislation. It is already the rule that 
Member States implement regulations and apply 
directives. 
It is always possible for them to help finance Com-
munity operations or even to finance them in full (as 
with the part-financing of agreements concluded 
within the framework of the common commercial 
policy). 
This sentence ('certain measures') could be inter-
preted in such a way as to hinder Community financ-
ing, for which there is a recognized need. 
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B. For greater integration 
I. Rewording of the last sentence of Article 130r(2): 
The current wording 'Environmental protection 
requirements shall be a component of the Com-
munity's other policies' appears: 
(i) imprecise: the practical implications of this state-
ment are not clear; 
(ii) optimistic: the words 'shall be a component' 
record a fact rather than impose an obligation [trans-
lator's note: this is more true of the French version]. 
The proposed text is designed to be more precise and 
more forceful, which should make it easier for full 
account of the environmental factor to be taken in 
other areas of action. 
2. The deletion of Article 130r(5) for the reasons 
given above (1.8.3). 
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Trans-European networks 
Draft text 
Part Three of the EEC Treaty, Title I (Common 
rules), new Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 (new) 
Trans-European networks 
Article 102a 
I. In order to help to attain the objectives of Article 
8a of this Treaty and to enable all operators and 
regions to derive full benefit from the establishment 
of an area without internal frontiers, the Union shall 
contribute to the establishment and development of 
trans-European networks, in particular infrastructure 
for transport, telecommunications, energy and voca-
tional training. 
2. The Member States shall regard infrastructure pro-
grammes that may have a significant impact on the 
attainment of the objective referred to in paragraph I 
as a matter of common interest. To that end, they 
shall coordinate those programmes with the assist-
ance of the Commission, and shall cooperate as far 
as necessary in their implementation. 
3. Action by the Union shall aim in particular to 
promote the interconnection and interoperability of 
the networks. It shall take account of the demands of 
economic and social cohesion, environmental protec-
tion and cooperation with third countries. 
Article 102b 
I. In order to attain these objectives the Union shall: 
(i) establish a reference framework for trans-Euro-
pean networks, laying down the objectives, priorities 
and broad lines of measures envisaged for each sec-
tor. This reference framework shall identify projects 
of common interest; 
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(ii) implement such measures as may prove necess-
ary to ensure the interoperability of the networks, in 
particular in the field of standardization. 
2. In network finance, the Union shall provide addi-
tional financial aid for projects of common interest 
identified in the reference framework referred to in 
paragraph I. The Union shall also take account of 
the development of trans-European networks in the 
implementation of structural policies. 
Article 102c 
The measures provided for in Article 102b shall be 
adopted in the form of laws enacted by the European 
Parliament and the Council in accordance with the 
eo-decision procedure on a proposal from the Com-
mission and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee. 
* 
* * 
Explanatory memorandum 
Article 8a of the Treaty provides that: 'The internal 
market shall comprise an area without internal fron-
tiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty'. 
The Single Act gave the Community the instruments 
it needed to adopt a legal framework for achieving 
these freedoms, but it is now clear that a set of legal 
rules alone is not enough to ensure real freedom of 
movement, which alone can produce the economic 
effects the internal market is intended to achieve. 
A substantial effort in structural and technical 
improvement is also necessary, for the operation of 
the internal market is at present being hindered by 
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missing links, bottlenecks and missing networks in 
sectors which are essential for free movement. 
The legal means available to the Community until 
now have not enabled these difficulties to be over-
come. 
For the future, networks facilitating communications 
and bringing the different parts of the Community 
closer together, so as to increase its cohesion, are of 
fundamental importance if the frontier-free area is to 
operate properly. 
The need for such networks was stressed at the meet-
ings of the European Council in Strasbourg and 
Dublin and the Commission sent the Council a com-
munication on the matter (COM(90) 585 final). 
Looking at the four main areas concerned: 
(i) transport infrastructwe, which is essential for free 
movement of persons and goods, has to be seen glo-
bally, so as to ensure an intermodal and multimodal 
approach, which is indispensable for optimum 
exploitation of existing infrastructures and for devel-
oping them in a way which will help protect the envi-
ronment; 
(ii) telecommunications have a vital role to play in 
ensuring free movement in general, by providing 
rapid and secure transmission of necessary informa-
tion; pan-European services are indispensable for the 
operation of the frontier-free area; 
(iii) energy must be available throughout the Com-
munity and this requires gas pipelines and electricity 
lines which are interconnected at the Community, 
and indeed the continental, level; such interconnec-
tion is necessary in order to help optimum exploita-
tion of existing capacities and to guarantee the 
Union's security of supply; 
(iv) vocational training is an area where efforts have 
to be undertaken to improve the way everyone can be 
integrated into economic and social life and to facili-
tate mobility in the Union as a whole. The links here 
with telematic services are clear, as regards exchange 
of information to make sure that training systems are 
transparent, that experience is exploited and that the 
methods used are improved (Cedefop, Euryclee, 
Erasmus) and also in setting up systems of distance 
training. 
Assessing the needs at Community level cannot sim-
ply be a matter of adding together the requirements 
as worked out at national level. There must be Com-
munity consultation between all those concerned in 
designing and setting up infrastructures and services, 
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so as to appreciate the value to the Community of 
existing and planned infrastructures in order to 
ensure that they will be developed in a way consist-
ent with the operation of the internal market. 
Links which already exist or are being developed 
with other European and neighbouring countries 
must also be taken into account. 
Protecting the environment is another reason for such 
assessment, which may lead to a more efficient and 
effective use of existing infrastructures. The require-
ments of environmental protection also have to be 
taken into consideration in developing networks. 
In the four areas singled out above, the assessment of 
needs at Community level should help in identifying, 
realizing and developing trans-European networks. 
The barriers to the emergence of these networks have 
already been pointed out. They are due to difficulties 
in interoperability across frontiers, mostly for tech-
nical reasons, to inconsistent rules and regulations, to 
the absence of an overall vision at European level of 
the way demand and the corresponding infrastruc-
tures will develop, and to financing problems con-
nected with the size of the risks and an insufficiently 
European view of the projects to be undertaken. 
The remedies have also been identified and they 
mostly involve a greater degree of coordination at 
Community level between all those concerned. 
The first task is to find out what is the most appro-
priate network configuration at Union level for all 
the parties concerned, and at the same time to iden-
tify those difficulties which may arise in creating the 
network, at the technical level and also as regards 
rules and regulations and administration. It must be 
possible to use the reference framework to determine 
what action is necessary to create the network, in 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. It 
should also enable the advantage to the Community 
to be clearly identified and the scope of Community 
action precisely circumscribed. 
lnteroperability of networks is essential in ensuring 
their interconnection at Community, and indeed con-
tinental, level. It justifies Community action on rules 
and regulations, and on standardization. 
As far as possible, trans-European networks should 
be financed on private capital markets. Public financ-
ing will still be essential in those cases where profita-
bility cannot be ensured, and in particular where it is 
justified for economic and social reasons. The situa-
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tion of the outlying parts of the Union as regards the 
creation and interconnection of networks deserves 
special attention, with a view to economic and social 
cohesion and the implementation of the Union's 
structural policies. 
Community financing - which should be additional 
financing only - will be concentrated on projects 
which have been shown to be of value to the Corn-
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munity and it may be in addition to national or 
regional help, taking in particular the form of financ-
ing for feasibility studies or loan guarantees. 
The measures to be taken to achieve the objectives of 
the Union will be adopted by the Council, acting by 
a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, The Economic and Social Committee will be 
consulted and the European Parliament will be asso-
ciated through the eo-decision procedure. 
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Culture and protection of the heritage 
Draft text 
Culture and protection of the 
heritage 
Article ... 
l. The Union shall contribute to the flowering of cul-
tures in Europe while respecting their national and 
regional diversity. It shall pay particular attention to 
improving familiarity with and dissemination of the 
cultures, languages and history of the peoples of 
Europe, to safeguarding the cultural heritage and to 
cultural exchanges, in particular by developing com-
munications media and audiovisual cooperation. 
2. The Union shall also develop cooperation with 
non-member countries and with international organi-
zations with responsibilities for cultural matters, in 
particular the Council of Europe. 
3. In pursuance of the objectives set out in paragraph 
I, the Union shall have regard for the cultural dimen-
sion in its other policies, in particular when adopting 
measures to achieve the objectives set out in Article 
8a. 
4. Measures to encourage European artistic creation, 
cultural exchanges, multilingualism and audiovisual 
cooperation shall be adopted [in the form of laws 
enacted by the European Parliament and the Council 
in accordance with the eo-decision procedure on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting 
the Economic and Social Committee]. They may take 
the form of programmes. 
* 
* * 
Explanatory memorandum 
I. Culture is one of the fundamental elements of the 
European identity. Since the Union is to have the 
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general aim of bringing its component peoples closer 
together, it cannot be confined to the purely econ-
omic and social areas to which the Community, 
under the existing Treaties, is basically limited. It 
must also have regard for those values which, for 
every citizen, for every community and for every 
people, constitute the heritage through which they 
express their sense of belonging and solidarity and 
the source of influence which they can exert in their 
relations with each other and with non-members. It is 
everybody's business to preserve these heritages and 
renew them through artistic creation and cultural 
exchange. Consequently, the Treaty guarantees every 
Union citizen the right to cultural expression and 
imposes on him the obligation to respect cultural 
expression by others (Article X6 of the 'Union citi-
zenship' Title). At different levels, however, this is 
also a collective responsibility, devolving partly upon 
the Union. 
The Rome European Council of 14 and 15 December 
1990 recognized this. One of the specific areas in 
which it atlirms the need to extend ot redefine the 
powers of the Union is 'safeguarding the diversity of 
the European heritage and promoting cultural 
exchanges and education'. The Commission, too, 
referred to culture in its opinion of 21 October 1990, 
stating: 'in line with the principle of subsidiarity, cul-
tural affairs should continue to be a matter for the 
Member States and the regions. It would be a good 
idea, however, to include an article on the cultural 
dimension of Community activities'. That is the 
background to the present draft. 
2. Paragraph I begins by setting out the Union's 
objectives in cultural matters and stressing the 
importance of the principle of subsidiarity. The 
Treaty does not set out to introduce a common cul-
tural policy and certainly does not aim at the kind of 
centralization that can only result in uniformity. The 
Union is conceived as having a purely supporting 
role, with powers over cultural matters remaining 
firmly with the Member States and their regional 
authorities. All the Union would do would be to 
make its contribution where this seems potentially 
useful. 
The corollary is that the emphasis is placed on cul-
tural diversity. The draft would guarantee respect for 
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this diversity by the Union, and quite specifically 
refers to cultures in the plural. 
That paragraph further clarifies the general signific-
ance of Union action along two main lines: 
fJTSt, to support efforts made to safeguard and 
develop the cultural heritage; 
second, to promote cultural enrichment and dissemi-
nation by developing exchanges and encouraging 
mutual understanding. 
Special attention would therefore be devoted to 
improving familiarity with and dissemination of the 
cultures, languages and history of European peoples, 
to safeguarding the cultural heritage and to cultural 
exchanges, in particular by means of developing 
communications media and audiovisual cooperation. 
3. The fact that international cooperation is necess-
ary for the dissemination and defence of cultures is 
reflected in paragraph 2. The Union must be open to 
the world in this respect as in others and must be 
involved in international cooperation with non-mem-
ber countries and the appropriate international 
organizations, both in promoting exchanges and 
interaction between peoples of different cultures and 
in working together with countries which, without 
being members of the Union, share the same values 
as its Member States. The clear reference here is to 
other countries of Europe which are as much a part 
of the European identity as the Member States. The 
specific role of the Council of Europe is highlighted. 
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4. The forms that Union action can take are set out 
in paragraphs 3 and 4 and are of two types: 
First, the Union must have regard for the cultural 
dimension in its other policies, in particular when 
adopting measures to achieve the objectives set out in 
Article Sa. Free movement of cultural goods, and in 
particular of audiovisual material; harmonization of 
standards as the necessary means of promoting high-
definition television; freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services for 'cultural workers'; 
training of young artists - these are areas in which 
the beginnings of Community action are already 
present. By expressly calling for consideration for the 
cultural dimension, paragraph 3 consolidates the 
foundation thus laid but also involves the institutions 
in making appropriate adaptations to general rules if 
they have a potential impact on cultural goods and 
services (the book trade, for instance, or respect for 
the Member States' language rules in the teaching 
profession). 
Second, the Union can contribute to the flowering of 
cultures by taking measures to encourage them. Para-
graph 4 offers a basis for such action which may con-
cern European artistic creation, cultural exchanges, 
multilingualism and audiovisual cooperation, though 
this list is not to be regarded as exhaustive. Measures 
are to be taken in the form of laws [enacted by Par-
liament and the Council in accordance with the eo-
decision procedure on a proposal from the Commis-
sion and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee]. 
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Health 
Draft text 
Health 
Article . .. 
I. The Union's objective shall be to complement and 
support action undertaken by the Member States to 
protect health, and in particular to combat major 
health scourges such as cancer, AIDS, and cardiovas-
cular and mental illness. 
2. The measures needed to support action under-
taken by the Member States, to approximate and 
coordinate the provisions they implement and to 
organize mutual assistance to this end shall be 
adopted [in the form of laws enacted by the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council in accordance with 
the eo-decision procedure on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee]. 
3. Research activities carried out pursuant to Articles 
130 to 130p shall contribute to achieving the objec-
tive set out in paragraph I. 
* 
::- * 
Explanatory memorandum 
This new Article gives the Union the new task of 
complementing and supporting action undertaken by 
the Member States and is a dynamic implementation 
of the subsidiarity principle in defining the Union's 
contribution to public health. While the purpose is to 
enhance the action of the Member States by supply-
ing a horizontal, comprehensive and coordinated 
approach, the union clearly cannot and must not 
intervene in the whole range of health protection 
matters. 
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For one thing, the action concerned must relate to 
questions of general interest. Priorities need to be 
defined here, and the Article takes a first step by 
referring to major health scourges. This may be 
regarded as a historical priority, since at all times the 
fight against epidemics has been carried beyond 
national borders. But apart from epidemics, which 
are tending to disappear in our part of the world, 
there are new health scourges with substantial human 
and economic costs that are further compounded by 
the general ageing of our population. 
The major health scourges identified here are those 
where the Council, at the explicit request of the Euro-
pean Council, has already begun action - such as 
cancer, AIDS and cardiovascular disease. The new 
Article will make it possible to pursue and amplify 
this action. Closely related to these major diseases are 
the social problems related to the use of drugs and 
tobacco and the abuse of alcohol. 
The objective set out in this Article will require mea-
sures to promote cooperation and mutual assistance 
between the Member States. This in concrete terms 
confrrms the orientation taken by the Council in 
recent years; exchanges of information between the 
Member States and the possibility of Community ac-
tion have been introduced despite the absence of a 
specific basis for health protection. 
Nevertheless this Article would enable the Union to 
go further and to take action to give a Community 
character to the prevention of health risks and the 
fight against major scourges wherever necessary, par-
ticularly where there is a cross-frontier element. Con-
sideration could be given to health protection mea-
sures to accompany measures taken under other poli-
cies, including those for the completion of the inter-
nal market. When adopting the Directive on products 
derived from human blood, for example, the Council 
asked for general consideration to be given to the 
supply of blood products in the Community. Human 
organ transplants also qualify for cross-frontier con-
sideration. 
It is proposed that the Union should act by establish-
ing minimum requirements applicable in 'each Mem-
ber State so that a common base can be established 
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at a minimum level without prejudicing existing or 
future national measures providing for a higher 
degree of protection or more intensive action. 
Unlike the present situation, in which separate mea-
sures are taken in isolation from each other, the com-
bination of all these components (minimum require-
ments, coordination and mutual assistance) should 
make it possible to ensure consistency, efficiency and 
harmonization of basic principles; in this manner, 
health protection may be better assured and the cam-
paign against major health scourges improved. 
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Given the importance attached to health protection 
in the Member States, the fullest possible involve-
ment of Parliament must be ensured and the adop-
tion of measures facilitated by introducing the major-
ity voting rule. 
Union research policy has an integral role to play in 
health protection; medical and health research is 
already provided for in the framework programme 
(Articles 130fto 130p). 
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Compliance with the judgments of the Court of 
Justice 
Judgments of the Court of Justice: 
penalties for failure to comply 
(Commission staff paper) 
l. In its Opinion of 21 October 1990 the Commission 
expressed concern at the fact that, in the absence of 
sanctions, Court of Justice rulings are not always 
implemented, and stated that it might consider pro-
posing a system of sanctions to deal with this type of 
situation. The correct application of Community law 
suffers from the all too frequent reluctance of Mem-
ber States to implement Court judgments declaring 
that they have failed to fulfil their obligations, even 
though Article 171 of the EEC Treaty requires them 
to comply. 
The only possible way of dealing with such situations 
as the Treaties stand is to commence new proceed-
ings under Article 169 for infringement of Article 171, 
but experience has shown that a second adverse rul-
ing may have no more effect than the first. 
The Commission's annual reports to Parliament and 
the Council on the application of Community law 
reveal that the number of judgments given under 
Article 171, even where the Court has given a second 
adverse ruling, remains excessively high. In the last 
three report years alone, 83 Article 171 judgments 
were not implemented. On 12 occasions the Commis-
sion, following a first condemnation, has had to bring 
yet further proceedings against Member States in the 
Court of Justice in respect of the very same infringe-
ment. 
This being so, the idea of applying sanctions to make 
the procedure more effective was bound to arise. 
2. Of the various types of sanction that might be 
envisaged, there is one which must be dismissed 
immediately: there can be no question of providing 
or authorizing countermeasures against the recalci-
trant Member State. The possibility exists in subpara-
graph (b) of the third paragraph of Article 88 of the 
ECSC Treaty 1 but has never been used. Above all, 
while it might be possible to conceive of this kind of 
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measure in the ECSC, which is a Community of 
limited scope, the idea is inconceivable in a general 
Community. If there were a whole series of infringe-
ments, and derogations along these lines proliferated, 
new barriers would inevitably be raised whereas the 
point of the Community is to remove them. In other 
words, the remedy would run the risk of actually dis-
mantling the single market. 
3. It might, however, be possible to envisage finan-
cial sanctions against Member States which, having 
been condemned by the Court of Justice for infring-
ing Community law, were again arraigned before the 
Court for failure to comply with the ftrst judgment. 
This is the idea which has been put forward by the 
UK delegation. 
One solution might be to give the Court, in its second 
judgment, the power to decide, or to _authorize the 
Commission to decide: 
(a) to suspend payment of sums owing to the 
offending Member State (as already provided in the 
ECSC Treaty); 
(b) to inflict a financial penalty on the Member 
State. 
Community secondary legislation already provides 
examples of measure akin to financial penalties. 
Where the Community provides financial assistance 
under the structural Funds, payment of aid which has 
been decided upon is dependent on the Member 
State complying with requirements of Community 
law relating to the operation to be financed (Article 7 
of Regulation No 2052/88; Article 24 of Regulation 
No 4253/88). The same applies also in the applica-
tion of common rules on public procurement: where 
1 Article 88 provides that where a Member State fails to 
comply with a decision recording that it has failed to ful-
fil an obligation, 'the High Authority may, with the 
assent of the Council acting by a two-thirds majority: 
(b) take measures, or authorize the other Member States 
to take measures, by way of derogation from the provi-
sions of Article 4, in order to correct the effects of the 
infringement of the obligation'. 
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an operation for which Community support is avail-
able involves the award of public contracts, the pay-
ment of Community aid is dependent upon compli-
ance with the requirements of the relevant directive. 
The question now is whether the possibility of finan-
cial sanctions should be written into the Treaty in 
general terms, specifically wherever a Member State 
fails to comply with a judgment given against it by 
the Court of Justice. 
There is no legal obstacle to a power to inflict finan-
cial penalties, but it has to be admitted that the exer-
cise of it may come up against practical and political 
difficulties. The frrst difficulty would lie in setting the 
penalty at such a level that it can be both effective 
and balanced. Experience has shown that the Mem-
ber States which are the most frequent offenders are 
also those which suffer from difficult economic and 
financial situations and need Community assistance. 
The impact of a financial penalty can accordingly 
vary from one Member State to another. A penalty 
which hurts one Member State may have little deter-
rent effect on another. Likewise, the practical conse-
quences of an infringement may vary, not only 
according to its nature but also according to the 
Member State concerned. These, then, are all mater-
ial considerations for the determination of the 
amount of a financial penalty. 
Another important question is the decision as to 
which institution should have power to impose a 
sanction and set its amount. It would have to be an 
independent institution, either the Court of Justice or, 
at the very least, the Commission acting with the 
Court's authorization. If the Council were to be 
involved, the spirit of mutual understanding between 
the Member States, or indeed their complicity (if sev-
eral of them were guilty of an infringement), could 
make the sanction ineffectual in practice. The Court's 
preliminary thinking on the subject favours the Com-
mission as the institution which would be responsible 
for setting the amount. 
Whatever the outcome of these reflections, the Com-
mission reserves the right to make proposals in due 
course for the introduction of financial penalties 
against Member States in breach of their obligations, 
covering both the nature of the penalty and rules for 
determining the amount. 
4. Are there, however, other ways of making the 
Member States comply with Community Jaw? 
(a) In the decentralized system set up by the Treaty, 
the Member States are responsible for ensuring the 
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implementation of Community law and the protec-
tion of rights conferred on citizens and firms by them. 
A power is thus conferred on the Member States, but 
so, above all, is a duty, flowing from the general prin-
ciples of the Community legal order as defined by 
the Court of Justice on the basis, notably, of the gen-
eral obligation imposed by Article 5 of the Treaty. ' 
One of the requirements imposed on Member States 
is that their domestic Jaw should contain provisions 
of such a nature that anybody with an interest can 
reap the benefit (or suffer the detriment) of a failure 
to comply with Community law - recovery of aid 
wrongly paid; availability of remedies in the event of 
wrongful acts or failure to act; possible liability of 
public authorities towards victims of failure to apply 
Community law. 
However, the situation is far from satisfactory. Com-
munity Jaw relies on the national legal orders for its 
application, but suffers from the fact that they are 
widely different and in some cases frankly inade-
quate (some, but not all, Member States have a prin-
ciple of liability for abuse of legislative powers, but 
even where this liability exists it is extremely difficult 
to obtain redress). 
The question, then, is whether the efficacity of Com-
munity Jaw would not be adequately boosted by rely-
ing on the broad obligation flowing from Article 5 
and from the general principles of Jaw, but spelling 
out their requirements in provisions explicity offering 
guarantees. A number of instruments of Community 
secondary legislation have attempted to achieve this 
in specific areas (the directives on equal treatment for 
women and men at work require the Member States 
to provide judicial remedies for the victims of discri-
mination, and Directive 89/665/EEC provides for 
remedies in relation to public procurement). 
Should this approach be generalized, and should it be 
written into the Treaty itself? The technique would be 
to amplify Article 5 of the EEC Treaty by specifying 
what rules must be laid down in internal legal sys-
tems to deal with failures to comply with Community 
obligations and redress their consequences (judicial 
or similar remedies for citizens; liability of public 
authorities towards the victims, whatever the nature 
1 
'Member States shall take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from 
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They 
shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopar-
dize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.' 
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or origin (administrative or legislative) of the infringe-
ment; possibility of interim measures to ensure that a 
wrongful act does not have irreparable conse-
quences). If necessary, the institutions could be 
empowered to take the requisite harmonization or 
coordination measures, for even if the rules to be laid 
down here remained in the ftrSt instance to be taken 
within the national legal systems of the Member 
States, it might be found necessary to ensure at least 
a modicum of consistency between them. 
(b) Another approach might be to extend the juris-
diction of the Court of Justice in cases concerning 
failure by a Member State to comply with its obliga-
tions. 
(I) Most infringements in fact concern failure to 
transpose harmonization directives into domestic Jaw. 
Where the Court of Justice finds against a Member 
State more than once on the same issue, it could con-
ceivably be given the power to take its own decision, 
with direct effect, on the measures needed to trans-
pose Community rules into the national Jaw of the 
offending State. 1 It might, for instance, declare in 
certain cases that a directive was directly applicable. 
In some ways this would be more than an extension 
of the rule already to be found in Court judgments to 
the effect that individual citizens can rely on direc-
tives against recalcitrant Member States. 
But there are two dangers here: 
(i) This approach would be inadequate where the 
Community legislation requires the national authority 
to take positive action (especially where it actually 
has the possibility of choosing between different, 
equally effective transposition techniques) or to 
establish complex administrative machinery; 
(ii) This approach would, moreover, entail the estab-
lishment of a decentralization mechanism in the form 
of a superior authority enjoying a fully fledged power 
of substitution. The concept is familiar in many fed-
eral States, but given the present situation of Com-
munity integration, even assuming that further pro-
gress is made towards political union, some Member 
States might for that very reason find it unacceptable. 
Ultimately, the difficulties are such that the solution 
scarcely seems realistic; it must be ruled out on politi-
cal grounds. 
(2) Another possibility would be to confer on the 
Court of Justice a jurisdiction similar to that enjoyed 
by the constitutional courts of a number of federal 
States to scrutinize federal legislation in the light of 
the federal constitution. The Court would then have 
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power to rule that the legislation of a Member State 
conflicts with a provision of Community law and to 
declare it inapplicable or even to annul it. 
This technique, unfortunately, would only work 
where there was a positive act by a national authority. 
It would not help to solve the numerous disputes 
arising from a Member State's failure to take action. 
Moreover, even without going so far as to establish a 
substitution mechanism as considered above, the 
approach would probably encounter general opposi-
tion since it would give the Court the power to inter-
fere in the national legal orders. 
(3) To take a more modest and less aggressive 
approach, the Court of Justice could be given juris-
diction to declare, in judgments finding that an in-
fringement has been committed, what measures 
should be taken by the offending Member State in 
order to put an end to it. 
There are a number of possible ways of extending the 
Courts's jurisdiction along these lines: 
(i) The Court might be given the power to impose 
periodic penalty payments on Member States as an 
incentive to come into line. The same practical diffi-
culties might arise here as were already mentioned in 
connection with financial penalties earlier in this 
paper, but the psychological effect on the national 
authorities of the recalcitrant Member State could be 
quite salutary. 
(ii) The Court could also be given jurisdiction to 
issue injunctions. As it happens, the Court of Justice 
already sees itself as having this jurisdiction when 
hearing applications for interim measures against 
Member States, but it is reserved for exceptional 
cases. It is predicated on there being a degree of 
urgency with a risk of irreparable damage being 
done. All the Court can do is order provisional mea-
sures, pending its consideration of the substance of 
the case. It would be worth considering the possibil-
ity of extending and formalizing this power of injunc-
tion. 
(4) The consequences of infringements include the 
liability of Member States towards persons who suf-
fer as a result. A real possibility of having this liabil-
ity duly established would have a much greater deter-
rent effect on Member States than the possibility of 
being ordered to make fixed or periodic penalty 
1 The Commission would, of course, be expected to assist 
the Court by its pleadings and its involvement in the oral 
proceedings. 
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payments. The principle of this kind of liability 
already exists in the Community legal order. It is for 
the courts and tribunals of each Member State to 
implement it in accordance with their respective legal 
systems. 
It would be worthwhile amplifying the liability with-
out affecting national jurisdiction. One way would be 
for the Court, when confirming that an infringement 
has been committed, to declare explicitly in its judg-
ment that the effect of the infringement is to render 
the offending Member State liable towards persons 
whose rights are affected. The authority enjoyed by a 
judgment duly given in these terms and pleaded in 
the national courts would be of great assistance to 
those seeking redress. 
5. One last point: if the foregoing suggestions were 
accepted - particularly as regards expanding Article 
5 of the EEC Treaty and extending the jurisdiction of 
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the Court to declare the consequences of a judgment 
ruling that an infringement has been committed -
and if one or more mediators were instituted in each 
Member State, as has been proposed in connection 
with European citizenship, these mediators would 
then have an important role to play in seeing that 
Community law was properly applied. If they were 
responsible for safeguarding the rights and interests 
of Union citizens in each Member State, one of their 
prime concerns would quite naturally be to ensure 
that national legislation was adapted so as to provide 
proper protection for these rights and interests, and 
they would be at pains to make all the necessary 
representations both to national authorities and to 
Community institutions. Where an infringement was 
committed by public authorities, one of the me-
diators' tasks would be to provide citizens with full 
information on the extent of their rights and to assist 
them in using all proper ways and means of obtain-
ing redress (notably in proceedings to establish the 
liability of public authorities, as mentioned above). 
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Economic and Social Committee 
Draft text 
Economic and Social Committee 
Article4 
I. The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be 
carried out by the following institutions: 
a European Parliament, 
a Council, 
a Commission, 
a Court of Justice. 
Each institution shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty. 
2. The European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission shall be assisted by an Economic and 
Social Committee, which shall be an institution with 
advisory status. 
3. The audit shall be carried out by a Court of Audi-
tors acting within the limits of the powers conferred 
upon it by this Treaty. 
Article 154 
The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority, 
determine the salaries, allowances and pensions of 
the President and Members of the Commission and 
of the President, Judges, Advocates-General and 
Registrar of the Court of Justice, and the allowances 
of the members of the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. 1 It shall also, again by a qualified majority, 
determine any payment to be made instead of remu-
neration. 
Note: The provisions of the Financial Regulation 
relating to the presentation of the budget will have to 
be amended, as will the rules on the emoluments of 
the members of the institutions. 
S.2/91 
Chapter3 
The Economic and Social 
Committee 
Article 193 
An Economic and Social Committee is hereby estab-
lished. It shall have advisory status. 
The Committee shall consist of representatives of the 
various categories of economic and social activity, in 
particular, representatives of producers, farmers, car-
riers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional occu-
pations and representatives of the general public. 
Article 194 
The number of members of the Committee shall be 
as follows: 
Belgium ...................................................... 12 
Denmark .................................................... 9 
Germany .................................................... 24 
Greece ........................................................ 12 
Spain .......................................................... 21 
France ........................................................ 24 
Ireland........................................................ 9 
Italy ............................................................ 24 
Luxembourg ............................................... 6 
Netherlands ................................................ 12 
Portugal ........ ............................ .................. 12 
United Kingdom ....................................... 24 
The members of the Committee shall be appointed 
by the Council, acting unanimously, for four years. 
Their appointments shall be renewable. 
1 The purpose of this amendment is to define the scope of 
the last sentence of the Article. 
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The members of the Committee may not be bound 
by any mandatory instructions. ' 
Article 195 
I. For the appointment of the members of the Com-
mittee, each Member State shall provide the Council 
with a list containing twice as many candidates as 
there are seats allotted to its nationals. 
The composition of the Committee shall take 
account of the need to ensure adequate representa-
tion of the various categories of economic and social 
activity. 
2. The Council shall consult the Commission. It may 
obtain the opinion of European bodies which are 
representative of the various economic and social 
sectors to which the activities of the Community are 
of concern. 
Article 196 
The Committee shall elect its chairman and officers 
from among its members for a term of two years. 
It shall adopt its rules of procedure. z 
The Committee shall be convened by its chairman at 
the request of the European Parliament, of the Coun-
cil, of the Commission or on its own initiative. 
Article 197 
The Committee shall include specialized sections for 
the principal fields covered by this Treaty. 
In particular, it shall contain an agricultural section 
and a transport section, which are the subject of 
special provisions in the Titles relating to agriculture 
and transport. 
These specialized sections shall operate within the 
general terms of reference of the Committee. They 
may not be consulted independently of the Com-
mittee. 
Sub-committees may also be established within the 
Committee to prepare, on specific questions or in 
specific fields, draft opinions to be submitted to the 
Committee for its consideration. 
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The rules of procedure shall lay down the methods of 
composition and the terms of reference of the spe-
cialized sections and of the sub-committees. 
Article 198 
I. The Committee must be consulted by the Euro-
pean Parliament, by the Council or by the Commis-
sion where this Treaty so provides. 3 The Committee 
may be consulted by these institutions in all cases in 
which they consider it appropriate. The Committee 
may also deliver opinions on its own initiative in 
cases where it considers it appropriate. 
The European Parliament, the Council or the Com-
mission shall, if it considers it necessary, set the Com-
mittee, for the submission of its opinion, a time-limit 
which may not be less than one month from the date 
on which the chairman receives notification to this 
effect. Upon expiry of the time-limit, the absence of 
an opinion shall not prevent further action. 
The opinion of the Committee and, where appro-
priate, that of the specialized section, together with a 
record of the proceedings, shall be forwarded to the 
European Parliament, to the Council and to the 
Commission. 
2. Where the eo-decision procedure provided for in 
Article 189a applies, the Commission shall send its 
proposal to the Committee at the time of transmis-
sion to the European Parliament and the Council. 
The Committee shall submit its opinion and the 
record of its proceedings to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission within one month 
of the transmission of the proposal. 
3. The Committee shall be kept informed of the ac-
tion taken on its opinions by the institution which 
consulted it. 
* 
* :!· 
1 The reference to the appointment of members in their 
personal capacity has been deleted, at the Committee's 
request. 
Abolition of the requirement that the Committee's rules 
of procedure must be unanimously approved by the 
Council. 
3 Subject to review, in particular if the eo-decision pro-
cedure is not adopted for all areas of Community 
competence. 
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Explanatory memorandum 
I. The Rome European Council on 14 and 15 
December 1990 instructed the Intergovernmental 
Conference on political union to examine ways of 
improving the effectiveness of Community institu-
tions and bodies other than the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission in the light of the 
suggestions presented by these institutions and by the 
Member States. 
The Economic and Social Committee has informed 
the Conference of its desire for greater autonomy and 
an extension of the number of cases where it must be 
consulted. 
In its opinion of 21 October 1990 the Commission 
had already stressed that the development of the 
social dialogue presupposed inter alia enhancing the 
status of the Committee and of its members. 
2. The Commission feels that the Conference should 
accede to the Committee's requests, which, moreover, 
were already contained in the Committee's 1989 
memorandum on the consolidation of its role in the 
run-up to 1992 and were broadly supported by the 
Commission. From the budgetary angle, the 1989 
proposal to amend the Financial Regulation would 
give the Committee the status of an institution by 
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granting it its own section in the budget and the 
power to transfer appropriations within each Title. 
It is therefore proposed that the Committee's status 
as an institution be clearly laid down in an amend-
ment to Article 4 of the Treaty, which would render 
superfluous any specific reference to its autonomous 
status in other provisions. 
However, the Committee's autonomy must be further 
strengthened by giving it the power to adopt its own 
rules of procedure and by recognizing its right to 
deliver opinions on its own initiative, which is 
already current practice. Moreover, under the propo-
sals for a new institutional balance, the European 
Parliament, as well as the Commission and the 
Council, would be able to consult the Committee 
when it considers it appropriate. 
The Commission feels that the question of extending 
the cases where the Committee must be consulted 
must be solved in a way which fits in with the 
reforms of the legislative process it is proposing. The 
Committee would therefore have to be consulted on 
all primary legislation adopted, in the hierarchy of 
norms proposed by the Commission, by the eo-deci-
sion procedure decision between the European Par-
liament and the Council. Moreover, the Commission 
has now incorporated this idea in its working docu-
ments for the Intergovernmental Conference. 
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Human resources (vocational training and 
education) 
Draft text 
Human resources 
Article 122 
I. In order to develop the potential of its human 
resources, the Union shall implement a vocational 
training policy, which reinforces and complements 
the actions of Member States and takes account of 
the diversity of the training systems. 
2. Action relating to vocational training shall have 
the following objectives: 
{i) to improve social and professional entry and re-
entry into the labour market, and continuing training 
throughout working life; 
(ii) to develop the exchange of information and 
experience in the field of vocational training, particu-
larly through the exchange and mobility of trainers 
and trainees and the creation of trans-European net-
works; 
(iii) to facilitate access to vocational training 
throughout the Union in particular through the recog-
nition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of 
formal qualifications. 
3. This action shall be implemented, in so far as 
workers are concerned, in accordance with the terms 
of Articles 118, 119 and 120. 
4. To this end, the necessary provisions shall be 
established by laws adopted in eo-decision with the 
European Parliament and the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee. The laws may take 
the form of programmes. 
Article 1231 
I. With a view to consolidating the European dimen-
sion of education and improving mutual understand-
ing, while maintaining full respect for the diversity of 
the education systems, the Union shall encourage: 
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(i) links and cooperation between the education sys-
tems, particularly through the establishment of trans-
national networks and the exchange of information 
and experience; 
(ii) the exchange and mobility of pupils and young 
people; 
(iii) the teaching and learning of foreign languages 
within the union. 
2. The Jaw, adopted in eo-decision with the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council, on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the Economic 
and Social Committee, shall define the conditions 
under which the actions to promote the above objec-
tives shall be conducted in the context of pluriannual 
programmes. 
~-
* * 
Explanatory memorandum 
1. Introduction 
In its opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for 
amendment of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community with a view to political union, 
the Commission considered that an increase of Com-
munity powers should concentrate on certain fields, 
including 'basic and further vocational training'. 
Meeting in Rome on 14 and 15 December 1990, the 
European Council took the view that there was 'a 
wide recognition of the need to extend or redefine 
the Community's competence in specific areas', 
including education. The European Council also 
'stressed the importance of the support that young 
J Actions involving relations with non-member States and 
international organizations under Articles 122 and 123 
are covered by the provisions of Title V on a common 
external policy. 
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people can bring to European integration and the 
hope that Community action ... will be extended'. 
The Commission therefore proposes to amend the 
provisions of the existing Article 128 so as to clarify 
its scope and provide the necessary means of action. 
The Commission further considers that an Article 
should be introduced in order to provide for some 
competence in the Treaty with respect to education. 
In coherence with the new provisions presented by 
the Commission for Title Ill 'Social dimension and 
human resources', these two Articles are presented in 
the form of a Chapter 2 for this Title referring to 
'Human resources' and include an Article 122 on 
vocational training and an Article 123 on education. 
Article 128 would thus be deleted. 
2. Vocational training 
The Commission has carefully examined the 
approach that should be taken to amend Article 128. 
The existing Article has evolved to provide increased 
scope for action, both in the area covered by the 
notion of vocational training and in the fact that it 
entitles the Commission to propose and the Council 
to adopt action programmes with substantial budget-
ary implications. Article 128 could, however, benefit 
from clarification so as to remove the ambiguities 
which will continue as long as concrete policy and 
actions remain based on a generally worded text. The 
simple majority voting procedure and the lack of 
express provision for consultation of the European 
Parliament also impose a revision of the existing 
Article. 
Moreover, it is imperative that the Union stresses the 
importance it will attach to developing the potential 
of its human resources, particularly through voca-
tional training policy, increasingly recognized as an 
essential element in the strengthening of economic 
and social cohesion (see the Commission's proposal 
for Title V) and in increasing the competitiveness of 
European industry through the quality of the contri-
bution to be made by the training systems throughout 
the Union. The central role of continuing training 
and life-long learning is now widely regarded as 
essential in developing an active society, capable of 
mastering economic, technological, social and cul-
tural change, and in meeting the challenges from 
other parts of the world. 
The Commission proposes, therefore, to provide in 
clearer terms for the main policy objectives to be pur-
sued by the Union in the field of vocational training, 
bringing thereby an added value to the policies and 
activities of the Member States. 
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The scope of action by the Union in terms of the 
notion of vocational training remains unchanged by 
the amendments, and as defined by the Court of Jus-
tice in the Gravier case. ' This notion includes uni-
versity-level courses in general. 
The proposal for an Article 122, amending Article 
128, highlights, in its first paragraph, the need to take 
into account the diversity of the different vocational 
training systems. It also clearly establishes that action 
of the Union will reinforce and complement the ac-
tion of Member States, in accordance with the con-
cept of subsidiarity. These elements confirm that the 
overall aim of the Union is neither to seek blanket 
harmonization nor the standardization of training 
policy. 
The amended Article then, in its second paragraph, 
centres the Union's vocational training policy on 
three principal objectives: 
(i) The first objective relates to initial training, 
retraining and continuing training. This covers voca-
tional training following full-time compulsory educa-
tion and preceding full-time entry into the labour 
market. All forms of youth training, apprenticeships, 
university and higher education are considered to be 
covered here, the objective of the Union being to 
equip young people with the skills and competences 
needed to enter the labour market. Continuing train-
ing of workers is also covered here as a policy objec-
tive essential to a vocational training policy. Other 
categories covered by this objective will include those 
who are not considered to have active links with the 
labour market, i.e. women returning to the labour 
market after bringing up children, for whom retrain-
ing may be necessary. 
(ii) The second objective relates to the means to 
promote a European dimension to vocational train-
ing through the exchange of experience and informa-
tion and mobility, particularly of students and train-
ees. This refers essentially to programmatic and cata-
lytic action at Community level, such as Cornett 
(university-industry cooperation in training in the 
field of technology), Force (development of continu-
ing training), Petra (youth training) and Erasmus 
(inter-university cooperation and student mobility), 
t Education 'which prepares for a qualification for a pro-
fession, trade or employment or which provides the 
necessary training and skills for a particular profession, 
trade or employment is vocational training, whatever the 
age or training level of the pupils or students, and even if 
the course includes a part of general education.' ( Gravier 
v City of liege, Judgment of 13 February 1985- Case 
293/83, Reports of Cases before the Court 1985-2). 
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etc. In addition, measures will be taken to develop 
the networking infrastructures necessary to provide 
for information on opportunities for training and 
transfrontier cooperation throughout the Union. 
(iii) The third objective relates to the question of 
access to vocational training which may be impeded, 
amongst other things, by the non-recognition, for aca-
demic as opposed to professional purposes, of quali-
fications acquired in another Member State. It is a 
matter of concern to the Commission that, while 
mobility in the training field is a priority objective of 
the Community, individuals still face sometimes 
insuperable difficulties in achieving access to training 
in another Member State. 
In its third paragraph, it is noted that as far as voca-
tional training for workers is concerned, the provi-
sions of the Commission's proposals for Chapter I of 
Title Ill, Articles 118 to 120, apply. The term 'worker' 
is intended to mean any person employed by an 
employer, including trainees and apprentices. 1 
The means of action provided under Article 122 will 
in all cases involve a procedure of eo-decision with 
the European Parliament, consultation of the Econ-
omic and Social Committee, and a qualified majority 
voting procedure. For the establishment of pro-
grammes, the same procedure as that provided for in 
the proposal for a revised Article 120 is envisaged. 
3. Education 
In addition to action in the field of vocational train-
ing, the Commission has carefully examined the 
scope for an Article relating to general education. The 
need to complement the efforts of Member States to 
improve the quality of their education systems 
through the pooling of experience and innovations 
and the building of transnational cooperation is well 
recognized and indeed demanded by the Member 
States. Understanding of the role and development of 
the Union, knowledge of languages and opportunities 
for the exchange and mobility of pupils, young 
people and the teachers accompanying them are 
important elements in the education of future active 
citizens of the Union. Moreover, the present situa-
tion, whereby Community support can be given, for 
example, to inter-university cooperation and the 
mobility of trainees, but not to young people in the 
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academic streams of secondary schools is anachronis-
tic and potentially unfair. Cooperation in the youth 
field is in its early stages of development, largely 
through support for youth exchanges, outside formal 
educational structures, for which recourse to Article 
235 is currently necessary. 
In Article 123 is therefore proposed relating to educa-
tion, in which the Union's involvement is clearly 
delimited and defined, dealing only with aspects of 
cooperation, mobility and exchange. The Commis-
sion's formulation of this Article draws on estab-
lished terms and practice as expressed in the different 
Resolutions agreed by the Council and the Ministers 
for Education meeting within the Council on many 
occasions. Member States remain exclusively respon-
sible for the school systems and indeed for education 
policy; the means of action provided for the Union 
are supportive and programmatic, as opposed to har-
monizing legislation. 
In terms of scope, the term 'education' as used in this 
Article is intended to refer to full-time general educa-
tion in the school systems of the Member States. 
The first paragraph of the proposed Article 123, 
which establishes its overall objective - to promote a 
European dimension to education, while maintaining 
full respect for the diversity of the education systems, 
and indeed a better mutual understanding of the rich-
ness of this diversity - has already been underlined 
in different texts submitted for Treaty revision (see 
Union citizenship and culture). Here too, the Union 
will not be seeking harmonization or standardization 
but to complement the policies of Member States 
through the added value of cooperation at Com-
munity level, through exchange and mobility and 
specifically through the improving of foreign-lan-
guage competence, as well as by pooling information 
and experience on innovation and themes of com-
mon interest. 
The second paragraph defines the procedure for the 
adoption of pluriannual programmes, involving eo-
decision with the European Parliament, consultation 
of the Economic and Social Committee, and a quali-
fied majority voting procedure. 
In the field of action covered by Articles 122 and 123, 
cooperation with non-member States and with inter-
national organizations is covered by the Commis-
sion's proposal for a Title V on a common external 
policy. 
1 See Article 3 of Council Directive of 12 June 1989 on the 
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in 
the safety and health of workers at work (OJ L 183, 
29.6.1989). 
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Financial provisions of the EEC Treaty 1 
Draft text 
Financial provisions of the EEC 
Treaty 
Article 199 
(Unity and balance of the budget) 
I. All items of revenue and expenditure of the Com-
munity, including those relating to borrowing and 
lending activities pursued under Article 203a and to 
the European Development Fund, shall be included 
in estimates to be drawn up, approved and shown in 
the budget for each financial year. 
2. The revenue and expenditure shown in the budget 
shall be in balance. 
Article 200 
(Own resources) 
I. Community expenditure shall be financed, with-
out prejudice to other revenues, from own resources 
which guarantee the Community's financial auton-
omy. The Member States shall ensure that sufficient 
own resources are made directly available to the 
Community. 
Own resources may include one or more Community 
taxes. 
2. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting Parlia-
ment, shall lay down the rules on own resources and 
recommend them to Member States for adoption in 
accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. 
Should the Council intend to depart from the posi-
tion of Parliament then it shall introduce a concilia-
tion procedure. Conciliation shall take place in a 
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conciliation committee, which shall consist of mem-
bers of the Council and the same number of repre-
sentatives of Parliament, and whose proceedings 
shall be attended by the Commission. The committee 
shall have the task of achieving agreement between 
Parliament and the Council. At the end of the conci-
liation procedure Parliament shall adopt a new posi-
tion. The Council shall decide only after presentation 
of this new position or at the earliest three months 
after the introduction of the conciliation procedure. 
3. The conditions for calling in own resources and 
the corresponding rules of procedure shall be laid 
down in the decision taken in accordance with para-
graph 2. 
Article 201 
(Medium-term financial planning and budgetary 
discipline) 
I. The multiannual financial perspective shall consti-
tute the reference framework for budgetary discipline. 
For each financial year it shall indicate, as appropria-
tions for commitments, the volume and structure of 
foreseeable Community expenditure, including 
expenditure for new policies. Furthermore, it shall 
include a reserve in order to meet unforeseen expend-
iture. 
The overall annual totals shall, moreover, be shown 
in payment appropriations which shall remain within 
the own resources resulting from the decision pro-
vided for in Article 200(2). These amounts shall fur-
ther be expressed in terms of percentages of gross 
national product. 
2. The amounts appearing in the multiannual 
financial perspective shall be ceilings binding on the 
Community institutions during the annual budget 
procedure. 
1 The corresponding provisions of the ECSC and Euratom 
Treaties are also to be similarly amended. 
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3. The financial perspective shall be annexed to an 
interinstitutional agreement [a decision], which shall, 
on a proposal from the Commission, be adopted by 
the Council, acting by a qualified majority, and by 
Parliament, acting by a majority of its members and 
three-fifths of the votes cast. 
As long as the interinstitutional agreement [the deci-
sion] has not been adopted, the Commission may 
alter its proposal. Unanimity shall be required for the 
Council to amend the Commission's proposal. 
4. The multiannual financial perspective may be 
modified in accordance with the procedure laid down 
in paragraph 3. 
5. In the absence of any decision on a proposal for a 
new multiannual financial perspective, the figures 
laid down for the latest year shall also apply to the 
following year. 
Article 201a 
(Medium-term financial planning and budgetary 
discipline) 
Any financial commitment resulting from a legal act 
adopted on the basis of this Treaty is conditional 
upon the availability of financial resources. No deci-
sion which has a financial impact exceeding the 
resources available in the budget or laid down in the 
financial perspective shall be implemented until the 
budget and, where appropriate, the financial perspec-
tive have been correspondingly adjusted in accord-
ance with the appropriate procedure. 
Article 203 
(Budgetary procedure) 
I. The financial year shall run from I January to 31 
December. 
2. Each institution of the Community shall draw up 
estimates of its expenditure. The Commission shall 
consolidate these estimates in a draft budget. It may 
attach thereto an opinion which may contain differ-
ent estimates. 
The draft budget shall be drawn up in accordance 
with the financial perspective referred to in Article 
201 and the decision provided for in Article 200. 
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3. The Council and Parliament shall decide at all 
stages of the procedure on the estimates for both 
expenditure and revenue in accordance with the 
financial perspective referred to in Article 201 and 
the conditions laid down in the decision provided for 
in Article 200. 
4. The draft budget shall be transmitted to Parlia-
ment. Parliament shall express its opinion on the 
draft budget within 45 days. 
It may amend the draft by a majority of votes cast if 
the Commission raises no objections. 
Where the Commission objects to proposals for 
amendments to the draft budget, their adoption by 
Parliament shall require the votes of a majority of its 
members and three-fifths of the votes cast. 
The Commission may object to: 
(i) proposals for amendments which would reduce 
expenditure which the budgetary authority must 
include in the budget if the Community is to fulfil its 
internal and external commitments resulting from the 
Treaties or from acts adopted in accordance there-
with; 
(ii) proposals for amendments which would increase 
other expenditure. 
5. The draft budget adopted by Parliament shall be 
transmitted to the Council. If Parliament has not 
expressed an opinion within the time-limit provided 
for by paragraph 4, the initial version of the draft 
budget shall be transmitted to the Council. The 
Council shall adopt its position on the draft budget 
by a qualified majority within 30 days. 
If the Council does not propose amendments to the 
draft budget adopted by Parliament within this 
period, the budget shall be deemed to be adopted in 
this form. 
6. If the Council proposes amendments, it shall 
immediately introduce a conciliation procedure. Con-
ciliation shall take place in a conciliation committee, 
which shall consist of members of the Council and 
the same number of representatives of the Parlia-
ment, and whose proceedings shall be attended by 
the Commission. The committee shall have the task 
of achieving agreement upon a common draft 
budget. 
If the Council, acting by a majority of its members, 
and the representatives of the Parliament, acting by a 
majority, agree within 20 days, then the amended 
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draft budget shall be sent to Parliament; if not, then 
the draft budget in the form amended by the Council 
shall be sent to the Parliament. 
7. Parliament may within 30 days adopt the draft 
budget by a majority of its members' votes or may 
amend it by a majority of its members' votes and 
two-thirds of the votes cast. In this case the budget 
may only include amendments proposed by Parlia-
ment in accordance with paragraph 4 or by the Coun-
cil in accordance with paragraph 5. If Parliament 
does not take a decision within this period, the 
budget transmitted to the Parliament shall be deemed 
to be adopted. 
8. Within the time-limits laid down in paragraphs 4 
and 7, Parliament acting by a majority of its members 
and two-thirds of the votes cast may, if there are 
important reasons, reject the draft budget and ask for 
a new draft to be submitted to it. 
If Parliament rejects the draft budget, the Commis-
sion shall draw up a new draft. The procedure shall 
be repeated in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 7. 
The emergency procedure shall apply; the time-limits 
laid down shall be reduced by half for the stages of 
the procedure completed before rejection. 
9. When the procedure provided for in this Article 
has been completed, the President of Parliament shall 
declare that the budget has been finally adopted. 
10. The exact timetable for the course of the budget-
ary procedure shall be laid down in the Financial 
Regulation provided for in Article 209. 
Article 203a 
(Borrowing and lending activities) 
I. The Community shall have the power to borrow 
funds in order to grant loans. The proceeds of its bor-
rowing activities shall be used exclusively to finance 
its lending activities, decided on the basis of this 
Treaty. 
2. The Council and Parliament, acting on a proposal 
from the Commission in accordance with the proce-
dure laid down in Article 203, shall approve the ceil-
ings for borrowings and !endings. 
3. Borrowing and lending activities shall be listed in 
a separate part of the budget in accordance with the 
Financial Regulation provided for in Article 209. 
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Article 204 
Provisional twelfths 
If at the beginning of a financial year, the budget has 
not yet been voted, a sum equivalent to not more 
than one-twelfth of the budget appropriations for the 
preceding financial year may be spent each month in 
respect of any chapter or other subdivision of the 
budget in accordance with the provisions of the 
Regulations made pursuant to Article 209; this 
arrangement shall not, however, have the effect of 
placing at the disposal of the Commission appropria-
tions in excess of one-twelfth of those provided for in 
the draft budget in course of preparation. 
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, 
provided that the other conditions laid down in the 
first subparagraph are observed, authorize expendi-
ture in excess of one-twelfth. 
The Council shall forward its decision immediately to 
the European Parliament; within 30 days the European 
Parliament, acting by a majority of its members and 
three-fifths of the votes cast, may adopt a different 
decision. The decision of the Council shall be sus-
pended until the European Parliament has taken its 
decision. If within the said period the European Parlia-
ment has not taken a decision which differs from the 
decision of the Council, the latter shall be deemed to be 
finally adopted. 
The decisions referred to in the second and third par-
agraphs shall lay down the necessary measures relat-
ing to resources to ensure application of this Article. 
Article 206 
(Court of Auditors) 
The ftrst subparagraph of paragraph 4 is replaced by 
the following: 
The members of the Court of Auditors shall be 
appointed for a term of six years by the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority with the consent of 
Parliament. 
Article 206b 
(Discharge) 
The following paragraph is added: 
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2. The institutions shall take the necessary measures to 
act upon the observations in the discharge decision 
provided for in paragraph 1 and shall, at the request of 
Parliament or of the Council, give an account of the 
measures which they have taken. 
Article 207 
(The ecu- Treatment of balances) 
The budget shall be drawn up and implemented in 
ecus in accordance with the Financial Regulation 
established pursuant to Article 209. 
The own resources provided for in Article 200(1) shall 
be placed at the disposal of the Community by the 
Member States in ecus. 
The available balances of these own resources or con-
tributions shall be deposited with the Treasuries of 
Member States or with bodies designated by them. 
The balances may be invested on terms to be agreed 
between the Commission and the Member State con-
cerned. 
Article 209 
(Financial regulations) 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a pro-
posal from the Commission after receiving the con-
sent of Parliament and obtaining the opinion of the 
Court of Auditors, shall: 
(a) make Financial Regulations specifying in parti-
cular the procedure to be adopted for establishing 
and implementing the budget, for presenting and 
auditing accounts and for carrying out borrowing and 
lending activities; 
(b) determine the methods and procedure whereby 
the budget revenue provided under the arrangements 
relating to the Communities' own resources shall be 
made available to the Commission, and determine 
the measures to be applied, if need be, to meet cash 
requirements; 
(c) lay down rules concerning the responsibility of 
authorizing officers and accounting officers and con-
cerning appropriate arrangements for inspection. 
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Articles 202, 205, 205a, 206a, 208 
Unchanged. 
* 
* * 
Explanatory memorandum 
As envisaged in its opinion of 21 October 1990, the 
Commission is putting before the Intergovernmental 
Conference a proposal for the revision of the finan-
cial provisions of the Treaty. The purpose of this 
memorandum is to explain the reasons and the prin-
ciples underlying the proposal and to outline its con-
tent. 
I. Reasons and principles 
(a) The 1988 financial reform and in particular the 
lnterinstitutional Agreement introduced a different 
system and different rules from those contained in 
the Treaty. The maximum rate rule no longer applies 
in practice. The Council's first reading of the draft 
budget has become a mere formality. The exclusive 
rights reserved by the Council on compulsory 
expenditure and Parliament on non-compulsory 
expenditure hardly reflect the present situation: the 
volume of non-compulsory expenditure will soon 
exceed that of compulsory expenditure and the prin-
ciples of budgetary discipline should now be applied 
just as rigorously - if not more so - to non-com-
pulsory expenditure as to compulsory. The timetable 
set by the Treaty is completely divorced from reality. 
(b) The budgetary discipline arrangements deriving 
from the February 1988 agreement are a key factor in 
the financial system but remain a fragile achieve-
ment. Repeated revisions of the financial perspective, 
dictated by unforeseen circumstances, have under-
mined their status as binding rules. There is a good 
case for confirming that these arrangements are 
strictly binding, since it is in the interests of all the 
institutions to agree on a stable financial framework 
which reflects a common vision of the development 
of Community policies. 
(c) Applying the principles underlying the work of 
the Intergovernmental Conference on political 
union, the Commission has already presented propo-
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sals for assoetatmg Parliament in the common 
foreign and security policy, for enhancing its legisla-
tive powers, for making other areas subject to its 
assent and for involving it in the investiture of the 
Commission. These same principles obviously apply 
to the Community's finances: 
(i) the desire for greater democracy must surely con-
cern the budget: it is by using their influence on the 
budget that parliamentary regimes have enhanced 
their authority; 
(ii) the quest for greater effectiveness has three clear 
implications: 
the need to make the budget procedure less cumber-
some and to consolidate the rules; 
the need to strike a comprehensive institutional bal-
ance between the Council and Parliament, weighted 
differently in three different areas: greater influence 
for the Council in determining the 'tax law'; evenly 
shared decision-making powers for defining and 
managing the financial perspective; the final say for 
Parliament in the annual budget procedure; 
more scope for the Commission, which is responsible 
for implementing the budget, to influence budgetary 
and financial procedures. 
(d) The proposal for the revision of the financial 
provisions is concerned only with procedures and has 
no bearing on the size of the Community budget for 
the post-1992 period. 
11. Proposed provisions 
(a) Own resources 
The Community would be financed solely from own 
resources, which guarantee it financial autonomy and 
could take the form of Community taxes. There 
would be a clear statement of the obligation for the 
Member States to provide the Community with suffi-
cient own resources. The Decision laying down the 
nature of the own resources and setting a ceiling 
would be ratified by national parliaments as at pres-
ent, but after a conciliation procedure between the 
Council and Parliament. 
The Treaty would stipulate that the Decision must 
lay down the conditions for calling in own resources, 
while leaving open the possibility that, once the con-
ditions were met, a connection might be made 
between the use made by the budgetary authority of 
its right of initiative over expenditure and the rate of 
a Community tax. This could be the subject of a dec-
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laration annexed to the Treaty which would be bind-
ing on the institutions. 
In the annual budget procedure the two arms of the 
budgetary authority would vote on both revenue and 
expenditure, but would have to comply with the 
provisions of the own resources Decision. 
(b) The financial perspective and budgetary 
discipline 
The principle of a financial perspective setting ceil-
ings for various categories of expenditure within a 
coherent financial framework would be enshrined in 
the Treaty. This instrument would be drawn up, man-
aged and revised in accordance with an Interinstitu-
tional Agreement (or a Decision) adopted by the 
Council and Parliament by a qualified majority; 
however, the text of the Agreement (or Decision) 
would not be allowed to depart from the Commis-
sion's original proposal without the Commission's 
consent, unless the Council was unanimous. 
(c) Budget procedure 
The draft budget would be drawn up by the Commis-
sion. It would be adopted at first reading by Parlia-
ment then transmitted to the Council for a single 
reading. Parliament would then have the last say. 
Binding deadlines would be set for the various stages 
of the procedure. 
The procedure would offer guarantees to both the 
Council and the Commission. 
The Council would have the power to initiate a con-
ciliation procedure. If this procedure were to produce 
agreement, Parliament could then adopt the agreed 
budget by a simple majority. Otherwise, it would 
have to muster a qualified majority in order to amend 
the budget as passed by the Council. If Parliament 
failed to take a decision within the time allowed, the 
draft budget adopted by the Conciliation Committee, 
or, failing this, the budget emerging from the Council 
reading, would be deemed to be adopted. 
The Commission could object to amendments envis-
aged by Parliament, in particular if it wished to 
ensure that the appropriations required to cover 
expenditure resulting from Council decisions were 
actually available. To defeat this opposition, Parlia-
ment would have to produce an augmented qualified 
majority. 
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The concept of 'compulsory expenditure' would 
remain but would not entail any difference in the 
powers of the two arms of the budgetary authority. 
The Commission would have the means to ensure 
that sufficient appropriations were set aside for this 
type of expenditure. 
(d) The universality of the budget 
The main priority is to include the EDF in the budget 
with effect from the next renewal in 1995. 
The next step would be to include borrowing and 
lending operations in the budget; the ceilings would 
be authorized by the budgetary authority without pre-
judice to the provisions of the basic regulations. It is 
hardly logical to restrict the budgetary authority's role 
to authorizing the provision of a budget guarantee 
when the growth in loans to non-member countries 
means that the risk is becoming less and less hypo-
thetical. 
* :!· 
Commentary 
Introduction 
Two of the aims of the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence are to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of 
the Community's decision-making structures and to 
increase the effectiveness of the institutions and the 
decision-making process. These aims also apply to 
the system of Community finances. With this in 
mind, the Commission suggested in its opinion of 21 
October 1990 that discussion be concentrated on the 
following specific areas: 
(i) increasing Parliament's powers and responsibili-
ties by giving it some influence over revenue; 
(ii) establishing a (new) interinstitutional balance; 
(iii) incorporating the principles of budgetary disci-
pline into the EEC Treaty; 
(iv) reconsidering the distinction between compul-
sory and non-compulsory expenditure. 
The Commission based its opinion on the realization 
that the legal and political framework for decisions 
166 
on the Community's finances changed considerably 
in the 1970s and 1980s from that originally laid down 
in the Treaty. 
The most significant developments have been the 
Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 June 1988 and the 
Council Decisions of 24 June 1988 on the system of 
the Communities' own resources and on budgetary 
discipline which implemented it. 
Without anticipating the detailed reports on the 
implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement, 
the Decision on own resources and the borrowing 
and lending operations to be presented by the Com-
mission by the end of 1991, it is safe to say that the 
new system of own resources and the budgetary dis-
cipline based on the Interinstitutional Agreement are 
now regarded as established Community practice. 
They should therefore be accorded their rightful place 
and incorporated into the Treaty itself. 
In enshrining these principles in the Treaty, the over-
riding aim must be to take into account the two hori-
zontal objectives of the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence, namely democratic legitimacy and increased 
efficiency, without calling into question the operation 
of the present system of own resources. 
Article 199 (unity and balance of the budget) 
I. The budget is the expression of the financial activ-
ities of the Community and as such should express 
the unity of the Community's activities. It should 
therefore incorporate the activities of the European 
Development Fund and borrowing and lending 
activities. The EDF could be included from 1995 
(when the present allocation of resources to the 
seventh EDF expires). 
Consequently the new Article 199 stipulates that the 
EDF falls within the budget; a 'transitional arrange-
ment' will have to be introduced into the 'treaty mod-
ifying certain financial arrangements' in order to spe-
cify that budgetization shall only take effect with the 
eighth EDF, foreseen in the course of the 1995 exer-
cise. 
However, it will no longer be necessary to make spe-
cific reference to the European Social Fund, since all 
the structural Funds are automatically included in the 
Community budget. 
It would be theoretically possible to include the 
ECSC operating budget in the general Community 
budget. However, because of its different system of 
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financing and the fact that the ECSC Treaty expires 
. in 2002, such a move would be of little practical 
value. 
2. The unity and balance of the budget is not 
affected by the type of revenue. Provisions on the 
sources of revenue and the (limited) possibilities for 
raising loans are therefore laid down in Articles 200 
and 203a. 
However, it must be made clear that budget decisions 
cover estimates and approval of both revenue and 
expenditure. 
Article 200 (own resources) 
I. At its meeting on 14 and 15 December 1990, the 
European Council stressed that all the resources 
needed to achieve the objectives of political union -
within the framework laid down by the Intergovern-
mental Conference - and the implementation of 
Community policies must be made available. Since 
the reform of the Community's finances by the Deci-
sion of 21 April 1970, it is generally agreed that the 
Community's activities should no longer be financed 
from contributions by the Member States - as ori-
ginally provided in the EEC Treaty- but by its 'own 
resources'. The Council Decision of 24 June 1988 
increased the number of resources to four. The fourth 
resource, which is linked to the GNP of Member 
States, not only serves to cover an increase in finan-
cial requirements but is also designed to make con-
tributions fairer by linking them to Member States' 
ability to pay. 
2. The system of own resources should be retained. 
In fact, only the frrst two resources laid down in the 
1988 Decision are by nature 'own' resources; how-
ever, these two sources of revenue can be expected to 
become less and less significant. It will therefore be 
appropriate to strengthen the 'own' aspect, namely 
the 'community' aspect of all resources. Moreover, it 
seems desirable for any new decision on own 
resources to introduce at least in principle a new 
source of revenue which might also take the form of 
a Community tax. 
3. However, the Intergovernmental Conference need 
not decide on the form these resources would take 
nor on their number. It will be enough to lay down in 
the Treaty the procedure for adopting own resources 
decisions. Consideration should be given here to the 
growing integration of the Community and the aims 
of the Intergovernmental Conference. 
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Parliament should therefore be given greater influ-
ence over own resources decisions, without diminish-
ing the role of the Member States, which have trans-
ferred their responsibilities to the Community and are 
therefore responsible for providing it with adequate 
financial resources. Giving Parliament joint responsi-
bility for all revenue is a more effective way of streng-
thening democratic legitimacy than giving it specific 
powers for a single (additional) resource. This solu-
tion also seems to fit in better with the present system 
and is more practical from the point of view of the 
unity of the budget (Article 199) and budgetary dis-
cipline with its ceilings applicable to all the institu-
tions (Article 201 ). 
Other questions can also be left to a new own-
resources decision, such as its period of validity, the 
assessment base, the maximum rate and the detailed 
rules for calling in individual resources. In the inter-
ests of the Community's stability, the own resources 
at its disposal should be fixed for a longer period, 
extending beyond the financial perspective (see 
Article 20 I). 
However, agreement could be sought on making an 
explicit connection between Parliament's right of ini-
tiative in budgetary matters and the fixing of a call-in 
rate for a given source of revenue. The Commission 
could put forward concrete proposals to this effect 
within the context of the report [on the operation of 
the system of own resources] which it will submit by 
the end of 1991. 
4. Since the Community cannot operate without own 
resources, a decision on own resources should remain 
in force until it is replaced by a new one. A similar 
arrangement is laid down in the Decision of 24 June 
1988. 
Article 201 (medium-term financial planning) 
I. The most important lesson to be learned from the 
application of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 
June 1988 is that the introduction of a binding 
medium-term financial plan makes it possible to 
enforce strict budgetary discipline and is a useful way 
of achieving reliability and avoiding conflict in the 
establishment and implementation of the Com-
munity budget. The basic features of budgetary dis-
cipline should therefore be enshrined in the Treaty 
itself. The essential element is medium-term financial 
planning (covering a period of four to five years).lt is 
an attempt to reconcile forecast expenditure and 
expected revenue and to set compulsory ceilings for 
each budget year and for each category of expendi-
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ture. These upper limits provide a framework within 
which the annual budget is established. 
2. Only the basic features of budgetary discipline 
and the procedure for establishing the financial per-
spective, including the principle of the inclusion of a 
reserve for unforeseen expenditure, need to be laid 
down in the Treaty. On the other hand the details (in 
particular the division of expenditure into categories, 
setting of ceilings, the period of validity of the finan-
cial perspective, conditions and procedure for the 
amendment and renewal of the financial perspective, 
etc.) can be decided, on the basis of a Commission 
proposal, by an Interinstitutional Agreement or a 
decision. 
Only in this way can the necessary flexibility be guar-
anteed, since the lnterinstitutional Agreement or 
decision can then make adjustments to account for 
changing circumstances without the need for amend-
ments to the Treaty. However, in drawing up a new 
Interinstitutional Agreement or decision, care must 
be taken to ensure that adequate procedures are 
introduced for adjusting the financial perspective to 
changing circumstances and that the reserve for 
unforeseen expenditure can be used for its intended 
purpose. 
Leaving these details to be decided by an Interinstitu-
tional Agreement will provide the best guarantee that 
the widest possible consensus is reached between the 
three institutions and that all three keep to the agree-
ment in the establishment and implementation of the 
budget. In this respect, the Agreement of 29 June 
1988 has proved successful. 
Since the financial perspective offers the Council suf-
ficient guarantees, the institutional balance can be 
tipped in Parliament's favour at the next stage (estab-
lishment of the budget). 
3. Medium-term financial planning should be 
approached in the same way as the decision on own 
resources: the financial perspective, once fixed, 
should remain valid until a new perspective takes 
effect. Otherwise at the end of the last year of the 
financial perspective the volume of credits would be 
fixed by the annual budgetary procedure. 
Article 201a (medium-term financial planning 
and budgetary discipline) 
I. Parliament has wider powers over the budget than 
over legislation. With the budget, Parliament can take 
the initiative in entering items and determining avail-
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able resources to fund them, whereas the Council 
broadly determines the content of legal instruments. 
There is therefore a need to define the connection 
between the adoption of legal instruments having a 
financial impact and their implementation in the 
budget. The aim here must be to ensure that budget-
ary discipline - binding on both institutions - is 
not breached, without at the same time eroding the 
legal powers of either institution. 
2. These proposals do not affect the existing balance 
between the legislative authority and the budgetary 
authority. Article 22 of the Financial Regulation 
already contains the provision that the implementa-
tion of appropriations entered for significant Com-
munity action shall require a basic act. 
However, it is proposed to raise the provision of 
Article 16 of the Decision of 24 June 1988 on budget-
ary discipline to the level of a Treaty provision. 
Article 203 (budgetary procedure) 
I. Since 1975, budget procedure has in practice been 
moving steadily further away from what the Treaty 
originally prescribed: 
(i) since 1975, a new- more realistic- timetable 
has been followed; 
(ii) ever since the Interinstitutional Agreement intro-
duced medium-term financial planning and since 
budgetary discipline has entailed meeting the condi-
tions of the financial perspective for the various cat-
egories of expenditure, the distinction between com-
pulsory and non-compulsory expenditure has 
counted for much less. But the current wording of 
Article 203 still makes much of the distinction; 
(iii) the need to fix a maximum rate of increase for 
non-compulsory expenditure (Article 203{9)) has 
been overtaken by the binding conditions imposed 
by the financial perspective. 
Key basic decisions for establishing the budget now 
derive from the decision-making procedure for 
medium-term financial planning. At the same time 
the annual budgetary procedure has been stream-
lined. The EEC Treaty as it stands does not clearly 
specify whether, when the two arms of the budgetary 
authority together determine expenditure, they are to 
act likewise regarding revenue. 
The annual budget procedure constitutes the third 
and most concrete stage in the financial planning 
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system. At the first stage the overall volume of avail-
able funds is defined by determining own resources. 
At the second stage, in the medium-term financial 
planning process, binding ceilings for specific catego-
ries of expenditure are set for each financial year 
within the bounds of available revenue. At the third 
stage precise sums are allotted to individual areas of 
Community activity (expressed as budget entries) 
within the previously defined margins. 
2. The proposal is now that, while Parliament is to 
have a role to play, the Member States should retain 
their broad power of decision on own resources; the 
decision on own resources will still have to be ratified 
in future. At the medium-term financial planning 
stage provision has been made for genuine eo-deci-
sion by the Council and Parliament. 
With the fixing of binding upper limits both on own 
resources and on the various categories of expendi-
ture, the Member States have an adequate guarantee 
that these limits will not be exceeded in the annual 
budget procedure. 
Given that one of the objectives of the Intergovern-
mental Conference is to strengthen democratic legiti-
macy and that the power to approve the budget is 
one of the traditional powers of any parliament, it is 
clear that Parliament's position in the budget proce-
dure needs to be enhanced. The easiest way to do this 
would be to abandon the rather blurred distinction 
between compulsory and non-compulsory expendi-
ture, which, moreover, has been largely superseded 
with the rising importance of medium-term financial 
planning. 
The consequence is that Parliament will now have 
the last word for all expenditure, subject to the con-
straints of budgetary discipline. The Council would, 
then, in the new situation, consider the draft budget 
after Parliament, so that it can take account of Parlia-
ment's position in its deliberations. 
The actual content of the budget (entry of items and 
allocation of specific amounts) has a considerable 
impact on the performance of the tasks entrusted to 
the Community. The Commission is directly affected 
for it has the right to propose legislation, it is the 
institution which executes the Community's budget 
and has the task of defending the Community 
interest. It should therefore have the possibility of 
acting to ensure that the Community always dis-
charges its legal obligation to meet expenditure and 
that non-compulsory new expenditure does not 
exceed the limits of budgetary discipline and own 
resources. 
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3. The budget procedure can be considerably stream-
lined by introducing the following procedure: 
(i) the draft budget is drawn up by the Commission; 
(ii) the draft is transmitted direct to Parliament, 
which takes a position at first reading and, where 
appropriate, proposes amendments. These amend-
ments can relate to expenditure described hitherto 
either as non-compulsory (giving rise to 'amend-
ments') or as compulsory (giving rise to 'proposed 
modifications'). In future, therefore, the institutions 
will still have to agree on a demarcation between 
these two categories although they could modify to a 
certain extent that contained in the Joint Declaration 
of30 June 1982; 
(iii) the Council gives its opinion at a single reading 
of the Commission's draft and Parliament's proposed 
amendments; 
(iv) the draft is returned to Parliament for formal 
adoption or, failing agreement, for a final decision at 
second reading. 
A precise time-limit should be set in the Treaty for 
each individual stage, as it has been in the proposals 
for changes to the legislative cooperation procedure. 
However, it does not appear essential to lay down a 
new timetable for the budget procedure in the Treaty. 
This can be done in the Financial Regulation, so as 
to provide more flexibility. 
The budget procedure should lead to the broadest 
possible agreement between the two arms of the 
budgetary authority and the Commission. To avoid 
any stalling of the budget procedure, it should be 
stipulated that if necessary one institution can ulti-
mately prevail over the views of the other institu-
tions; in this case the last word would rest with the 
Parliament. To give the other institutions a guarantee 
that their views will be taken into account in the 
event of disagreement, the Decision would have to be 
adopted by a greater majority. 
4. In order to secure the widest possible agreement 
between the two arms of the budgetary authority, 
with no risk of holding the budget up, a conciliation 
procedure between the Council and Parliament is 
provided for. It is to be initiated by the Council if the 
budget passed at the close of the Council reading is 
different from the budget passed at Parliament's first 
reading. If the conciliation procedure results in an 
agreement, Parliament can then adopt the budget at 
the ensuing second reading by a majority of its mem-
bers or can amend the budget by a qualified majority. 
Should the procedure not result in an agreement, 
then Parliament shall decide upon the budget in the 
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form decided upon by the Council. It may adopt this 
draft by a majority of its members or may amend it 
by a qualified majority. If Parliament fails to take a 
decision within the time allowed, the budget is 
deemed to be adopted in the form in which it was 
sent to the Parliament. 
The composition of the Conciliation Committee 
must be such that both arms of the budgetary auth-
ority are appropriately represented. This applies parti-
cularly to the Council, to which the results of the 
conciliation are transmitted for approval, although it 
has no formal second reading. From this it follows 
that the Committee should be made up of one repre-
sentative for each Member State and an equal num-
ber of representatives of Parliament; Parliament's 
representatives would be taken from the groups in 
proportion to their relative size, in order to secure 
optimum representation of its membership. The 
Commission should play an advisory role in the work 
of the Committee, so that it can perform its task as 
the guardian of Community interest. 
5. In the context of the new budgetary procedure 
proposed in Article 203, the Commission considers 
that it is essential as far as existing obligatory 
expenditure is concerned that the budgetary authority 
should be bound to make available the budgetary 
resources which the Commission considers necessary 
in order to meet the expenditure decided by the 
Council. 
The most appropriate way of ensuring this would be 
by a Joint Declaration of the three institutions 
annexed to the Treaty amendments agreed at the 
IGC and to be incorporated subseq~ently in any 
future Interinstitutional Agreement. In that Joint 
Declaration the two arms of the budgetary authority 
would commit themselves to making available the 
necessary budgetary resources and the Commission 
would commit itself to proposing the necessary cre-
dits and to drawing the attention of the budgetary 
authority to their obligations in this regard including 
by means of its right of objection under Article 
203(4). 
6. Parliament retains its right to reject the draft 
budget by a qualified majority if there are important 
reasons. The Commission must then present a new 
draft budget. This launches a new budgetary proce-
dure under which the time-limits for the individual 
stages are halved. 
7. The decision on the budget covers both expendi-
ture and revenue at the same time (see point I 
above). The decision on revenue must comply with 
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the provisions of the own resources decision on the 
calling-in of the individual sources of revenue. If 
there is a margin available within the framework 
provided, the budgetary authority may also amend 
the volume of the various sources of revenue called 
in to finance foreseeable expenditure. 
8. Since the budget must also keep within the frame-
work of medium-term financial planning, any 
amendment to the financial perspective must nor-
mally be carried out before the start of the budgetary 
procedure in accordance with the conditions laid 
down (see comments on Article 201). 
Article 203a (borrowing and lending) 
The Community already resorts to borrowing, but 
only in specific areas and in order to finance loans. 
The Community's borrowing activity will increase 
considerably with economic and monetary union and 
the internationally coordinated aid measures for 
other European countries. 
Borrowing represents a special type of Community 
revenue and is therefore covered by the general provi-
sions of the Treaty, in particular Article 199. How-
ever, in accordance with the proposals drawn up by 
the Commission in the context of EMU, borrowing is 
not meant to finance the general budget (exclusion of 
deficit-spending). The volume and purpose of bor-
rowings are to be decided case by case. The corres-
ponding borrowing and lending activities are to be 
listed separately in the budget. Moreover, each time 
that the Community considers it necessary to have 
recourse to a borrowing/lending instrument a specific 
legal base must be adopted according to the appro-
priate legislative procedure. 
EEC guarantees, on the other hand, which include 
both: 
(a) guarantees in connection with Community instru-
ments (under which the Community borrows funds 
to grant loans); and 
(b) guarantees on behalf of third parties (such as the 
EIB or other bodies which grant loans from their 
resources); 
are still to be given a token entry in the budget as 
potentially 'normal' expenditure to cover the even-
tuality of the Community having to act on its guaran-
tee if a debtor defaults. 
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The guarantee referred to at (b) therefore raises the 
specific problem of assessing and containing the risk 
arising for the Community budget. 
The horizontal rule proposed would obviate the need 
for the specific rule for economic and monetary 
union contained in Commission working paper 
SEC(90) 2500. 
Article 204 (provisional twelfths) 
The existing text should be brought into line with the 
new Article 203 since the distinction between com-
pulsory and non-compulsory expenditure has been 
abolished and Parliament has been given the final 
decision on all expenditure. 
Article 206 (Court of Auditors) 
The proposed amendment satisfies the wishes of Par-
liament and the Court of Auditors. 
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Article 207 (use of the ecu) 
I. The proposed amendment takes account of the 
fact that the ecu is gradually becoming a standard 
unit and general means of payment in dealings 
between the Community and its Member States and 
in the drafting and implementation of the Com-
munity budget. This is consistent with efforts towards 
economic and monetary union. 
2. The final paragraph of the old Article 207 is no 
longer relevant since the general provisions apply to 
the administration of the European Social Fund. 
Article 209 (Financial Regulation) 
The proposed amendments to the decision-making 
procedure, designed to strengthen democratic legiti-
macy and increase efficiency (qualified majority in 
the Council, consent of Parliament), extend to the 
Financial Regulation and the rules for implementa-
tion of the own-resources decision. Introducing the 
same procedures at subsidiary levels is consistent 
with the system. 
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Proposed new budgetary procedure 
• 
Commission draft 
I 
r 
Parliament first reading I Commission objection to: 
· reduction of CE 
·increase in NCE? 
no yes 
rejected by 
majority of 
members and 
2/3 ofvotes 
simple majority majority of mem-bers and 3/5 of votes 
I J. 
l Council reading J 
qualified 
yes majority for 
amendment ? 
Conciliation procedure 
no 
J agreement? budget as adopted by 1 yes -l Parliament I no 
+ on first 
rea din 
Parliament second reading 
I I I ,--------:1:::_-------__:i--T-------1 
rejected by accepted by modified by accepted by 
majority of majority/ no majority of majority/ no 
members and decision with- members and decision with-
2/3 of votes in time-limit 2/3 of votes in time-limit 
I 
+_ t j_ 
budget as budget as 
adopted by budget as 
adopted by EPon 2nd adopted by Council +EB 
reading Council 
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Structure of the draft treaty on the Union 
Draft text 
Contents 
Treaty on ... union 
Principles 
Union citizenship 
Union policies 
• External policy t 
• [Union policy on home affairs and judicial cooper-
ation) 
The institutions of the Union 
General and final provisions 
Provisions amending the ECSC Treaty 
Provisions amending the Euratom Treaty 
Principles 
Article A 
Unchanged. 
Article B 
The Union shall take the place of the European 
Communities as established by the Treaties establish-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
European Economic Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community and subsequent treaties 
and acts modifying or supplementing them; they con-
stitute the original nucleus of the Community edifice 
and their federal vocation is thus confirmed. 
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Article C 
I. The Union shall have as its task to organize, 
according to principles of consistency and solidarity, 
relations as a whole among its Member States and 
their peoples and to achieve their gradual progress 
towards ever closer association. 
2. (Set out Union objectives based on Article 2 of the 
EEC Treaty, as updated by the SEA, together with 
those of EMU and common foreign and security 
policy. (Article A(2) on p. 76 of the Presidency draft) 
3. The Union shall have the resources needed to attain 
the objectives it has set itself and to carry through the 
policies to that end. (Rome 11) 
4. Moreover, the Member States of the Union shall 
provide mutual assistance in all circumstances where 
the interests of any of them are threatened. 
Article D 
I. Unchanged. 
2. [See Presidency text but spell out its scope] 
3. [Possibility of a provision on subsidiarity (see 
Article B on p. 14 of the Presidency draft}, subject to 
the outcome of negotiations, particularly on Article 
235) 
Article Da 
[List Union activities, taken over from Article 3 of the 
EEC Treaty, as updated by the SEA, together with 
those of EMU and common foreign and security 
policy) 
1 Common foreign and security policy, commercial and 
economic policy, and development cooperation policy 
(including association of OCTs). 
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Article E 
[Article 4 of the EEC Treaty, listing the institutions 
and other bodies but adding the European Council 
and the Central Bank] 
Article F 
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty 
NB: Articles 6, 8a, 8b and Se of the EEC Treaty to be 
reviewed. 
Union citizenship 
Presidency text, subject to points under discussion at 
the Conference, in conjunction with Article 7 of the 
EEC Treaty. 
Union policies 
TITLE X 
The external policy of the Union 
Article 
I. The purpose of the external policy of the Union is to 
secure the coherence of the whole of the Community's 
external activities in the framework of its foreign, secur-
ity, economic and development policies. (Rome II) 
2. [Article B(2) on p. 77 of the Presidency draft 
unchanged, except for replacing 'Community' by 
'Union'] 
Chapter I 
Common foreign and security policy 
Article A 
I. The Union shall define and implement a common 
foreign and security policy ... (rest unchanged). 
2. Moved to Article C2, above. 
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Article B 
I. Unchanged. 
2. Moved to new Article above. 
Article C 
Unchanged. 
Article D 
I. Unchanged. 
2. The Political Committee, composed of the heads 
of the political departments of the Member States 
and of the Commission shall have as its tasks: ... (rest 
unchanged). 
3. Council proceedings and decisions shall be prepared 
and their implementation monitored by the General 
Secretariat of the Council, cooperating in organized 
fashion with the Commission. 
The Commission shall participate fully in the work 
carried out in the common foreign and security 
policy field. 
4. Unchanged. 
Articles E, F, G, Hand I 
Unchanged, subject to current negotiations. 
Articles J and K 
Replace 'joint action' by 'Union action'. 
Article L 
Unchanged, subject to current negotiations. 
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Articles M to P(general provisions) 
The Commission considers that Article N should be 
reviewed in the light of changes made to other arti-
cles. 
Article 228a applies to the conclusion of international 
agreements under the common foreign and security 
policy. 
Chapter II 
Commercial policy and external 
economic policy 
The Commission reminds the Conference that it has 
proposed an amended version of the existing Treaty 
articles for insertion in this Chapter. 
Article 228 applies to the conclusion of international 
agreements in areas covered by this Chapter. 
Chapter Ill 
Development cooperation policy 
The Commission reminds the Conference that it has 
proposed a set of provisions to govern this policy and 
give it an explicit legal basis in the Treaty. 
Article 228 applies to the conclusion of international 
agreements in areas covered by this Chapter. 
Chapter IV 
'Multidimensional' agreements 
Article 228b applies to the conclusion of agreements 
in areas covered both by the common foreign and 
security policy and by other Union policies. 
General and final provisions 
Article 223 
The Commission reminds the Conference that it has 
proposed that this Article be deleted. 
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Article 228 
Presidency draft, pp. 69 and 70. 
Article 228a 
[Provisions derogating from the Article 228 procedure 
as regards the conclusion of agreements relating to 
the common foreign and security policy] 
Article 228b 
[Provisions derogating from the Article 228 procedure 
as regards the conclusion of agreements relating to 
common foreign and security policy and to areas 
covered by other Union policies ('multidimensional' 
agreements)] 
Article 228c 
I. In areas to which the procedure of Article 228 
applies, the Union shall be represented by the Com-
mission in relations with non-member countries and 
in international organizations and conferences. 
2. For all questions of specific interest to the Union, 
without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter I, the 
Member States shall act jointly in international 
organizations and conferences. To this end, the Com-
mission shall present proposals relating to the scope 
and implementation of such joint action to the Coun-
cil, which shall act by a qualified majority. 
Explanatory memorandum 
I. The Dublin and Rome European Councils, res-
ponding among other things to initiatives by Mr 
Kohl and Mr Mitterrand, declared the intention of 
transforming the Community into a European 
Union, and of developing its political dimension, 
notably on the international scene. The Commission 
considers that the Intergovernmental Conference 
should be guided by the basic thinking which has 
been behind the construction of Europe (or 40 years 
now, namely that all progress made towards econ-
omic, monetary, social or political integration should 
gradually be brought together in a single Community 
as the precursor of a European Union. 
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This being so, it is somewhat paradoxical that the 
current trend in the Intergovernmental Conference 
favours a kind of revision of the Treaty of Rome that 
would depart from this general unification process 
and keep the Community no longer as the focal point 
but simply as one entity among others in a political 
union with ill-defined objectives and a variety of 
institutional schemes. 
True enough, the Intergovernmental Conference is 
faced with the difficult task of generating a consensus 
on a common foreign and security policy at a time 
when the 12 Member States are faced with a series of 
challenges on the world scene. 
It is equally true that the foreign and security policy 
will undoubtedly involve adjustments to the way in 
which common decisions are prepared and imple-
mented and confer an eminent role on the European 
Council. 
But in this area, as with EMU, where a new institu-
tion is also to be established, this adjustment to the 
Community approach cannot be allowed to go so far 
as to break up the existing model, which has demon-
strated its dynamism and efficiency. 
2. In its instructions to the Intergovernmental Con-
ference, the Rome European Council laid emphasis 
on 'the vocation of the Union to deal with aspects of 
foreign and security policy, in accordance with a sus-
tained evolutive process and in a unitary manner, on 
the basis of general objectives laid down in the 
Treaty' as a fundamental principle. It was on this 
basis that the Commission supported a single Treaty. 
Yet the structure of the draft Articles presented by the 
Luxembourg Presidency on 15 April highlights the 
risk that the Conference will depart from this basic 
orientation. 
In that draft foreign and security policy is conceived 
and defined as standing alone as a separate pillar of 
the general structure. It is fully separated from all 
other policies, described as Community policies. A 
third pillar, also to be set up alongside the Com-
munity, is also envisaged as consisting of 'home 
affairs and judicial cooperation'. These new entities 
are attached to the Community only artificially and 
only under the heading of a political union which, in 
Article B(2), gives equal but separate status to the 
Community, foreign and security policy and coopera-
tion. This jeopardizes the Rome European Council's 
avowed objective of securing 'coherence of the over-
all external action of the Community in the frame-
work of its foreign, security, economic and develop-
ment policies'. 
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3. Following the guidelines set by the European 
Council, the Commission stands by the view set out 
in its opinion of 21 October 1990 that the main, 
indeed the central, objective of transforming the 
Community into a European Union should be to 
ensure the unity, the consistency and, as a result, the 
efficiency of its international activities. It is, of 
course, clear that a common foreign and security 
policy is a sui generis policy that can be implemented 
only gradually; but it is not possible to affirm the 
identity of the Union and the consistency of its inter-
national personality simply by adding a foreign and 
security policy to existing policies. The reality of 
international life makes clear how closely political 
relations, extending from external security to compli-
ance with human rights, are related to economic poli-
cies. This consistency can be guaranteed in full only 
if the construction of the Community is conceived on 
a unitary base. Consequently, there can be no ques-
tion of grafting the Union concept onto the existing 
Treaty; the Union must absorb the Community and 
all that it has achieved. 
4. The Commission accordingly proposes that the 
Presidency draft be amended on a number of points 
which are essential if objectives defined by the Euro-
pean Council are to be achieved. In particular: 
(a) the external policy of the Union can be made 
efficient and coherent by: 
(i) the existence of institutional machinery for the prep-
aration and implementation of Union decisions in 
the common foreign and security policy area; 
(ii) strengthening the existing external policies - a 
redefined common commercial policy; cooperation 
with European countries to be written into the Trea-
ties; likewise for developing countries; 
(iii) a clear statement of the Union's international 
identity in terms of its treaty-making power in areas 
within its general jurisdiction, particularly, of course, 
in relation to its common foreign and security policy 
and its presence on the international scene; 
(b) the unitary character of the European construc-
tion should be reflected in the structure of the Treaty: 
(i) by combining in the introductory articles all the 
foundations and objectives of the Union, both those 
already covered by the existing Community, includ-
ing the single market, and those of economic and 
monetary union and of the new foreign and security 
policy; 
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(ii) placing in this first part of the Treaty both the 
provisions for the Union institutions and the concept 
of Union citizenship, with the rights and obligations 
pertaining to it. 
The few proposed amendments to the Presidency 
draft annexed to this paper chiefly concern the struc-
ture of certain parts of the Treaty and affect the texts 
of the relevant articles only in so far as is strictly 
necessary. 
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Consultative Committee of Regional and Local 
Authorities 
Draft text 
Chapter4 
The Committee of Regional and 
Local Authorities 
Article 198a(new) 
I. A Committee of Regional and Local Authorities 
shall be attached to the Commission. It shall have 
consultative status. 
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected 
representatives at regional or local level. They shall 
be appointed in their personal capacity and shall not 
be bound by any mandate. 
3. The number of members of the Committee shall 
be as follows: 
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Denmark .......................... 5 
Germany ...... , ................... 24 
Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Spain ............................. 18 
France ............................ 24 
Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Italy .............................. 24 
Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
United Kingdom .................. 24 I 
4. Each Member State shall appoint the number of 
members of the Committee to which it is entitled pur-
suant to paragraph 3 for four years following consul-
tation with the national representative bodies of the 
regions and local authorities. 
The mandate of members of the Committee may be 
renewed. 
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Article 198b(new) 
I. The Committee shall elect its chairman and offi-
cers. 
2. The Committee shall adopt its rules of procedure. 
It may set up specialized sections or working parties. 
Article 198c(new) 
I. The Committee may be consulted by the Commis-
sion on any matter concerning regional development 
and in particular on the preparation and implementa-
tion of the regional policy of the Union, including 
the regional and local implications of the other poli-
cies of the Union. 
2. The Commission. shall consult the Committee on 
all draft proposals .for laws concerning the regional 
policy of the Union, as defined in paragraph I. 
The Commission shall, if it considers it necessary, set 
the Committee a time-limit which may not be less 
than one month from the date on which the Chair-
man receives notification to this effect. Upon expiry 
of the time-limit, the absence of an opinion shall not 
prevent further action. 
3. The Commission may publish the opinions of the 
Committee. 
The Committee shall be informed by the Commis-
sion of the action taken on its opinions. 
!!· * 
Explanatory memorandum 
I. The European Council meeting in Rome on 14 
and 15 December 1990 noted the importance which 
1 Total: 155. 
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some Member States attach to the adoption of 
arrangements that take account of the special com-
petence of regional or local institutions as regards 
certain Community policies and the need to consider 
suitable procedures for the consultation of such insti-
tutions. 
The Commission's opm1on of 21 October 1990 
stressed the usefulness of the establishment of a con-
sultative representative body for the regions. 
In its resolution of 22 November 1990 on the Inter-
governmental Conferences, Parliament advocated 
setting up a committee of the regional and local auth-
orities of the Community with consultative status 
composed of elected representatives of the regions 
and municipalities of the Community. 
2. The Commission considers that the Treaty should 
contain provision for the regional and other local 
authorities to be represented through a specific con-
sultative body based on the existing Consultative 
Council of Regional and Local Authorities, set up by 
Commission Decision 88/487 /EEC of 24 June 
1988. I Like that Council, the body would consist of 
elected members of those authorities and would give 
its opinions on all matters concerning regional 
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development and on the regional or local implica-
tions of any Community policy. 
To take account of the variety of regional and local 
structures in the Member States, the members of the 
Committee will be appointed from among elected 
regional or local members by the Member States, fol-
lowing consultation with national representative bod-
ies. 2 The composition of the Committee reflects the 
breakdown among the Member States adopted in the 
case of Parliament (Article 138 EEC). Naturally, dif-
ferent figures could be used if those chosen pose 
particular difficulties for any Member State. 
Once set up, the Committee would advise the Com-
mission, which could refer matters to it whenever 
necessary. Consultation would be compulsory in the 
case of proposals for laws in the field of regional 
policy in the broad sense. 
The Committee would enjoy a certain autonomy in 
that it could issue opinions on its own initiative and 
would be free to adopt its own organization within its 
rules of procedure, for example by setting up special-
ized sections or working parties. 
Periodically, perhaps twice a year, the Commission 
could hold joint working meetings with the Com-
mittee. 
I OJ L 247, 6. 9. 1988, p. 23. 
Such as the national sections of the Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions, which exist in a number of 
Member States, or similar bodies (e.g. the Local Govern-
ment International Bureau in the United Kingdom). 
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